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 For nearly twenty years, federal judges were required to strictly adhere to the 
federal sentencing guidelines (‘the Guidelines”), which calculated sentences based on 
the offender’s current offense level and his or her prior offense history, and which 
tightly controlled which aggravating and mitigating factors could be considered.  
However, the U.S. Supreme Court effectively altered the course of federal sentencing 
with its decision in Booker/Fanfan in 2005, which made the Guidelines advisory; 
although judges are still required to consider the Guidelines and to provide reasons 
for departing from their recommendations, Booker has minimized the concern for 
appellate interference and, as such, has presumably opened the door for increased 
judicial discretion.  The current dissertation examines the impact of the Supreme 
Court’s decision and extends prior work by paying particular attention to its effect on 
 
drug and immigration offenses and by incorporating unique dynamic measures to 
examine contextual changes over time. 
 Because Booker provides a natural experiment, a quasi-experimental pre-test 
post-test design is employed to examine the decision’s impact, with separate models 
estimated for the full study period (2000-2008), the pre- and post-Booker periods, and 
each quarter in the study period.  In addition, the impact of the decision is examined 
both through individual-level models, which focus on the role of offense and offender 
characteristics, and multilevel models, which more closely investigate how Booker’s 
impact may be contextualized by district-level factors. 
 The results provide very little evidence of a “Booker effect” during the years 
examined; instead, they largely suggest that judges continued to sentence according to 
pre-Booker sentencing patterns.  When noticeable differences were found pre- to 
post-Booker, closer examination of quarterly trends often revealed that shifts occurred 
prior to Booker, during the PROTECT Act period.  However, because there was 
initially a large amount of federal-level confusion regarding the interpretation of 
Booker’s application – subsequent clarification was provided by the Supreme Court 
in Kimbrough and Gall – it is possible that the true effects of Booker became evident 
well after the study period ended.  Future research should expand the types of 
contextual variables included, incorporate qualitative data, and more precisely 
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CHAPTER I: INTRODUCTION 
For nearly twenty years, the federal sentencing guidelines (hereafter, “the 
Guidelines”) required that judges strictly adhere to sentences calculated based on an 
offender’s current offense level and his or her prior offense history, and the 
aggravating and mitigating factors that could be considered in order to arrive at a 
sentence were tightly restricted (Mustard, 2001; Tonry, 1996; USSC, 2006).
1
  This 
was deliberate, as the intended aims of the Guidelines were to reduce judicial 
discretion and, at the same time, to reduce sentencing disparities and lenient 
sentences.  Academics and judges alike criticized the Guidelines for their complexity, 
for their severity, for their limited flexibility and inadequate range of sentencing 
options, and for the possibility that prosecutors would experience increased discretion 
and accordingly be able to manipulate Guidelines sentences (Albonetti, 1997; 
Anderson, Kling, and Stith, 1999; Burns, Elden, and Blanchard, 1997; Frase, 2000; 
Kempf-Leonard and Sample, 2001; Nagel and Schulhofer, 1992; Ruback, 1998; 
Spohn, 2002; Stith and Cabranes, 1998; Tonry, 1996; Weisburg, 2007).   
Still, the Guidelines withstood this criticism as well as numerous challenges 
concerning their Constitutionality, and they became synonymous with federal 
sentencing.  However, the course of federal sentencing was effectively altered in 
2005, when the U.S. Supreme Court decided the Booker/Fanfan cases (hereafter 
“Booker”).  Put simply, Booker changed the process by which sentences could be 
increased beyond the Guidelines range.  Prior to the decision, judges were able to use 
                                                 
1
 As noted by Tonry and Hatlestad (1997: 7-8), “the guidelines are presumptive in the sense that they 
set sentencing standards for individual cases that were presumed to be appropriate and that judges were 




a preponderance of evidence standard to find facts that would increase offenders’ 
sentences (Seghetti and Smith, 2007; USSC, 2006; Yeh and Doyle, 2009).  Booker 
demanded that such facts either be provided by the defendant’s own admission or be 
subjected to a jury using a beyond a reasonable doubt standard.  Not wishing to 
expand the limited role of the jury in the federal system, the Supreme Court instead 
opted to make the Guidelines advisory so that judges could continue to drive federal 
decision-making.
2
  Although judges are still required to consider the Guidelines and 
to provide reasons for departing from their recommendations, Booker has minimized 
the concern for appellate interference and, as such, has presumably opened the door 
for increased judicial discretion. 
The current dissertation addresses the following research questions: 
1. How have sentencing patterns changed since the Supreme Court’s 
decision? 
2. Have disparities in sentencing outcomes (in general, and specifically for 
drug and immigration offenses) increased now that judges are afforded 
greater discretion? 
3. Are crack and powder cocaine cases sentenced more similarly in the post-
Booker period? 
4. How has sentencing in immigration cases changed since Booker? 
5. What role do district-level factors play in sentencing outcomes? 
                                                 
2
 The terms “voluntary” and “advisory” are used somewhat similarly throughout this document.  
However, “advisory” is preferred when discussing the post-Booker federal sentencing guidelines, as 
judges are still required to consult the recommendations of the Guidelines, while “voluntary” 
guidelines, as in some state systems, imply a looser level of judicial adherence. 
3 
 
The obvious questions facing researchers and criminal justice personnel in the 
wake of Booker are what effect it has had on federal sentencing outcomes and 
whether unwarranted disparities have increased now that judges’ decisions are less 
constrained.  Booker provides a unique type of natural experiment in which the 
impact of legitimized judicial discretion can be gauged.  Although a growing body of 
empirical research has investigated the impact of this monumental shift in sentencing 
policy (see Hofer, 2007; Ulmer and Light, 2010; Ulmer, Light, and Kramer, 2011a, 
2011b; USSC, 2006, 2010a, 2012), the current dissertation substantially contributes to 
and extends these studies in a number of key ways.  First, it provides an in-depth and 
longitudinal examination of sentencing trends for drug offenses, with particular 
attention paid to the way crack and powder cocaine cases have been handled over 
time.  Second, because immigration cases represent the fastest growing offense 
category in federal criminal caseloads, the present work examines these cases 
separately and investigates the extent to which inter-district variation in the 
sentencing of these offenses exists and has changed over time.  Third, this dissertation 
reaches beyond typically examined contextual factors to incorporate unique dynamic 
measures that capture changes in district-level demographic factors over time.  
Finally, in addition to making the unique contributions outlined here, the current 
dissertation represents an important effort to independently replicate prior research 
efforts, and the importance of replication should not be underestimated in social 
research (see King, 1995).   
Given that drug cases make up a substantial portion of the federal caseload, in 
addition to historical disparities associated with the sentencing of different types of 
4 
 
drug offenses, there are ample reasons to devote attention to sentencing outcomes for 
federal drug cases.  The current work examines the influence of changing 
demographic factors and other unique contextual measures of interest, such as relative 
district-level drug caseload, on sentencing outcomes for drug offenders over time.  In 
addition, because Booker (and the Supreme Court’s later clarification in Kimbrough) 
left judges freer to depart from the Guidelines in cases specifically involving crack 
cocaine - which were, until very recently, subject to particularly severe and widely 
criticized punishments - the present work also investigates the extent to which the 
sentencing patterns for crack and powder cocaine cases have been altered in the post-
Booker era. 
Due to their expanding share of the federal caseload, immigration offenses 
also warrant a separate examination.  Immigration cases are comprised of a 
demographically different group of offenders than federal sentencing cases more 
generally, and these cases are also likely to benefit from sentencing discounts in the 
form of fast-track departures.
3
  While a growing body of research (e.g., Hartley and 
Armendariz, 2011; Wolfe, Pyrooz, and Spohn, 2011) focuses on the role of 
citizenship status in federal sentencing outcomes, few studies are devoted to 
investigating outcomes for those individuals specifically sentenced for immigration 
offenses.  The Commission’s (2006; 2010a) analyses conceal the unique nature of 
these offenses by examining them in models with all other federal criminal offense 
types, while other work (Ulmer and Light, 2010; Ulmer, Light, and Kramer, 2011a, 
2011b) acknowledges their distinctive characteristics but drops them from analysis. 
                                                 
3
 The Early Disposition Program seeks to expedite, or fast track, case processing and allows courts to 
approve downward departures of up to four levels. 
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Hartley and Tillyer (2012) devote their attention to immigration offenders, but their 
analyses are limited to a single year of federal sentencing data and concentrate solely 
on sentence length outcomes.  This dissertation extends this body of research by 
examining immigration cases separately and by investigating how contextual factors 
influence different sentencing outcomes for these unique offenses.   
Prior research on the influence of Booker is also quite limited in terms of the 
contextual factors that it has examined.  Analyses completed by the Commission 
(2006; 2010a) and by Hofer (2007) excluded districts as controls in their analyses.  
More recent research by Ulmer and Light (2010) explores whether inter-district 
variation increased after the Supreme Court’s decision, but it uses unconditional 
multilevel models to complete this investigation.  Ulmer, Light, and Kramer (2011a) 
expand this line of inquiry to include several contextual variables (i.e., districts’ 
departure rates, caseload per judge, and districts’ mean offense levels) and find that 
inter-district variation did not increase substantially after Booker.  Still, the role 
played by other contextual elements remains unexplored.  The current dissertation 
extends beyond prior research by controlling for additional district characteristics and 
by incorporating the effects of both static and dynamic measures of racial 
composition and caseload pressure in federal punishment.   
The dissertation proceeds as follows.  Chapter II is devoted to explaining the 
Booker decision and placing it within the historical context of federal sentencing 
reform.  Chapter III provides a review of relevant federal level sentencing studies, 
including those specific to drug and immigration offenses.  Chapter IV outlines the 
specific hypotheses to be explored, and Chapter V details the data and methods to be 
6 
 
utilized.  The overall models are presented in Chapter VI; the findings for drug-
specific models are detailed in Chapter VII; and immigration-specific results are 
detailed in Chapter VIII.  Chapter IX provides a summary of the results, and Chapter 
X discusses policy implications of the present research, and suggests directions for 
future research efforts. 
7 
 
CHAPTER II: THE BOOKER DECISION IN CONTEXT 
 In order to provide a fuller understanding of the impact of the Booker decision 
on federal sentencing practices, it is first necessary to place the decision within its 
proper historical context.  This chapter provides an overview of the changes 
precipitating the development of sentencing guidelines in general and at the federal 
level in particular.  It then examines the legal challenges leading up to Booker, and it 
ends by detailing the particulars of the U.S. Supreme Court’s ruling in Booker and by 
discussing the uncertain sentencing environment left in its wake. 
Sentencing Reform and the Guidelines Ideal 
 Prior to the 1970s, indeterminate sentencing allowed judges broad discretion 
to customize appropriate sentences for individual offenders based upon a wide range 
of aggravating and mitigating factors (Reitz, 1998; Spohn, 2002; Stith and Cabranes, 
1998).  The underlying philosophy of punishment was rehabilitation, with judges 
determining the minimum and maximum terms but prison and parole authorities 
determining the actual release date.
4
   
 Ultimately, support for indeterminate sentencing and the rehabilitative ideal 
were undermined by the confluence of several factors, including an increase in crime 
during the 1960s, a rising suspicion that rehabilitation programs did not work (e.g., 
Martinson, 1974), and a growing discontent with the criminal justice system that 
transcended political party lines (Anderson, Kling, and Stith, 1999; Frase, 2000; 
Reitz, 1998; Stith and Cabranes, 1998).  In a scathing critique published in 1972, a 
federal judge, Marvin Frankel, noted that indeterminate sentencing was characterized 
                                                 
4
 At the federal level, this meant that release dates were set by the U.S. Parole Board, usually after one-
third of the sentence had been served (Seghetti and Smith, 2007). 
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by unjustifiably divergent sentences handed down to different offenders charged with 
the same offenses (a cause for liberal concern), and he discussed the wide discretion 
the system afforded to judges (a concern for conservatives).  Not only did Frankel 
question the skills of both judges and prison and parole officials, but he questioned 
the validity of rehabilitation: “Until or unless we have some reasonable hope of 
effective treatment, it is a cruel fraud to have parole boards solemnly order men back 
to their cages because cures that do not exist are found not to have been achieved” 
(Frankel, 1972: 34).  Importantly, Frankel concluded his essay by advocating the use 
of sentencing commissions to study sentencing practices and to make sentencing 
recommendations. 
With the need to address sentencing disparities and judicial discretion clearly 
identified and the rehabilitative ideal in doubt, many jurisdictions began to 
experiment with alternative sentencing schemes.
5
  In the late 1970s and early 1980s, a 
handful of individual states latched onto Frankel’s (1972) idea of sentencing 
commissions as a way to achieve determinate reform.  Since that time, commissions 
have been adopted in eighteen states and the nation’s capital, in addition to the federal 
system (Engen, 2009; Frase, 2005).  These commissions are tasked with studying 
sentencing trends, developing sentencing guidelines, monitoring the impact of the 
guidelines, and enacting amendments as necessary (Spohn, 2002).  Guidelines vary 
                                                 
5
 Five states adopted statutory determinate sentencing structures, in which the punishment options 
available to judges were constrained to specified sentencing ranges, and every state and the federal 
system created mandatory sentences for specific offenses (e.g., offenses involving violence, firearms, 
drugs, etc.) or for habitual offenders.  Although broadly popular with the public, mandatory penalties 
have often been criticized for being excessively severe and have been plagued by problems including 
inflated discretion for prosecutors, wide circumvention, enlarged prison populations, and exacerbated 
sentencing disparities, among other things (Reitz, 1998; Spohn, 2002; Tonry, 1996; Zimring, Hawkins, 
and Kamin, 2001). Some studies indicate that “three strikes” laws, for instance, may even be 
associated with increases in homicide rates (Kovandzic, Sloan, and Vieraitis, 2002, 2004; Marvell and 
Moody, 2001).     
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significantly by jurisdiction (Frase, 2000, 2005; see also Kauder and Ostrom, 2008),
6
 
and although state sentencing commissions and their guidelines have generally been 
viewed as success stories, their level of success is similarly context-dependent 
(Tonry, 1996; for an opposing viewpoint, see Bushway and Piehl, 2001).  Their 
success is partially attributable to their insulation from sudden political whims, as 
well as the fact that state sentencing commissions often seek input from both legal 
authorities and practitioners (Frase, 2000).  Accordingly, almost all state “systems 
leave plenty of room for the consideration of unique offense and offender 
characteristics, crime-preventive as well as retributive sentencing purposes, local 
community values and resources, and emerging sentencing theories such as 
restorative and community justice” (Frase, 2000: 443).   
The Federal Sentencing Commission and its Guidelines 
Congress shared with the states the desire to reduce judicial discretion and 
eradicate unwarranted disparities.  However, the federal experience with sentencing 
reform is significantly differentiated from the state experience by the high level of 
politicization in the reform process and by the rigidity and severity ultimately 
embodied in the resulting guidelines.  The federal sentencing commission was 
originally envisioned in legislation before Congress in 1974, just two years after 
Frankel’s famous treatise (Tonry, 1996).  However, a decade passed before the 
United States Sentencing Commission (hereafter referred to as “the Commission”) 
                                                 
6
 Guidelines may range from voluntary (i.e., judges are not required to follow them) to presumptive 
(i.e., judges are expected to follow them unless providing documented reasons for departure), and they 
may be either descriptive (i.e., modeled after prior sentencing patterns) or prescriptive (i.e., prescribing 
new sentencing patterns).  Although guidelines in a handful of jurisdictions include misdemeanors, 
most guidelines cover only felony offenses (Frase 2000, 2005; Spohn, 2002; Tonry 1996).  The 
decisions to retain parole, to integrate intermediate sanctions into guidelines schemes, and to tailor the 
guidelines to deal with prison crowding also vary by jurisdiction (Engen, Gainey, Crutchfield, and 
Weis, 2003; Frase, 2000, 2005; Marvell, 1995; Reitz, 1998; Tonry, 1996; Weisburg, 2007). 
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was created as part of the 1984 Sentencing Reform Act (SRA).  By that time, there 
had been a seismic shift in the ideology surrounding criminal justice policy.  
Although the legislation was cosponsored by Edward Kennedy and Strom Thurmond, 
prominent senators representing both ends of the political spectrum (Anderson, Kling, 
and Stith, 1999), the Reagan administration was already firmly established and its 
“get tough” approach was widely embraced.
7
  Ultimately, the seven members 
appointed to the Commission were determined to prove their abidance to this new 
approach, and they sought to demonstrate their intolerance for lenient judges and their 
willingness to be tough on crime (Tonry, 1996).   
The “get tough” approach is clearly evident in the SRA, which not only 
created the Commission but also abolished federal parole and capped sentence 
reductions for good behavior at 15%.  The groundwork for the Guidelines was also 
spelled out in the SRA, which embraced uniformity, proportionality, and honesty as 
its goals.
8
  The Guidelines were to be presumptive and to require lengthy terms of 
incarceration for specific offenses involving violence, drugs, and white-collar crimes, 
and for repeat or “career” offenders (Breyer, 1988; USSC, 2006).  The SRA also 
delineated grounds for mitigating or aggravating sentences, and it established a range 
                                                 
7
 Despite this broad support for “get tough” strategies in the 1980s, there was still no single underlying 
sentencing philosophy evident in the federal sentencing guidelines.  This should come as no surprise, 
given that state level guidelines are similarly characterized.  As underscored by Reitz (1998: 545), “the 
last twenty-five years can be characterized as a period in which no single policy viewpoint has stood 
squarely behind the operation of U.S. sentencing structures – unless it has been the view that 
rehabilitation was not the way to go” (emphasis in original).  Breyer (1988) discusses the philosophical 
compromise embodied by the federal guidelines; he notes that the Commission, by creating 
“evolutionary” guidelines based on typical past practices, sought to balance just deserts and deterrence 
goals (see also USSC, 2006). 
8
 Mustard (2001: 289) defines each of these terms:  “An honest sentence avoids the confusion that 
occurs when judges impose an indeterminate sentence that is subsequently reduced by ‘good-time’ 
credits.  Sentencing uniformity narrows the disparities in sentences imposed by different federal courts 
for similar criminal conduct by similar offenders.  Proportionality imposes appropriately different 
sentences for criminal conduct of different degrees of severity.”  
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of no more than 25 percent between minimum and maximum sentences in the 
guideline range.  Further, in designing the Guidelines, the Commission was 
prohibited from “considering the race, sex, national origin, creed, and socioeconomic 
status of offenders, and [the SRA] instructed that the sentencing guidelines should 
reflect the general inappropriateness of considering certain other factors that might 
serve as proxies for forbidden factors, such as current unemployment” (USSC, 2006: 
4).   
The resulting federal sentencing guidelines, which took effect on November 1, 
1987, make use of a sentencing grid, with six “Criminal History” categories (i.e., 
prior convictions and time served) represented on the horizontal axis and 43 “Offense 
Level” categories (i.e., the severity of the current offense) represented on the vertical 
axis (see Appendix A).  Unlike state guidelines systems, which have often been 
lauded for their fairness and flexibility, the federal guidelines have been criticized for 
being overly rigid, complex, and unnecessarily harsh (Frase, 2000; Spohn, 2002; 
Tonry, 1996).  The Commission chose to depart from the proven approaches used by 
state commissions, arguing that “state guidelines systems which use relatively few, 
simple categories and narrow imprisonment ranges . . . are ill suited to the breadth 
and diversity of federal crimes” (USSC, 1987: 14; see also Breyer, 1988).
9
   
The criticisms leveled against the federal guidelines are multifaceted and well-
documented (c.f., Anderson, Kling, and Stith, 1999; Ruback, 1998; Spohn, 2002; 
                                                 
9
 At the same time, it is telling that no state has chosen to base its guidelines system around the model 
provided by the federal guidelines.  In fact, Tonry (1996) points out that several states specifically 
denounced the federal guidelines model as they were developing their own guidelines. 
12 
 
Stith and Cabranes, 1998; Tonry, 1996; Weisburg, 2007).
10
  Still, although Tonry 
(1996: 72) calls them “the most controversial and disliked sentencing reform 
initiative in U.S. history,” a sizeable body of research suggests that they were 
effective in reducing unwarranted disparities (Anderson, Kling, and Stith, 1999; 
Hofer, Blackwell, and Ruback, 1999; McDonald and Carlson, 1993; USSC, 1991, 
2004).  Even Tonry (1996) admits that the Guidelines have been effective if they are 
judged on their intended goals of reducing the number of cases sentenced to probation 
and increasing the average federal prison sentence (see also USSC, 1991).  Further, 
he states: “However misguided the U.S. Sentencing Commission’s policies, and 
however ineffective its efforts to elicit acceptance from practitioners, it has become a 
specialized agency of technical competence and has managed through its guidelines 
radically to alter sentencing practices in the federal courts” (Tonry, 1996: 26).   
Legal Challenges Leading up to Booker/Fanfan 
Criticisms and misgivings aside, the Guidelines remained in place largely as 
the Commission outlined them for close to twenty years.  During that time, their basic 
legality has been repeatedly questioned and upheld by a series of Supreme Court 
cases, beginning with Mistretta v. United States in 1989, which upheld the 
Constitutionality of both the Guidelines and the Commission by ruling that the SRA 
did not violate the doctrine of separation of powers (USSC, 2006, 2008).   
Over time, other legal challenges have followed.  Most central are the 
challenges that have invoked the Sixth Amendment, which calls for speedy and 
                                                 
10
 It should be noted that there is even criticism of all of the criticism that the Guidelines have received.  
Weisburg (2007) contends that academics have been too focused on condemning the federal guidelines 
instead of imagining a suitable alternative.  He additionally argues that the obsession with all things 
federal has meant that the “less visible, harder to quantify conditions of state law get ignored” 
(Weisburg, 2007: 9). 
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public jury trials for criminal defendants by an impartial jury of their peers (see Table 
1).  The history of these challenges is fairly recent, starting with Apprendi v. New 
Jersey (2000), in which the U.S. Supreme Court ruled that, aside from a prior 
conviction, facts that lead to an aggravated sentence beyond a statutorily prescribed 
maximum must be decided by a jury using the “beyond a reasonable doubt” 
standard.
11
  Two years later, the Court decided Ring v. Arizona (2002), which applied 
the Apprendi decision to the determination of facts related to an offender’s eligibility 
for a sentence of capital punishment (Frase, 2007).
12
   
More relevant to the nature of guidelines sentencing, the Supreme Court 
decided Blakely v. Washington in 2004.  The Court ruled that a judge’s application of 
an enhanced sentence under the Washington State guidelines violated the defendant’s 
Sixth Amendment right to a jury trial, as the defendant had not made admissions that 
supported the court’s finding of “deliberate cruelty” – a statutorily defined ground for 
departure – in his kidnapping case.  Thus, the Court’s ruling redefined “statutory 
maximum” as “the maximum sentence that a judge may impose solely on the basis of 
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 Apprendi was arrested in 1994 after shooting into the home of his black neighbors, whom he initially 
admitted to targeting based on their race.  He pled guilty to a federal firearms violation carrying a 
prison term of 5 to 10 years, and the judge accepted his plea.  However, the State of New Jersey later 
filed a motion to enhance Apprendi’s sentence under the state’s hate crime statute, and the judge found 
“by a preponderance of evidence” that the crime was racially motivated and thus imposed a 12-year 
sentence.  The U.S. Supreme Court ultimately reversed this decision, ruling in 2000 that, aside from a 
prior conviction, facts that lead to an aggravated sentence beyond a statutorily prescribed maximum 
must be decided by a jury using the “beyond a reasonable doubt” standard.  Frase (2007) provides an 
excellent description of the way Apprendi changed the standards of proof required in sentencing.   
12
 Under the State of Arizona’ death penalty statute, after the jury decided the defendant was guilty of 
first-degree murder, the trial judge was allowed to determine whether the aggravating factors required 
by Arizona law to impose the death penalty were present.  The Supreme Court ruled that the Arizona 
statute violated the Sixth Amendment since the aggravating factors acted as the “functional equivalent” 
of a greater offense, thereby necessitating that a jury should decide the aggravating factors.  Although 
important, the impact of the Ring decision was limited “because many jurisdictions were already 




the facts reflected in the jury verdict or admitted to by the defendant, not the 
maximum the judge may impose after making additional findings” (USSC, 2006: 12).  
Blakely sent tremors of doubt through the sentencing community.  In essence, 
the ruling meant that upward departures from the guidelines could only be imposed 
after the alleged facts warranting a longer sentence were decided by a jury using the 
beyond a reasonable doubt standard (Tonry, 2006).  Although “upward departures are 
rare in every guidelines system” (Tonry, 2006: 3), the Blakely decision still meant 
that states had to come up with a workable solution for dealing with those rare 
instances in which such departures may arise.  Frase (2007) suggests that most 
affected jurisdictions opted to comply with Blakely by providing the relevant jury 
rights, although some states attempted to get around the decision by broadening 
sentencing ranges (thereby allowing for longer sentences and making upward 
departures unnecessary) or by instituting “topless” guidelines (i.e., statutory 
maximums replace the high ends of the guidelines ranges).  Still, because the impact 
of Blakely was limited to Washington State and a handful of other presumptive 
guideline states, Bushway and Piehl (2007) contended that the affected states set 
about “Blakelyizing” their sentencing systems, and they argue that apparently little 
changed in those states or at the state level in general.   
At the same time, uncertainty also arose regarding how Blakely would affect 
the federal guidelines (Seghetti and Smith, 2007; USSC, 2006; Weisburg, 2007; Yeh 
and Doyle, 2009).  Some argued that the Guidelines were exempt from Blakely (and 
Apprendi) because, unlike Washington State’s guidelines, which were statutorily 
created by the legislature, the federal guidelines were created by an independent 
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sentencing commission (Frase, 2007).  Five circuits eventually ruled that Blakely did 
not affect the Constitutionality of the federal guidelines, but two others decided that 
the Guidelines were in violation of the Sixth Amendment (the Seventh Circuit 
decided United States v. Booker (2004), and the Ninth Circuit decided United States 
v. Ameline (2004)) (USSC, 2006).  Blakely thus disrupted the attempt to uniformly 
apply the Guidelines across the country and ultimately led to the Supreme Court’s 
2005 ruling in United States v. Booker (USSC, 2006). 
Booker/Fanfan 
Questions regarding Blakely’s application to the federal guidelines were 
answered when the Supreme Court made its decision in Booker/Fanfan in January 
2005.
13
  Both the Booker and Fanfan cases, which were consolidated and heard 
together before the Court, involved sentencing for drug offenses.  In both cases, 
appeals were made on the basis of whether a federal judge has the authority to decide 
facts that will enhance the offender’s sentence beyond that which was authorized by 
the jury’s verdict or by the offender’s guilty plea.  Essentially, the “merits” opinion in 
Booker, which was written by Justice Stevens, applied the Court’s Blakely decision to 
the federal system.  As in Blakely, the Court ruled that, after either a defendant’s 
admission or a jury’s verdict authorizes a certain range of punishment, a judge cannot 
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 Originally, a jury convicted Booker on two counts of possession with intent to distribute at least 50 
grams of cocaine base, thereby authorizing a sentence under the federal guidelines of 17 to 21 years in 
prison.  However, at sentencing the judge found, by a preponderance of the evidence, that Booker had 
distributed a quantity of drugs above that which was found by the jury and that he had also obstructed 
justice.  Under the Guidelines, these facts increased Booker’s sentencing eligibility to a range of 30 
years to life.  Fanfan’s case was similar: a jury convicted Fanfan of conspiracy to distribute more than 
500 grams of cocaine hydrochloride, which, under the Guidelines, authorized a sentence of five to six 
years in prison.  However, the prosecutor argued at sentencing that, although he was not formally 
charged, the defendant should be sentenced for possession and sale of crack cocaine.  These facts 
would have increased Fanfan’s sentence to a prison term of 15 to 16 years, but the judge sentenced 
Fanfan based solely on the crime for which he was found guilty (Yeh and Doyle, 2009). 
16 
 
issue a sentence beyond that range based on a finding of facts that he/she makes using 
a preponderance of the evidence standard (Seghetti and Smith, 2007; USSC, 2006; 
Yeh and Doyle, 2009).  Instead, such facts (other than a prior conviction) must be 
either provided by the defendant’s admission or proved beyond a reasonable doubt to 
a jury.     
The quandary thus facing the Court was how best to “restore the jury’s 
significance” (Seghetti and Smith, 2007: 4) while at the same time maintaining a 
workable federal sentencing process.  Justice Breyer, writing the Court’s “remedial” 
opinion, recognized that the day-to-day functioning of federal proceedings would be 
hindered by requiring juries to play a larger fact-finding role, and he also 
acknowledged that the use of real offense conduct in sentencing would be 
incompatible with having juries play such a role (USSC, 2006).
14
  Accordingly, the 
option of expanding the utilization of juries in the federal system to meet the demands 
of the Sixth Amendment was abandoned.  
Instead, in line with the exceptions for indeterminate systems outlined in its 
earlier decisions in Apprendi-Blakely, the Court sought to remedy the situation by 
modifying the provisions of the SRA that were found unconstitutional (Frase, 2007).  
Specifically, it excised 18 U.S.C. § 3553(b)(1), which made the Guidelines 
mandatory, as well as 18 U.S.C. § 3742(e), which outlined the grounds for appeal 
related to guideline departures (Seghetti and Smith, 2007; USSC, 2006; Yeh and 
Doyle, 2009).  Although these modifications disrupted Congress’ vision of a 
                                                 
14
 Under §1B1.3 of the Guidelines, offenders can be sentenced for “relevant conduct,” or “real-offense 
conduct,” including behaviors for which they were never convicted or even formally charged (Burns, 
Elden, and Blanchard, 1997; Spohn, 2002; Tonry, 1996).  This was designed to transfer the 
responsibility for the determination of offense-related facts to judges (Albonetti, 1997; Nagel and 
Schulhofer, 1992) and thus curtail potential abuse of plea bargaining by prosecutors. 
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mandatory guidelines system, Justice Breyer wrote that Congress’ goal of linking the 




The Court’s ruling in Booker transformed the Guidelines overnight from a 
mandatory system into an advisory system.  Still, district courts initially reacted with 
confusion to the instruction that, although judges are not required to apply the 
Guidelines, they still “must consult those guidelines and take them into account when 
sentencing” (Booker, 2005: 264).  Much of the confusion derives from the Court’s 
failure to more explicitly define what it meant when it said that sentences falling 
outside of the Guidelines would be subject to reversal if they failed to meet a 
“reasonableness” standard (Frase, 2007; Hofer, 2007; Seghetti and Smith, 2007; Yeh 
and Doyle, 2009).
 
 Subsequently, two opposing viewpoints developed regarding the 
extent to which the Guidelines must be considered.  At one end of the spectrum was 
the viewpoint that significant weight should still be placed on the Guidelines (United 
States v. Wilson, 2005), and at the other end was the view that the Guidelines are only 
one of the factors detailed in 18 U.S Code §3553(a) to be considered in determining a 
sentence (United States v. Ranum, 2005) (Seghetti and Smith, 2007; USSC, 2006).  
Ultimately, the Court ruled in Rita v. United States (2007) that sentences within the 
range prescribed by the Guidelines may be presumed to be reasonable and that district 
judges are afforded the discretion to prescribe non-guideline sentences both by 
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 The voting of the justices for both the merit and remedial opinions is of note.  For the merits opinion, 
justices Scalia, Souter, Thomas, and Ginsburg joined Justice Stevens, who delivered the opinion.  
Justice Ginsburg swapped sides to take part in the 5-4 vote for the remedial decision, the opinion for 
which was delivered by Justice Breyer and which effectively made the Guidelines advisory. 
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departing and applying § 3553(a), although the Court asserted that reasons should be 
provided for individual sentencing decisions (Seghetti and Smith, 2007).    
The advisory nature of the Guidelines, as laid out by Booker, was further 
reinforced by two additional cases decided in 2007 - Gall v. United States and 
Kimbrough v. United States.  The High Court’s decision in Gall indicated that 
sentences outside of the Guidelines were not necessarily “unreasonable.”  The 
Kimbrough decision further legitimized sentencing outside of the Guidelines by 
confirming that, in relevant cases, judges may consider the crack- versus powder-
cocaine disparity as justification to deviate from prescribed sentencing ranges. 
 Opinions and predictions about the impact of Booker on the federal sentencing 
landscape have varied widely.  For instance, former Attorney General Alberto 
Gonzales (2006) predicted that “shorter sentences and disparities among sentences 
will occur under a system of advisory guidelines.”  The major fear here is that 
unwarranted disparities will return, as judges will be able to use any criteria they 
deem appropriate in determining an individual’s sentence.  On the other hand, others 
have argued that repaving the way for judicial discretion in an overly harsh federal 
system is a positive move, as it will allow for sentences to be tailored to meet the 
individual needs of offenders and to again treat different cases differently (Hofer, 
2007).  There is a relatively small body of empirical research that examines the full 
impact of the Booker decision on federal sentencing practices, and it is examined in 
the next chapter.  
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CHAPTER III: LITERATURE REVIEW 
 A considerable body of research exists surrounding sentencing guidelines at 
both the federal and state levels, most of which has been focused on whether 
guidelines systems have been effective in reducing unwarranted sentencing 
disparities.  In general, statewide studies have found that legally relevant factors (i.e., 
prior criminal record and offense seriousness) are the primary determinants of 
sentencing outcomes.  At the same time, some of this research presents evidence that 
non-legal factors, including age, race, and gender, continue to play a role in how 
punitively the criminal justice system treats offenders (Engen and Gainey, 2000; 
Kramer and Steffensmeier, 1993; Steffensmeier, Kramer, and Striefel, 1993; 
Steffensmeier, Kramer, and Ulmer, 1995; Stolzenberg and D’Alessio, 1994).   A large 
body of research completed on sentencing outside the guidelines suggests that 
departures represent a significant source of disparate treatment (Engen and 
colleagues, 2003; Johnson, 2003, 2005; Kramer and Ulmer, 1996, 2002; Ulmer, 
1997).  Additionally, some research, particularly in Pennsylvania, suggests that there 
is significant variation in sentencing depending on characteristics of the local 
courtroom context (Johnson, 2005, 2006; Kramer and Ulmer, 1996, 2002; Ulmer and 
Johnson, 2004). 
Because state guidelines systems vary significantly from the federal system 
and, indeed, from each other with respect to both sentencing law and culture, it may 
be difficult to extrapolate the results from state-level studies to the federal system.  
This chapter focuses on federal sentencing research and begins by detailing the 
research conducted on the pre-Booker period, before the Guidelines were transformed 
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from mandatory to advisory.  Particular attention is then focused on research 
examining the way both drug and immigration offenders have been sentenced under 
the Guidelines.  Finally, the chapter concludes by turning to the handful of studies 
that have thus far examined the impact of Booker on federal sentencing outcomes.   
Pre-Booker Research on the Federal Guidelines 
 Pre-Booker research on the federal guidelines largely focused on three 
different areas: the role of extra-legal factors in sentencing outcomes, the shift of 
discretion from judges to prosecutors, and the way specific offenses are sentenced 
under the Guidelines.  Studies falling into each of these categories are outlined below.  
The Role Played by Extra-Legal Factors 
 As with sentencing research in general, studies conducted at the federal level 
have chiefly focused on whether different groups (e.g., racial groups, genders) have 
been treated comparably in the post-Guidelines era.  Such research has largely 
utilized the publicly available data maintained by the Commission.
16
  An early annual 
report indicated that 81% of cases were sentenced within the applicable sentencing 
range and that disparity in terms of both sentences given and time served decreased 
under the Guidelines (USSC, 1991).  Other early evaluations also found that the 
Guidelines reduced unwarranted disparity (McDonald and Carlson, 1993), even if 
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 This approach is not without criticism.  Wellford (2007) points out that the advancement of 
sentencing research has been stunted, both in terms of theory development and in terms of 
understanding the wide range of factors that may actually influence sentencing decisions, by 
researchers’ willingness to rely solely upon officially collected data (see also Everett and Wojtkiewicz, 
2002).  Additionally, others have noted that the road to sentencing may be a long one, and offenders 
may be subjected to disparate treatment at earlier, more hidden stages in the criminal justice system, 
which were not subject to reform and the importance of which may have been exacerbated by the 
Guidelines (Anderson, Kling, and Stith, 1999; Bushway and Piehl, 2001, 2007; Farabee, 1998; Kempf-
Leonard and Sample, 2001).  Still, due to the dearth of data in these earlier stages, as well as the wide 
availability of sentencing data, it is perhaps not surprising that the sentencing phase has received a 
great deal of attention from researchers seeking to examine disparities in the criminal justice system. 
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surveys administered by the General Accounting Office in 1992 indicated that most 
judges and defense attorneys were skeptical of such reports (see also Farabee, 1998).  
Later research examining the impact of the Guidelines on inter-judge differences in 
the average sentence lengths prescribed for criminal defendants indicated that these 
disparities had been reduced since the introduction of the Guidelines (Anderson, 
Kling, and Stith, 1999; Hofer, Blackwell, and Ruback, 1999; USSC, 2004).  
Although much of the research conducted at the federal level suggests that 
legal factors (i.e., current offense and criminal history) are the primary consideration 
of federal judges in making sentencing decisions, a sizeable body of evidence does 
suggest that extralegal factors also make their way into sentencing decisions, albeit 
more subtly (Albonetti, 1997, 2002; Everett and Wojkiewicz, 2002; Hartley, Maddan, 
and Spohn, 2007; Hebert, 1997; Johnson and Betsinger, 2009; Johnson, Ulmer, and 
Kramer, 2008; Kautt and Spohn, 2002; Kempf-Leonard and Sample, 2001; Mustard, 
2001; Spohn and Fornango, 2009; Steffensmeier and Demuth, 2000; Zatz, 2000).  
Kempf-Leonard and Sample (2001), for example, examined cases sentenced in the 
Eighth Circuit in 1993-1994 and found that, although only legally relevant variables 
factored into the incarceration decision for female offenders, extra-legal factors were 
relevant to sentencing outcomes for males.  More specifically, younger men and men 
who were poor were more likely to be incarcerated, and younger men were also 
subject to lengthier sentences.  In addition, regardless of gender, white defendants 
were more likely to benefit from downward departures. 
Similarly, Mustard (2001) found sentencing disadvantages for blacks and 
males in the incarceration decision, the length of sentence, and the likelihood and 
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extent of departure.  Work by Steffensmeier and Demuth (2000) found that Hispanic 
males were generally more susceptible to longer sentences than white males and that 
disparities were especially great when downward departure cases were considered 
separately.  Additionally, Hispanics were less likely than both whites and blacks to be 
the recipients of substantial assistance departures, especially in drug cases. At the 
same time, work by Johnson and Betsinger (2009) generally found that, even after 
controlling for legally relevant factors, Asian Americans were sentenced similarly to, 
and sometimes more leniently than, white offenders, while blacks and Hispanics were 
subject to more punitive treatment at the hands of federal judges.  Finally, Johnson 
and colleagues used multilevel modeling and found that individual racial differences 
in sentencing “were exacerbated in socioeconomically disadvantaged districts and in 
districts with larger minority populations” (Johnson, Ulmer, and Kramer, 2008: p 
769). 
Shifting Discretion: Plea Bargaining and §5K1.1 Departures 
Because judge-initiated (§5K2.0) departures have historically been subject to 
a rather limited appellate review (i.e., appeals courts simply determined whether 
judges appropriately departed from the Guidelines based on factors not considered by 
the Commission), they have been acknowledged as a potential entry point for the 
consideration of offender and offense characteristics prohibited by the SRA (Farabee, 
1998; USSC, 2003).  However, because judicial discretion was the primary focus of 
the reform efforts enacted by the Guidelines (Farabee, 1998), and because judges 
have been fairly limited in the number of ways they could legitimately depart from 
the recommended sentencing ranges, a growing body of federal sentencing research 
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has focused on plea bargaining and prosecutor-initiated departures as avenues for the 
possible reintroduction of unwarranted disparities (Albonetti, 2002; Farabee, 1998; 
Hartley, Madden, and Spohn, 2007; Spohn and Fornango, 2009).  While the architects 
of the Guidelines acknowledged the potential for prosecutorial abuse of plea 
bargaining as a technique for achieving sentencing reductions for offenders, 
prosecutors still possess the power to determine which charges are filed and to 
facilitate sentencing reductions for offenders who plead guilty and for those who 
qualify for a two-level sentencing reduction for “acceptance of responsibility” 
(Albonetti, 1997, 2002; Gyurci, 1994; Hartley, Madden, and Spohn, 2007; Nagel and 
Schulhofer, 1992; Spohn, 2002; Spohn and Fornango, 2009; Stith and Cabranes, 
1998).
17
  As Spohn and Fornango (2009: 814) state, “By choosing the charges the 
defendant will face and by determining the ‘facts’ (for example, the type and amount 
of drugs for which the defendant will be held responsible) that will be proved at trial, 
the AUSA [Assistant United States Attorney] essentially determines the range of 
penalties from which the judge must choose.” 
In addition, it is prosecutors who remain largely in control of §5K1.1 
departures, which are sentencing discounts that may be supplied to offenders who 
offer substantial assistance to the government.
18
  These departures are especially 
common in cases involving drug offenses; when approved, they may remove the 
mandatory minimum sentences that offenders would normally face (Hartley, Madden, 
and Spohn, 2007; Spohn and Fornango, 2009).  Surprisingly little accountability is 
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 Disparities in the use of acceptance of responsibility discounts have been demonstrated by some 
research (Everett and Wojkiewicz, 2002). 
18
 For a list of the factors considered by judges when determining whether or not to grant a substantial 
assistance departure, see Spohn and Fornango (2009). 
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required for these decisions (Farabee, 1998; Gyurci, 1994; Steffensmeier and 
Demuth, 2000), and, although judges can ultimately deny substantial assistance 
motions, this is rare, and only the prosecutor can move for such a departure in the first 
place (Gyurci, 1994; Maxfield and Kramer, 1998).
19
  The concern over §5K1.1 
departures is that disparities will arise, especially because no guidelines exist to 
ensure that similar discounts are supplied for similar levels of assistance to the 
government (Hartley, Madden, and Spohn, 2007; Maxfield and Kramer, 1998; 
Richman, 1998).
20
   
Much of what we know about prosecutorial decision-making comes either 
from qualitative research (Nagel and Schulhofer, 1992; Schulhofer and Nagel, 1989) 
or from studies that have used the Commission’s data to examine prosecutorial 
decision-making indirectly (Albonetti, 1997; 2002; Johnson, Kramer, and Ulmer, 
2008; Mustard, 2001; Steffensmeier and Demuth, 2000).
21
  One exception is the work 
by Spohn and Fornango (2009), which supplemented publicly available Commission 
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 Still, the judge’s discretion in granting substantial assistance departures should not be minimized.  
As Burns, Elden, and Blanchard (1997: 1327, emphasis in original) state: “Once a section 5K1.1 
recommendation is made, the sentencing fate of the defendant is entirely up to the judge, who decides 
whether, and to what degree, the sentence should be reduced for the cooperation. . . .The prosecutor 
cannot cause a sentence to be reduced even one day below the Guidelines range unless the court also 
deems it appropriate.  The prosecutor possesses only the executive power to seek a departure” (see also 
Hartley, Madden, and Spohn, 2007; Spohn and Fornango, 2009).  
20
 Steffensmeier and Demuth (2000) worry that the increased discretion afforded to prosecutors by the 
option to initiate §5K1.1 departures puts minorities at risk for greater sentencing disadvantages while, 
at the same time, making prosecutorial decision-making even less transparent (see also Albonetti, 
1997; Anderson, Kling, and Stith, 1999).  This concern seems justified by the Commission’s own 
study indicating that the decision to file for §5K1.1 departures was unevenly embraced by individual 
prosecutors and across U.S. attorney offices (USSC, 1991; see also Maxfield and Kramer, 1998).  
Johnson, Ulmer, and Kramer (2008: 772) note that the changes brought about by Booker mean that 
“the issue of interdistrict variation in departures and their role in producing unwarranted sentencing 
disparities will likely become even more important.” 
21
 Maxfield and Kramer (1998: 6) note that, although the Department of Justice requires that all U.S. 
attorney offices document their use of substantial assistance departures, “there are no standards given 
to the individual U.S. attorney offices defining how the information is to be maintained, nor are the 
data required to be compiled or reported to the central DOJ offices in Washington, D.C.”   
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data with court documents in three federal district courts (Minnesota, Nebraska, and 
the Southern District of Iowa) during fiscal years 1998 through 2000.  These data 
allowed for the identification of the AUSA assigned to handle the case and revealed 
considerable differences among individual prosecutors with respect to filing motions 
for substantial assistance departures, even after controlling for characteristics of the 
individual offender and case.  The authors found that discounts were more likely in 
cases involving offenders who had more dependents and for those who were younger, 
white, female, better educated, citizens of the United States, and using drugs at the 
time of the crime.  Importantly, these recent findings are consistent with the bulk of 
prior work that suggests guidelines departures are one of the primary mechanisms 
leading to sentencing disparities in federal court (Albonetti, 1997; Johnson, Kramer, 
and Ulmer, 2008; Mustard, 2001). 
Offense-Specific Research: Drug Offenses 
Much of the federal sentencing literature has focused specifically on the 
punishments faced by drug offenders, with good reason.  Until 2009, when 
immigration offenses surpassed them, drug offenses were the most commonly 
prosecuted offenses in the federal system (Hartley and Armendariz, 2011).  As a 
report by the Commission notes, “the annual number of offenders sentenced for [drug 
trafficking] has increased from 13,521 in fiscal year 1991 to 24,332 in fiscal year 
2007, an increase of 80% in the number of drug trafficking offenders” (Reedt and 
Widico-Stroop, 2009: 7).   
The prevalence of drug cases in the federal system stems from sentencing 
policies associated with the “war on drugs” begun by President Nixon.  By the 1980s, 
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the primary targets of this “war” were crack and powder cocaine (Boyum and Reuter, 
2005).  Crack was particularly vilified as a drug which was not only extremely 
addictive, but which also threatened the unborn children of users and which generated 
violence, especially in inner city communities (Hartley and Miller, 2010; Loshin, 
2007; Vagins and McCurdy, 2006; Yeh and Doyle, 2009).  As a result of the “moral 
panic” surrounding crack (Chiricos, 2004; Hartley and Miller, 2010), the Anti-Drug 
Abuse Act of 1986 was enacted by Congress to address continuing concerns 
associated with the ills associated with this illicit substance.  Although the Act was 
responsible for creating the reductions associated with substantial assistance 
departures (Maxfield and Kramer, 1998), it was also, more controversially, 
responsible for requiring that offenses involving crack be subject to particularly 
severe penalties.  The alleged more serious danger associated with crack compared to 
powder cocaine was quantified in a 100:1 ratio, requiring that five hundred grams of 
powder cocaine be present to trigger the same mandatory minimum penalties that 
were demanded for just five grams of crack cocaine. The battle against crack offenses 
was escalated by Congress’ Omnibus Anti-Drug Abuse Act of 1988; while simple 
possession of any other drug (including powder cocaine), regardless of quantity, was 
associated with a maximum penalty of 1 year, possession of at least 5 grams of crack 
was subject to a mandatory 5 to 20 years in prison (Vagins and McCurdy, 2006). 
There has been an abundance of criticism for policies directed at crack 
offenders, with many pointing out that the 100:1 ratio, in particular, has not only 
failed to result in targeting serious drug traffickers (Hartley and Miller, 2010; Loshin, 
2007; Vagins and McCurdy, 2006), but that it unfairly targeted blacks, as crack is 
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more commonly found in black communities than in those of whites (Hebert, 1997; 
Kautt and Spohn, 2002; LaFree, 1994; Tonry, 1996; Vagins and McCurdy, 2006).  
Hartley, Madden, and Spohn (2007) cite statistics showing that blacks are both 
disproportionately arrested and subject to lengthier sentences for crack-related 
offenses.  Both the Commission and Congress acknowledged the inequality 
associated with this sentencing policy over time, and, as detailed by Yeh and Doyle 
(2009), Congress made some attempts in the past to address inequities associated 
drug sentencing.  For instance, in 1994 it enacted the Violent Crime Control and Law 
Enforcement Act, which created a safety valve provision designed to mitigate the 
mandatory minimum sentences associated with certain categories of drug offenses.  
Still, repeated recommendations by the Commission that the 100:1 ratio be revised to 
more accurately reflect the actual differences between crack and powder cocaine were 
rejected by Congress, and the policy stood for more than two decades, resulting in 
sentences “three to over six times longer for crack cocaine than for powder cocaine 
offenses” (USSC, 2006: 126; Yeh and Dolye, 2009; see also Loshin, 2007).
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Public perceptions of the elevated dangerousness associated with crack 
cocaine have diminished over time.  Hartley and Miller (2010) analyzed the content 
of 78 USA Today articles related to narcotics offending that were published in the 
year 2000; despite the fact that more than 10,000 cocaine cases went through the 
federal system that year, only 12 articles were specifically related to crack, while 53 
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 The Commission amended the Guidelines in 2007 in order to assign base levels for crack cocaine 
that corresponded to guidelines ranges including mandatory minimums (USSC, 2010b).  “Crack 
cocaine offenses for quantities above and below the mandatory minimum threshold quantities similarly 
were adjusted downward by two levels” (USSC, 2010b: 2).  In March 2008, the amendment was made 
retroactive, enabling some eligible incarcerated offenders to seek reductions in their sentences.  
President Obama signed the Fair Sentencing Act in August 2010, thereby reducing the 100:1 ratio and 
eliminating mandatory minimum penalties associated with crack-cocaine possession (American Civil 
Liberties Union, 2010). 
28 
 
focused on powder cocaine offending.  Neither the offender’s race nor the violence 
typically identified with cocaine was generally a focus in the sampled articles.  Using 
the Commission’s data for the same year, Hartley and Miller found that sentence 
length for crack and powder cocaine defendants was largely predicted by legally 
relevant factors and that most extra-legal factors were non-significant. 
Still, a study by Hartley, Madden, Spohn (2007), which also used Commission 
data for the year 2000, found that the prosecutor’s decision to file for a §5K1.1 
departure motion was motivated by a combination of legally relevant and irrelevant 
factors.  Motions for substantial assistance departures were less likely in cases 
involving crack rather than powder cocaine, while such motions were more likely in 
instances where a mandatory minimum sentence was involved and in which the 
offender was white, female, had more education, was charged with a more serious 
offense, and, in some instances, had a more extensive criminal history.  Interactions 
between race and gender also proved to be particularly salient, as white males were 
more likely than black and Hispanic males to benefit from §5K1.1 departures.  
Among females, race played a significant role only in powder cocaine guidelines 
cases.  Similar to the previous work by Kautt and Spohn (2002), which hypothesizes 
that judges may react to the criticism regarding disparate sentencing patterns for 
blacks and whites in crack cocaine cases by using whatever discretion they have to 
purposely decrease the sentences for black offenders, Hartley, Madden, and Spohn 
(2007) hypothesize that prosecutors may use substantial assistance departures in those 
instances involving particularly severe offenses or offender histories so that judges 
may prescribe more appropriate punishments.   
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Offense-Specific Research: Immigration Offenses 
Illegal immigration into the United States has increasingly become a focus of 
the federal government since the turn of the millennium.  Since that time, Congress 
has passed both the Victims of Trafficking and Violence Protection Act of 2000 and 
the PROTECT Act of 2003 to control the penalties for illegal immigration, and the 
Department of Homeland Security (DHS) has turned its attention to securing the 
nation’s borders, and to the southern border in particular, after the terrorist attacks on 
September 11, 2001 (Hartley and Tillyer, 2012; Logue, 2009).  At the same time, 
immigration has become the source of heated ideological debate.  As noted by 
Hartley and Armendariz (2011:47), “Current political discourse regarding national 
security threats from Mexican drug cartels and a concurrent media induced panic 
regarding immigration and crime has produced a fear of immigrants in the United 
States (Jaret, 1999; Logue, 2009).” 
DHS estimates that there were approximately 10,790,000 unauthorized 
immigrants in the United States in 2010.  Perhaps not surprisingly, immigration cases 
represent the fastest growing offense category in federal criminal caseloads; a 2009 
report by the Commission indicates that the number of immigration cases increased 
by 165% during the previous decade, thereby contributing to the fact that these 
offenses now represent the largest percentage of the federal caseload.  Yet, 
shockingly little federal sentencing research has focused specifically on immigration 
offenses.
23
  This omission is especially astounding given the unique characteristics of 
both these offenses and the offenders who commit them.  Compared to other federal 
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 While Wolfe, Pyrooz, and Spohn (2011) discuss illegal immigration and negative perceptions of 
immigrants, their analyses focus on the role of citizenship status in the incarceration and sentence 
length decisions and are not specific to immigration offenses.   
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offenders, greater percentages of immigration offenders are Hispanic, possess lower 
levels of education, and are non-citizens (Schmitt, 2009); as noted by Hartley and 
Tillyer (2012), non-citizens may be more susceptible to prison terms because they are 
ineligible for alternative sanctions.  Immigration offenders are also likely to benefit 
from fast-track, or Early Disposition program, departures, which are authorized in 
seventeen federal districts (Gorman, 2009).  These sentencing discounts were first 
recognized by Congress in the PROTECT Act and were incorporated into the 
Guidelines in §5K3.1, which allowed for courts to approve downward departures of 
up to four levels at the behest of prosecutors in Early Disposition cases (Hartley and 
Tillyer, 2012).
 24
     
Post-Booker Sentencing Research 
The Booker decision has signaled a shift toward a renewal of judicial 
discretion in the federal system.  While judges must still consult the Guidelines in all 
cases, they now have the option of deviating from their recommendations with little 
fear of appellate reprisal, although they are still bound to impose the sentences 
mandated by mandatory minimum statutes (Seghetti and Smith, 2007; USSC, 2006).  
The advisory status of the Guidelines, and the discretion that judges are accordingly 
afforded, has led to the general hypothesis and, in some cases, fear that judges will 
increasingly impose less severe sentences than those that were imposed during the era 
when the Guidelines were mandatory (pre-Booker). 
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 The PROTECT Act was passed by Congress in 2003 to reduce the number of judge-initiated 
departures from the Guidelines. It limited the grounds for departures to what was laid out in 18 U.S.C. 
§ 3553(a)(2) and required that the court provide written reasons for departures, that the Chief Judge of 
each district submit documentation concerning departures to the Commission, and that appeals courts 
provide de novo reviews of district courts’ departure decisions (USSC, 2003). 
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A small but growing group of studies have examined the impact of 
Booker/Fanfan on federal sentencing outcomes.  The Commission’s (2006) Final 
Report on the Impact of United States v. Booker examines sentencing in three 
separate time periods: pre-PROTECT Act, post-PROTECT Act, and Post-Booker.  
Surprisingly, the Commission found that many pre-Booker sentencing patterns 
remained in place following the High Court’s decision, with the vast majority of cases 
(85.9%) sentenced in conformance with the federal sentencing guidelines.
25
  Further, 
the Commission found that most offenders were still sentenced to prison terms, with 
no significant difference being found in the imprisonment decision between the pre- 
and post-Booker time periods.  In addition, the average sentence length actually 
increased following the decision, continuing a pre-Booker trend; this was true across 
offense types (except for some immigration offenses), and the factors associated with 
the sentence length outcome were basically unchanged.
26
   
Despite these consistencies, pre- to post-Booker differences were evident in 
out-of-range sentences.
27
  Above-range sentences doubled after Booker, with those 
sentenced after the decision finding themselves 20.7% more likely to receive an 
upward departure.
28
  Below-range sentences also increased following the Booker 
decision, with government-initiated downward departures (e.g., substantial assistance 
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 At the same time, judges continued to select within-range sentences from the low end of the 
applicable guideline range (i.e., the presumptive sentence) 60% of the time. 
26
 The Commission does note that the trial variable was not significant in the post-Booker time period. 
27
 In Irizarry v. United States (2007), the Court reasoned that, because Booker made the Guidelines 
advisory, advance notification of deviations from the Guidelines – now known as “variances” – is not 
required.  Still, the term “departure” is used throughout this dissertation for ease of description 
between the pre- and post-Booker periods. 
28
 Still, the rate of upward departures remained very low, with only 1.6% of cases receiving a departure 
post-Booker (USSC, 2006). 
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and Early Disposition Program departures) accounting for a large percentage of these 
sentences.
29
  Judge-initiated downward departures also experienced an increase 
following the Booker decision, although monthly analyses showed the trend to be 
stabilizing.
30
  The multivariate analyses completed by the Commission reveal that the 
factors associated with downward departures changed somewhat following Booker, 
with non-citizenship, greater criminal history points, career offender status, and the 
application of a mandatory minimum sentence all decreasing the likelihood of 
downward departures post-Booker. 
The Commission (2006) also explored the impact of the Booker decision on 
the sentencing of some specific offense and offender types.  While district court 
judges continued to sentence crack cocaine cases in accordance with the Guidelines in 
the initial period following the Booker decision, they appeared to be seizing the 
opportunity to exercise their discretion in cases involving career offenders (most 
often involving drug trafficking offenses), as there was a post-Booker increase in the 
rate of below-range sentences for these individuals (see also Hofer, 2007).  
Differences in the sentences of subgroups of offenders persisted after the Booker 
decision, with men and blacks continuing to receive longer sentences than women 
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 Those sentenced after the Booker decision found themselves 61.4% more likely to receive a 
government-initiated downward departure (excluding substantial assistance); at the same time, the 
likelihood of receiving a substantial assistance departure actually decreased by 6.2% in the post-
Booker period compared with the post-PROTECT Act period (USSC, 2006). 
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 Although the finding that average sentence length increased post-Booker seems to be at odds with 
the increased use of downward departures, government-initiated or otherwise, the sentence length 
increase is largely explained by the fact that presumptive sentences have been trending upward since 
Fiscal Year 2003 (see also Hofer, 2007).  The Commission (2006) and Hofer (2007) point out that 
several guideline and statutory amendments may be responsible for this increase, including the 2001 
“Economic Crime Package,” the 2002 Sarbanes-Oxley Act, and the PROTECT Act.  The Commission 
(2006:73) also suggests the increase in presumptive sentences may be due to the possibility that “more 
serious offenses may have been brought for prosecution” (see also Hofer, 2007). 
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and whites; interestingly, post-Booker analyses by the Commission showed no 
difference between the sentences of whites and Hispanics.  
Hofer (2007) extends the work of the Commission (2006) by examining the 
reasons given by judges for departing from the Guidelines in the post-Booker era.  He 
finds that inadequate criminal history (§4A1.3) was the reason most commonly cited 
by judges.  Judges seemed to be particularly wary of applying the “career criminal 
guideline” (§4B1.1) to more harshly sanction those convicted of repeat drug 
trafficking and violent offenses; in the post-Booker era, such career offenders had 
significantly higher rates of departure (22.3%) than the overall caseload (13.0%).  
Judges in the post-Booker era also increasingly cited offender characteristics (e.g., 
age, physical condition, family ties, etc.) as reasons for departing from the guidelines; 
recall that, prior to Booker, judges could not generally consider these characteristics 
as reasons for departure, as they were deemed “not ordinarily relevant” under Chapter 
5, Part H of the Guidelines Manual. 
In 2010, the Commission revisited its earlier analyses (USSC, 2006) in order 
to better assess how the Booker decision has affected long-term sentencing trends by 
demographic factors; this more recent examination is limited to sentence length 
outcomes.  In their first set of analyses, the Commission (2010a) utilized the original 
methodology used for the 2006 report but updated the time frames to better highlight 
sentencing patterns that have occurred since the Booker decision; accordingly, they 
divided the data into a post-PROTECT Act period, a post-Booker period (i.e., 
following the Booker decision but preceding both the Kimbrough and Gall decisions), 
and a post-Gall period (i.e., following the Kimbrough and Gall decisions and ending 
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with the conclusion of fiscal year 2009).  The Commission found that sentence length 
differences between black and white offenders were not significant during the post-
PROTECT Act period but that significant differences between these two race groups 
did emerge during the post-Booker period; since that time, the difference between the 
two groups has been growing, with the post-Gall period witnessing sentence lengths 
that were 10% longer for blacks.  As in its 2006 report, the Commission found that 
sentence lengths for white and Hispanic offenders did not differ significantly in any 
of the three time periods examined.  At the same time, sentence length patterns by 
gender demonstrated significant differences across all three periods, with males 
experiencing significantly longer sentences than females. 
  Using a “refined model” to account for race and gender interactions, to 
control for pre-sentence detention status, and to exclude variables highly correlated 
with the presumptive sentence,
31
 the Commission (2010a) found that differences in 
sentence lengths between black and white male offenders have been increasing since 
the post-PROTECT Act period and that they were the greatest in the post-Gall period, 
with black males receiving sentences that were 23.3% longer than those of white 
males during that period.  Although no significant difference in sentence lengths was 
evident between Hispanic males and white males in the post-Booker period, Hispanic 
males received significantly longer sentences in the post-Gall period.   
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 Excluded variables include: “(1) the number of criminal history points; (2) whether the offender 
received a “saftety valve” adjustment (in drug cases); (3) whether the offender was convicted of an 
offense under 18 U.S.C. § 924(c); (4) whether the offender received a specific offense characteristic 
(“SOC”) enhancement for use of a weapon; (5) whether the Career Offender enhancement applied; (6) 
whether the Armed Career Criminal enhancement applied; and (7) the offender’s role, if any, in the 
offense (as reflected by a mitigating role adjustment, an aggravating role adjustment, or no role 
adjustment)” (USSC, 2010a: 20-21). 
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Opposing findings have been reached in three recent articles by Ulmer and his 
colleagues (Ulmer and Light, 2010; Ulmer, Light, and Kramer, 2011a, 2011b).   After 
providing a critique of the methodology used by the Commission (2010a), Ulmer, 
Light, and Kramer (2011b) provide a re-analysis of the impact of Booker that: 1) 
separates the imprisonment and sentence length decisions; 2) defines the incarceration 
decision purely with respect to receipt of prison or not; 3) controls for criminal 
history; 4) excludes immigration offenses; and 5) investigates whether departures 
have increased following the Booker and Gall decisions.  Their analyses utilize data 
broken into pre-PROTECT, PROTECT, post-Booker, and post-Gall periods.  With 
these changes in place, the authors conclude that the increased odds of imprisonment 
for black males in the post-Gall period, and not any evident sentence length 
disparities, may have influenced the Commission’s (2010a) findings regarding 
increased racial disparity after Booker and Gall.  Importantly, they note that this post-
Gall sentencing disadvantage for black males is significant relative only to the 
PROTECT period, which they argue stands out as “the truly unusual period in the 
history of the Guidelines” due to “relatively low levels of disparity [that] were an 
anomaly compared with the earlier years when the Guidelines were also mandatory 
(particularly the pre-Koon period), as well as the post-Booker years” (Ulmer, Light, 
and Kramer, 2011b: 1105).  In addition, the authors report that controlling for 
criminal history mediates the effect of being a black male and that, when immigration 
offenses are excluded from the models, sentence length disadvantages for black males 
are reduced and that “there is actually less length disparity affecting Black males in 
the post-Booker/Gall periods than in the pre-PROTECT era” (Ulmer, Light, and 
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Kramer, 2011b: 1106).  Finally, though Ulmer and colleagues report no post-
Booker/Gall increases in disparity for judge-initiated departures, they do indicate that 
such disparities for black and Hispanic males were apparent for prosecutor-initiated 
departures. 
  Ulmer and Light (2010) further investigate Booker’s impact by surveying 
federal court personnel about their perceptions and by using multilevel modeling to 
examine whether between-district variation has increased following the High Court’s 
decision.  Their survey results indicate that federal judges and defense attorneys 
associate the post-Booker era with increases in the use of waivers of right to appeal, 
negotiations around relevant conduct, and open pleas.  At the same time, these 
individuals do not believe that defense attorneys have gained a bargaining advantage 
since the Supreme Court’s decision, and they believe sentences have stayed stable.  
These perceptions are substantiated by statistical models that utilize federal 
sentencing data for the pre-PROTECT, post-PROTECT, and post-Booker periods.  
While the authors find that the post-Booker period is associated with shorter 
sentences for both drug and violent offenders, their results also show that extralegal 
disparities and inter-district variations have not increased since the Supreme Court’s 
decision.     
Ulmer, Light, and Kramer (2011a) focus more explicitly on variation between 
districts in incarceration and sentence length decisions following the Supreme Court’s 
ruling.  Consistent with their other work (Ulmer, Light, and Kramer, 2011b), these 
authors partition the data into pre-PROTECT, post-PROTECT, post-Booker, and 
post-Gall (extending to November 2008) periods.  Their analysis again excludes 
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immigration offenses, but it extends the range of independent variables previously 
examined in post-Booker research to incorporate a limited range of contextual 
variables, including districts’ departure rates, caseload per judge, and mean offense 
level.  Ulmer and colleagues conclude that extralegal disparity generally did not 
increase in either the post-Booker or post-Gall periods.  Additionally, while federal 
courts exhibited substantial variation in terms of the role played by extralegal 
characteristics in sentencing outcomes, there was not significantly more inter-district 
variation in the post-Booker or post-Gall periods than in earlier time periods. 
Sentencing for Drug Offenses in the Post-Booker Era 
As is the case more generally, post-Booker research focusing specifically on 
drug offenses is fairly limited.  Initial research by the Commission (2006) indicates 
that, contrary to expectations, federal judges did not seem to be using Booker as an 
excuse to compensate for the huge sentencing discrepancy between cases involving 
crack versus powder cocaine in the period immediately following the decision.
32
  
Instead, 84.8% of crack cocaine cases were sentenced in accordance with the 
Guidelines post-Booker, and this was roughly the same degree of guidelines 
conformance as for other drug types.  Later research by Ulmer and Light (2010) and 
by Ulmer, Light, and Kramer (2011a) indicates that the post-Booker period was 
actually associated with shorter sentences for both drug and violent offenders.  Ulmer 
and colleagues note that these findings are “not surprising given the very prevalent 
view among federal judges and other commentators that the drug Guidelines in 
particular were too severe” (Ulmer, Light, and Kramer, 2011a: 830).  Another study 
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 The Commission’s (2006) report was released before the Supreme Court decided Kimbrough v. 
United States (2007), which clarified that the parts of the Guidelines specifically pertaining to the 
crack/powder cocaine differential, like the Guidelines more generally, are now effectively advisory.  
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by Hartley and Armendariz (2011) finds that noncitizens generally received shorter 
sentences than citizens in federal drug cases and that differences in the effects of 
presumptive sentences and departures on sentence length varied by district and by 
citizenship status.  Unfortunately, these researchers used only a single year (2008) of 
the Commission’s data, making it impossible to determine Booker’s influence on 
these findings. 
Sentencing for Immigration Offenses in the Post-Booker Era 
Post-Booker research centered on immigration offenses is even more limited 
than the body of research focused on drug offenses.  Importantly, the Commission’s 
(2006; 2010) post-Booker work masks the way immigration cases are handled by 
ignoring the unique nature of these offenses and including them in multivariate 
models with all other offenses.  On the other hand, research by Ulmer and his 
colleagues (Ulmer and Light, 2010; Ulmer, Light, and Kramer 2011a; 2011b), 
consistent with prior work by Steffensmeier and Demuth (2000), excludes these 
offenses all together due to both the unique way in which they are processed (e.g., the 
use of fast-track departures) and because citizens cannot be charged with illegally 
entering or staying in the country.   
Hartley and Tillyer (2012) use federal sentencing data for 2008 to examine 
sentence lengths for immigration offenders who were issued pre-sentence 
investigation reports (PSR).  They find that males, those detained prior to sentencing, 
those with longer presumptive sentences, and those with more extensive criminal 
histories were subject to longer prison terms, while Hispanics, younger offenders, and 
U.S. citizens received shorter terms.  Immigration offenders charged with trafficking 
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were subject to sentences that were 28% longer than those sentenced for illegal entry, 
while offenders sentenced for illegal documentation were the recipients of sentences 
that were 18% shorter.  In addition, immigration offenders sentenced in the five 
southwestern border districts received longer average sentences than those in non-
border districts.  Hartley and Tillyer (2012) further partitioned the data based on the 
three different types of immigration offenses and for the five southwestern border 
districts.  The results of these disaggregated analyses revealed substantial district-
level variation in sentence lengths.  Unfortunately, Hartley and Tillyer’s (2012) study 
was limited to a single year and was not focused on assessing the impact of the 
Booker decision on sentencing patterns for immigration offenses over time.     
Summarizing Post-Booker Research 
To summarize, existing post-Booker research suggests that many of the pre-
Booker trends continued into this new era of sentencing, although some research 
indicates that extralegal disparities following the decision were not as large as was 
originally anticipated.  While informative, extant research on Booker’s influence is 
limited in several important ways:  1) it has paid only limited attention to drug 
offenses, with little consideration of the specific impact the decision has had on crack 
and powder cocaine sentencing; 2) it largely ignores immigration offenses; and 3) it 
has yet to fully consider important jurisdictional-level differences in the effects of 
Booker across federal district courts.  Accordingly, the next chapter provides the 
framework for addressing these limitations by outlining the specific hypotheses that 
this dissertation will examine. 
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CHAPTER IV: THEORY AND HYPOTHESES 
Extant post-Booker studies generally indicate that judges have continued to 
sentence according to the Guidelines since the High Court’s decision.  However, 
these studies do not focus specific attention to changes in drug or immigration 
sentencing trends, and they examine only a limited range of contextual factors.  Using 
previous research as a guide, this chapter outlines predictions about the impact of 
Booker on federal sentencing outcomes in general and on outcomes for drug and 
immigration offenses in particular.   
Understanding the General Influence of Booker on Sentencing Outcomes 
The limited body of research that has examined the influence of Booker on 
federal sentencing outcomes has largely found that the use of imprisonment has not 
changed significantly in the aftermath of the Supreme Court’s decision and that 
offenders sentenced in the period following Booker actually received longer prison 
terms than those sentenced prior to the decision (Hofer, 2007; USSC, 2006).  Several 
scholars have provided explanations for why sentencing patterns following the 
Supreme Court’s decision have largely stayed consistent with pre-Booker trends.  
Their arguments primarily center on the idea that the Guidelines “have become 
embedded in the organizational and legal culture of federal court communities” 
(Ulmer and Light, 2010: 175; see also Engen, 2009; Engen and Steen, 2000; Hunt and 
Connelly, 2005).  The federal courts have had two decades to adjust to the changes 
necessitated by the SRA and Guidelines.  Accordingly, it can be argued that, in that 
time, judges and other federal criminal justice personnel have come to more or less 
embrace and internalize the ideals of these reform efforts (see Engen, 2009) and that 
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they are used as a way to “maintain organizational efficiency” (Engen and Steen, 
2000: 1387).  To paraphrase one federal district judge, a whole generation of 
attorneys and judges has known only sentencing under mandatory guidelines 
(Chasanow, 2009; see also Hunt and Connelly, 2005).  Additionally, it is possible that 
courtroom communities have incorporated the recommendations of the Guidelines 
into what are believed to be appropriate punishments, or “going rates,” for commonly 
seen crimes (Eisenstein, Flemming, and Nardulli, 1988; Kramer, 2009; Sudnow, 
1965); as such, judges may be inclined to continue with the patterns that were 
established before Booker made the Guidelines advisory.  Still, an alternative 
viewpoint posits that this stability in sentencing patterns will erode over time.
 33
    
This position contends that judges may have kept their decisions in line with 
preexisting sentencing patterns during the time immediately after Booker because 
they anticipated that Congress would step in to revise the Guidelines and once again 
make them mandatory.  Hunt and Connelly (2005: 239) hypothesized that “judges 
will continue to comply with guidelines recommendations, at least in the typical cases 
for which the guidelines are designed, if the likely alternative is the perceived failure 
of advisory guidelines and more direct legislative control of sentencing, such as an 
expansion of mandatory minimum sentences.”  As one federal judge described it, 
although judges still felt “tethered” to the Guidelines immediately following the 
Booker decision, they may feel more inclined to deviate from the sentences 
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 More generally, clearer patterns will become evident as more time passes since the decision.  The 
Commission (2006) notes that, “As appellate jurisprudence evolves, uncertainties are resolved, the 
system becomes more predictable, and a more complete picture of the impact of Booker on federal 
sentences can be developed” (USSC, 2006: v).  Additionally, Wooldredge (2009) notes that it is 
important to include long follow-up periods when studying sentencing reform, as initial fluctuations in 
sentencing outcomes following reform efforts may only be temporary. 
42 
 
prescribed by the Guidelines with time (Chasanow, 2009).  Thus, it may be that, with 
each passing year following the Booker decision, sentences will start to deviate more 
and more from those previously demanded by the Guidelines.  
The latter viewpoint is embraced as a possible explanation for evidence 
confirming the emergence of greater extralegal disparities as more time has passed 
since the Booker decision.  Theoretical perspectives articulated by both Albonetti 
(1991) and Steffensmeier and colleagues (Steffensmeier, Kramer, and Ulmer, 1995; 
Steffensmeier, Ulmer, and Kramer, 1998) may be used to help explain why minority 
offenders, in particular, have been historically sentenced more harshly in the federal 
system.  Albonetti’s (1991) uncertainty avoidance/causal attribution theory posits that 
courtroom actors, in an effort to make rational decisions with only incomplete 
pictures concerning defendants and their crimes, depend upon “patterned responses” 
(March and Simon, 1958), or a “perceptual shorthand” (Hawkins, 1981: 280), based 
around stereotypes about the offender’s characteristics as well as the characteristics of 
the crime (see also Albonetti, 1997; 2002).  As such, more severe sentences are likely 
to be imposed upon defendants who are viewed by judges to be dangerous and/or 
likely to recidivate, and minorities may be particularly susceptible to such attributions 
(see also Kautt and Spohn, 2002).  Similarly, the offender’s predicted dangerousness 
and the need to protect the community are included as one of the individual level 
“focal concerns” considered by courtroom personnel when making sentencing 
decisions (Steffensmeier, Kramer, and Ulmer, 1995; Steffensmeier, Ulmer, and 
Kramer, 1998).  Other focal concerns include the offender’s culpability and the 
degree of harm the offender inflicted upon the victim, as well as practical constraints 
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related to both the individual (e.g., health of the offender, ties to family members) and 
the organization (e.g., case flow, prison crowding).  Building on the groundwork laid 
out by Albonetti (1991), Steffensmeier, Ulmer, and Kramer (1998: 768) posit that 
“judges, both as citizens and as elected officials, may share in the general 
stereotyping predominant in the community; and that racial (as well as age and 
gender) attributions will intertwine with the focal concerns . . . to influence judges in 
deciding whether to incarcerate an offender and the length of the incarceration.”   
If increased judicial discretion allows for an increased reliance on 
stereotypical attributions, as these perspectives suggest, then one would expect 
sentencing disadvantages for young minority males to be exacerbated in the post-
Booker era.  Existing research suggests that some of the extralegal disparities for 
males and minorities that were apparent when the Guidelines were mandatory 
continued under the advisory system (USSC, 2006; 2010a).  While existing studies 
are in disagreement over the precise role played by Booker (and subsequently by 
Gall) in exacerbating extralegal differences in incarceration outcomes (Ulmer, Light, 
and Kramer, 2011b; USSC, 2010a), they do suggest that these disparities have 
worsened over time.  Sentence length outcomes have been found to be more nuanced, 
with Ulmer and colleagues noting that “one concludes that the post-Booker era has 
brought greater sentence-length racial disparity disadvantaging Black males only 
when one’s basis of comparison is the PROTECT era” (Ulmer, Light, and Kramer, 
2011b: 1105, emphasis in original).  The current dissertation is expected to confirm 
these previous findings and, accordingly, predicts that: 
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H1: While post-Booker imprisonment and sentence length trends will largely 
resemble those found pre-Booker, differences between whites and minorities will be 
most apparent in more recent years of data. 
Although extant work suggests that the use of upward departures has grown in 
the post-Booker period, these deviations are still fairly uncommon, whereas the use of 
both government- and judge-initiated downward departures has continued to increase 
more steadily (Hofer, 2007; USSC, 2006).  There is some evidence to suggest that 
disparities in the application of the substantial assistance (§5K1.1) departures initiated 
by prosecutors have increased over time, especially in the post-Gall period, with 
particularly pronounced disparities evident for Hispanic males (Ulmer, Light, and 
Kramer, 2011b).  At the same time, because Booker has enabled an increase in 
judicial discretion, one would expect judge-initiated (i.e., §5K2.0) departures to be 
those most affected in the post-Booker period.  Indeed, the work by Hofer (2007) 
seems to suggest that judges view these departures as a legitimate avenue for 
adjusting sentencing inequities based on a sense of fairness.    In accordance with 
these findings, the following prediction is made: 
H2: Disparities will be evident between whites and minorities in the 
application of government- and judge-initiated departures from the Guidelines in the 
post-Booker period, particularly in more recent years of data.  
The focal concerns perspective presented by Steffensmeier, Ulmer, and 
Kramer (1998) acknowledges the fact that, beyond the individual level characteristics 
considered by the judge in any given case, there are additional factors that weigh into 
judicial decision-making.  Indeed, characteristics of the courtroom community 
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(Eisenstein, Flemming, and Narduli, 1988), in addition to factors associated with the 
environment in which the courtroom is located, combine with individual case-level 
factors to influence sentencing decisions (Johnson, Ulmer, and Kramer, 2008; Spohn 
and Fornango, 2009; Ulmer, 1997; Ulmer and Kramer, 1998).  While Steffensmeier, 
Ulmer, and Kramer (1998) give examples of organizational factors, such as case flow, 
which may serve as practical constraints to be considered in sentencing decisions by 
courtroom personnel, Dixon (1995) provides a more detailed explanation of the role 
played by the organizational context.  She argues that “political, social, and 
organizational environment” (Dixon, 1995:1164) in which sentencing occurs varies 
from place to place and is highly influential in the sentencing outcomes that result. 
As Johnson, Ulmer, and Kramer (2008) have expressed, the very nature of 
federal sentencing warrants a contextual approach.  Because federal districts extend to 
every corner of the United States, there is likely to be variation in what constitutes 
justice from one jurisdiction to the next, despite the fact that each is encompassed by 
a cohesive federal system.  The limited collection of studies that have examined 
Booker’s impact on sentencing outcomes have either paid limited attention to the 
contextual nature of federal sentencing (Hofer, 2007; USSC, 2006) or have found that 
inter-district variation has not increased since the decision (Ulmer and Light, 2010; 
Ulmer, Light, and Kramer, 2011a).  However, the influence of the role played by 
contextual influences is worthy of further examination.  Given that the Booker 
decision allowed for an expansion of judicial discretion and sentencing flexibility, 
one would expect that any inter-district variation in punitive practices should increase 
in the post-Booker period, as the formalized constraints of the Guidelines have been 
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relaxed, leaving judges’ decisions more susceptible to community-level influences.  
Accordingly, the current dissertation examines the following prediction: 
H3: Inter-district variation in sentencing outcomes will increase significantly 
in the post-Booker era. 
Prior theorizing and research suggests that several factors may account for 
inter-district variation in sentencing.  Some research has shown that lenient sentences 
are more likely to be granted in those jurisdictions experiencing a higher caseload to 
personnel ratio (Johnson, 2005, 2006; Kramer and Ulmer, 1996, 2002; Ulmer and 
Johnson, 2004).  In such jurisdictions, court personnel may attempt to accommodate 
heavy caseloads and increasing demands on criminal justice resources by prescribing 
less severe punishments to the offenders sentenced therein.  With formal constraints 
loosened under Booker, judges under heavy or increasing caseload pressure in the 
new sentencing era may feel justified in departing from the recommendations of the 
Guidelines in order to optimize case processing and maximize the usage of 
correctional resources.  Accordingly, the following hypothesis is offered: 
H4: Judges in districts characterized by heavy or increasing caseload 
pressure, net of individual factors, will hand down less punitive sentences in the post-
Booker period.  
 Another important contextual factor in sentencing in the post-Booker period 
may be district-level history with departures.  Judges in those districts that have 
traditionally high rates of departures may feel even more comfortable using them in 
the current sentencing environment, since the Court excised the portion of the 
Sentencing Reform Act (SRA) that dealt with departure-related appeals (18 U.S.C. § 
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3742(e)).  Alternatively, it may be that judges in those districts with historically lower 
rates of departure may now be more empowered to grant departures, now that the 
threat of appeal no longer looms as large.  Accordingly, the following bidirectional 
prediction can be made: 
H5: Historical district-level departure rates will influence the likelihood of 
individual departures in the post-Booker era. 
Prior research has also shown that sentencing disadvantages for minority 
offenders are often intensified in those districts characterized by large minority 
populations (Johnson, 2005; Johnson, Ulmer, and Kramer, 2008; Ulmer and Johnson, 
2004).  This research has been grounded in racial group threat theory, which posits 
that large or growing numbers of minorities are perceived as threatening to the 
dominance of the white majority (Blumer, 1958; Bobo and Hutchings, 1996; Dixon 
and Rosenbaum, 2004; Quillian, 1995).  In the post-Booker era, as the legitimacy of 
judicial discretion is ostensibly renewed and judges are freer to consider a broader 
array of factors, the role of district-level racial composition may play a more 
prominent role in sentencing outcomes.   
Previous studies have examined contextual variables in a somewhat static 
way, by using measurements of these variables at a single point in time.  However, 
racial group threat perspectives clearly argue for the importance of both static (i.e., 
the percentage of minorities already living in an area) and dynamic factors (i.e., 
whether the minority population is experiencing significant growth), and the current 
study will attempt to account for both of these factors. Based on previous research 
grounded in the racial threat perspective, it is anticipated that: 
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H6: Less favorable sentencing outcomes will be handed down in those 
districts in which blacks constitute a sizeable percentage of the population. 
H7: Less favorable sentencing outcomes will be handed down in those 
districts in which blacks constitute a growing percentage of the population. 
H8: The influence of district-level racial composition and growth will be 
greater in the post-Booker period. 
Booker’s Role in Sentencing for Drug Offenses 
The role of renewed judicial discretion may be particularly salient in drug 
cases, given their controversial place in the federal sentencing narrative.  Many 
judges have been among the group particularly critical of 100:1 crack versus powder 
cocaine sentencing mandates and their disparate impacts on minority offenders.  
Accordingly, Booker (and the clarification provided by Kimbrough) may present an 
opportunity for the bench to make sentences prescribed for these two drug offenses 
more equitable.  Although research published by the Commission in 2006 found that 
federal judges continued to sentence the majority of crack cocaine and other drug 
types in accordance with the Guidelines after the Supreme Court’s decision, their 
analyses are of limited utility because the Supreme Court had not yet decided 
Kimbrough, which effectively eliminated much of the uncertainty surrounding the 
application of Booker in crack and powder cocaine cases.  Because this dissertation 
uses more data than were available when the Commission (2006) published its report, 
it is possible to get a more fully developed picture of the impact Booker has had on 
drug sentencing, and on sanctions for crack and powder cocaine offenses in 
particular.  Accordingly, it is hypothesized that: 
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H9: Sanctions for crack cases will become less punitive over time in the post-
Booker era, making sentencing outcomes for crack more comparable to those found 
in cases involving powder cocaine. 
H10: Disparities between whites and minorities in sentencing outcomes for 
drug case will decrease in the post-Booker era, particularly in more recent years of 
data. 
It is also anticipated that the relative district-level drug caseload composition 
specifically affects sentencing outcomes for drug offenders.  Because the 100:1 crack-
cocaine policy has been heavily criticized, it may be the case that those districts 
characterized by large or increasing numbers of drug cases will be simultaneously 
characterized by a greater willingness to grant more favorable sentences in drug cases 
in the post-Booker period.  As such, it is expected that:   
H11: Judges in those districts characterized by heavy relative drug caseloads 
will grant favorable sentencing outcomes to drug offenders in the post-Booker period. 
H12: Judges in those districts characterized by increasing relative drug 
caseloads will grant favorable sentencing outcomes to drug offenders in the post-
Booker period.  
Booker’s Influence in Sentencing Outcomes for Immigration Offenses 
Very little research attention has been devoted to investigating how the 
Supreme Court’s decision has influenced sentencing outcomes for immigration 
offenses.  Existing Booker research has either masked the unique nature of 
immigration cases by including them in models with other types of offenses (USSC, 
2006; 2010a), or it has excluded these offenses from examination altogether (Ulmer 
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and Light, 2010; Ulmer, Light, and Kramer, 2011a; 2011b).  Although a recent study 
does pay particular attention to sentencing outcomes for these offenses (Hartley and 
Tillyer, 2012), this research was limited to a single year (2008) and was not intended 
to gauge the impact of Booker on sentencing trends for immigration offenders over 
time.   
Although the research by Hartley and Tillyer (2012) provides the most 
meaningful findings relevant to immigration cases (i.e., that longer prison terms have 
largely been reserved for those immigration offenders who were male, were detained 
prior to sentencing, had more extensive criminal histories, and were charged with 
trafficking offenses), it is difficult to draw inferences regarding Booker’s influence 
from a study using only a single year of data.  Two opposing viewpoints may apply.  
If judges are using Booker as an excuse to deviate from what are believed to be overly 
harsh sanctions for immigration offenses prescribed by the Guidelines, the post-
Booker period may be characterized by less punitive sanctions for these offenses with 
each passing year.  On the other hand, judges may use the increased discretion 
afforded to them by Booker to apply more punitive than prescribed sentences for the 
fastest growing segment of their caseload, particularly given the concomitant increase 
in anti-immigration sentiment since the beginning of the 21
st
 century.  Because little 
research exists to guide predictions, the analyses must be seen as exploratory in 
nature.  As such, it is simply hypothesized that: 
H13: Sanctions for immigration offenses will exhibit differences in the post-




H14: Disparities in sentencing outcomes will be evident between non-
Hispanics and Hispanics in the post-Booker period, particularly in more recent years 
of data. 
Finally, because previous research has shown that differences exist between 
non-border and border-districts, it is predicted that: 
H15: Inter-district variation in sentencing outcomes for immigration offenses 
exists and will increase significantly in the post-Booker era. 
The next chapter is devoted to describing the data and methods to be used to 
examine these hypotheses. 
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CHAPTER V: DATA AND METHODS 
This chapter describes the data used in the current dissertation.  Individual and 
case-level data provided by the United States Sentencing Commission, and contextual 
data obtained from a variety of sources, are used to investigate the hypotheses 
presented in the previous chapter.  These data, and all of the statistical modeling 
approaches employed, are explained in detail below. 
Data 
The primary source of data for the current analyses is the United States 
Sentencing Commission’s annual Monitoring of Federal Criminal Sentences series, 
which contains information about the characteristics of the defendant and his or her 
case.
34
  These data are available upon request from the Inter-University Consortium 
for Political and Social Research (www.icpsr.umich.edu).  The years 2000 through 
2008 were selected to provide comparable samples of pre- and post-Booker cases.  
Cases were limited to those sentenced within the 90 districts in the United States 
(including the District of Columbia); U.S. territories - Guam, North Marianas, Puerto 
Rico, and the Virgin Islands – were excluded.   
In addition to these individual-level (“Level 1”) data, community- and court-
level (“Level 2”) data are also utilized in some of the analyses that follow.  These 
data were derived from a variety of different sources, including statistical websites 
maintained by the United States Census Bureau, Fedstats, and the Administrative 
                                                 
34
 The federal court system has domain over cases that involve the U.S. Constitution, laws passed by 
Congress, or crimes committed on federal property (Federal Judicial Center).  Arrests may be made by 
federal law enforcement agencies including the Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms, and Explosives 
(ATF), the Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA), the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI), the 




Office of the U.S. Courts on behalf of the Federal Judiciary.  As discussed in more 
detail below, Level 2 data are only included in those models investigating the way 
contextual factors (e.g., caseload pressure, racial makeup) affect sentencing 
outcomes.   
Dependent Variables 
 In order to examine the study’s hypotheses, multiple sentencing outcomes are 
examined; all outcome variables are found in the Level 1 data provided by the 
Commission.  Since the inception of the Guidelines, the starting point for judges’ 
decisions has been based upon where the defendant’s criminal history score and 
current offense level intersect on the Sentencing Table (see Appendix A).  The first 
decision facing sentencing judges is whether or not defendants should be 
incarcerated; this decision is captured in the data by the Commission’s PRISDUM 
dummy variable, which is coded such that the receipt of a prison sentence is coded as 
1.
35
  The second decision facing judges is the length of prison term to which 
defendants are to be sentenced.  This outcome is derived from the SENTTOT variable 
provided by the Commission and represents the total sentence in months, with values 
capped at 470 months to represent life sentences (Kitchens, 2010); cases not receiving 
a prison sentence are excluded.  Consistent with prior research (Bushway and Piehl, 
2001; Johnson, 2006; Johnson and Betsinger, 2008; Wooldredge, 2007), due to the 
positively skewed nature of federal sentences, this dissertation uses a logged measure 
of sentence length.   
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 Because the current dissertation seeks to examine the role of Booker in determining the incarceration 
decision, the PRISDUM variable is chosen over the INOUT variable, which also measures the receipt 
of incarceration but also accounts for offenders’ eligibility for non-prison sentences. 
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 Judges may choose to sentence outside of the ranges prescribed by the 
Guidelines by utilizing one of several types of departures.  Although judges have 
increasingly made use of sentences above what the Guidelines recommend in the 
post-Booker era (Hofer, 2007; USSC, 2006), these upward departures are extremely 
rare and are therefore not examined as a separate outcome.
36
  On the other hand, two 
different types of downward departures are examined here.  Government-initiated 
downward departures include substantial assistance departures (§5K1.1) as well as 
Early Disposition (§5K3.1) departures, both of which are initiated at the discretion of 
the prosecutor but which still require judicial approval.  Judges may also initiate 
departures in those instances in which they perceive mitigating circumstances that 
were not embodied by the Guidelines.  The presence of either government-initiated or 
judge-initiated departures is captured in the data by separate dummy variables.
37
  
Those cases that are not eligible for either type of downward departure (i.e., those 
falling within Zone A of the Sentencing Table), those receiving upward departures, 
and those missing departure information are excluded from the analyses examining 
departure outcomes.  
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 Only 1% of cases sentenced between 2000 and 2008 received upward departures. 
37
 The U.S. Sentencing Commission’s coding of departures changed significantly over the nine years 
included in these analyses.  From 2000 through 2002, departures were captured using a categorical 
variable, DEPART, which indicated the absence/inapplicability of a departure or the presence of either 
an upward departure, a downward departure, or a substantial assistance downward departure.  In 2003, 
the DEPART variable was modified to include additional categories for departures based on the Early 
Disposition Program (EDP) as well as combinations of multiple departures (i.e., Substantial Assistance 
and Other Downward Departure; EDP and Other Downward Departure; EDP and Substantial 
Assistance; EDP and Substantial Assistance and Other Departure).  In 2004, and prior to the Booker 
decision in 2005, departures were captured using the DEPART_A variable; this variable largely 
followed the format laid out by the DEPART variable as it was used from 2000 to 2002 but this 
version also included a category for departures based on the EDP.  Finally, following the Booker 
decision in 2005, the Commission captured deviations from the Guidelines using BOOKERCD, a 
twelve-category variable which provided for differentiations between within range sentences and the 
various upward or downward departures, with distinctions made between departures based on 
Guidelines reasons and those using §3553 as a justification. 
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Level 1 Independent Variables 
 The primary Level 1 variable of interest is a dichotomous variable coded to 
indicate whether the offender’s case occurred before or after the Supreme Court’s 
ruling in Booker, which was decided on January 12, 2005.  Because the data are 
collected on a fiscal basis, the Booker decision falls in the midst of the year 2005; 
thus, in addition to all of the cases sentenced in 2006 through 2008, nearly half of the 
cases sentenced in 2005 are classified as post-Booker cases.   
A wide range of independent variables from the Commission’s data is 
included to account for a host of offense- and case-related factors.  First and foremost, 
a measure of presumptive sentence length is included; based on the offender’s 
criminal history score and his/her current offense severity, this variable represents the 
starting point for judges in deciding a suitable sentence and is considered “appropriate 
for ‘removing’ variation in sentence length attributable to the guidelines, and it may 
be a superior predictor relative to other legal measures such as offense 
type/classification and prior record” (Wooldredge, 2009: 295; see also Bushway and 
Piehl, 2001; Engen and Gainey, 2000; Johnson, Ulmer, and Kramer, 2008; Spohn and 
Fornago, 2009; USSC, 2004).  The presumptive sentence is based on the adjusted 
guidelines minimum, but it also accounts for instances in which a mandatory 
minimum sentence trumps the recommended sentence.
38
  Consistent with prior 
                                                 
38
 The presumptive guidelines length was coded to adjust for mandatory penalties that supplant the 
adjusted guidelines minimum.  Some of these mandatories were present for all years in the dataset (i.e., 
drug and gun minimums), while others were instituted in later years; the latter include mandatory 
penalties for repeat sex offenders and for offenses involving explosives, pornography, illegal sexual 
activity (i.e., coercion and enticement to engage in prostitution/illegal sexual activity, transportation of 
minors), immigration, possession of false identification documents, and those committed while on 
release, in addition to “other” mandatory minimums not considered in this list.  In instances in which 
the safety valve was applied in drug cases, the presumptive guidelines length was coded as the adjusted 
guidelines minimum rather than the mandatory minimum (Spohn and Fornango, 2009). 
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research (Hofer and Blackwell, 2001; Johnson, Ulmer, and Kramer, 2008), the 
defendant’s criminal history score is also included in the analyses.  Even though 
criminal history is one of the two major components (along with final offense 
severity) that decide the presumptive sentence length, the two variables are only 
weakly correlated (r = .343). 
 The type of offense is captured by a set of six dummy variables – violent, 
property, drug, fraud, firearms, and other – with property offenses serving as the 
omitted reference category; as is discussed in more detail below, due to their unique 
characteristics, cases involving immigration offenses are examined separately.   
Finally, detention prior to sentencing and conviction by either a bench or jury trial are 
each captured by dummy variables.
39
  
Because the Commission only collects a limited amount of data on factors 
associated with defendants’ personal backgrounds, there are many variables for which 
the current analyses simply cannot control (e.g., socioeconomic status, family history, 
etc.).  Still, the data do contain information on the offender’s race/ethnicity, age, sex, 
citizenship status, number of financial dependents, and level of educational 
achievement.  The race of the defendant is recoded into a set of dummy variables 
such that whites, blacks, Hispanics, and members of other racial/ethnic groups are 
represented, and a separate binary variable is included for cases in which 
race/ethnicity is missing.
40
  Age is provided in years, and a dummy variable is used to 
                                                 
39
 Consistent with work by Johnson, Ulmer, and Kramer (2008), I elected not to include the variable 
for “acceptance of responsibility” in the analyses.  As noted by those researchers, not only does the 
presumptive sentence length variable account for acceptance of responsibility discounts, but it is also 
strongly associated with mode of conviction (i.e., correlation with plea bargaining, r = .613).   
40
 Only 1% of offenders were indicated as being both black and Hispanic; these cases were recoded 
into the black dummy variable. 
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indicate male gender.  Citizenship status is captured by a dummy variable coded so 
that non-citizens are equal to one, and a separate dummy variable is included to 
account for cases missing information on citizenship.  The number of dependents is 
also recoded as a dummy variable such that having one or more dependents is 
distinguished from having no dependents; a separate dummy variable is used to 
account for those cases missing information on dependents.  In addition, educational 
attainment is also represented by a series of dummy variables – less than a high 
school diploma, high school graduate, some college, college graduate, and education 
level missing – with high school graduates being the omitted reference category.  
Basic descriptions of relevant individual-level (“Level 1”) variables are provided in 
Table 2. 
Finally, in those models not considering contextual effects (see below), 
dummy variables are included to represent each of the federal districts.  Descriptive 
statistics for Level 1 data are provided in subsequent chapters. 
Level 2 Independent Variables 
Given that the study period spans nine years, attention must be paid to the fact 
that, not only did many sentencing changes occur during that time period, but it is 
very likely that many contextual changes occurred as well.  Accordingly, the second 
level of data consists of an assortment of static and, where appropriate, dynamic 
district-level independent variables reported for the 90 federal districts.  Descriptions 
of these Level 2 variables are provided in Table 3.  Court size is represented by the 
number of authorized judgeships in each federal district; because it exhibits little 
change over time, court size is captured by a static variable, with the number of 
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authorized judgeships averaged over 2000 through 2008.  Historic departures are 
calculated by averaging the aggregate rate of departures, including upward as well as 
government- and judge-initiated downward departures, over time, using the 
Commission’s data.  Caseload pressure, or the total number of filings (civil, felony 
criminal, and supervised release hearings) per district judge, is more variable over 
time.  Accordingly, a static measure of caseload pressure is calculated by averaging 
filings per judge over time, while a dynamic measure is used to account for the 
average percentage change in filings.    
Because group threat theories point to the need to examine the way that large 
and growing racial and ethnic minority populations affect sanctions, the current study 
uses both static and dynamic measures to account for shifts in these groups over time.  
Yearly county-level population data available through the U.S. Census Bureau were 
aggregated to provide percentages of blacks in each federal district.  Percent changes 
were then averaged over time.   
Analytic Approach 
 The effect of the Booker decision is examined in multiple ways.  Because 
Booker provides a natural experiment¸ a quasi-experimental pre-test post-test design 
is employed to examine the decision’s impact.  First, for each outcome, models 
including all cases sentenced throughout the study period are explored.  These “full” 
models include a dummy variable to indicate whether cases were sentenced in the 




Next, the results of period-specific (pre- and post-Booker) linear models are 
compared using a z-test for the equality of regression coefficients (Brame, 
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where 1  represents pre-Booker coefficients and 2 represents post-Booker 
coefficients.  In the case of nonlinear regression models, because coefficients are 
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where α represents underlying coefficient  and σ represents the standard deviation of 
the unobserved variation (Allison, 1999; Hoetker, 2007).  Statistical significance of 













     (5.3)  
 where 1  and 2 again represent pre- and post-Booker coefficients (Allison, 1999). 
Finally, because the more nuanced hypotheses set forth in this dissertation 
assert that important changes will not be apparent immediately following Booker but 
will emerge with time, each outcome is also examined using quarterly regression 
models.  Depending on the model, quarterly odds ratios or percent changes for 
variables of interest are graphed so that trends may be inspected. 
 The approach to examining the hypothesized effects of Booker described 
above is implemented in two ways.  First, individual-level models, which include 
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Level 1 predictors and control for district-level differences using fixed effects, are 
used to explore predictions concerning general changes in sentencing outcomes 
before and after the decision.  Second, in order to investigate how the impact of the 
Booker decision may be contextualized by district-level factors, multilevel models are 
employed and include both Level 1 and Level 2 predictors.  Each of these approaches 
is described in more detail below. 
Individual-Level Models 
Hypotheses concerning general changes anticipated in the wake of the 
Supreme Court’s decision are investigated using models which include only 
individual-level predictors and which control for average differences across districts 
using fixed effects.  The incarceration decision (i.e., the likelihood of receiving a 
prison sentence versus being released or receiving a sentence not involving 
imprisonment) is modeled using logistic regression.  Ordinary least squares (OLS) 
regression is used to model decisions concerning the length of prison sentences.  The 
likelihood of receiving a government-initiated or judge-initiated departure (or not 
receiving either type of departure) is modeled using multinomial logistic regression.  
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61 
 
where, for individual i, iX  represents the log odds of imprisonment, iY  represents the 
natural log of the months of imprisonment, and iZ  represents the log odds of 
receiving a d departure compared to receiving no departure, D.  Across all models, 
ijB  signifies a vector of j offense and case-related factors, and ikC  stands for a block 
of fixed effects for federal districts. 
Contextual Models 
  Predictions focused on the contextualized nature of sentencing attempt to 
extend the research scope beyond only the individual- and case-level factors typically 
shown to influence sentencing decisions to consider factors that may influence these 
outcomes in a more nuanced or indirect way.  Multilevel models are utilized to depict 
the nested relationship between individual cases sentenced within districts and to 
overcome the problems created by the dependent nature of this relationship (Johnson, 
2005; Ulmer and Johnson, 2004).  This dependency often results in residual errors 
that are “correlated within [districts], violating the OLS assumption of independent 
error terms and risking a misestimation of standard errors” (Ulmer and Johnson, 
2004: 152).  As Johnson, Ulmer, and Kramer (2008: 756) argue, “Hierarchical models 
correct misestimated standard errors caused by data clustering, provide properly 
adjusted statistical significance tests, and offer analytical advantages such as the 
parceling of variation across levels of analysis, the modeling of heterogeneity in 
regression coefficients, and the proper estimation of cross-level interaction effects.” 
Whereas most regression models assume uniform effects across aggregate 
units, multilevel models also have the ability to model variation in both the model 
intercept and the slopes for specified coefficients (Field, 2009).  In the present 
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context, this means that, rather than predicting that the Booker decision will have 
similar effects on all individuals regardless of where they are sentenced, the decision 
can be viewed as affecting individuals differently across districts.  Accordingly, 
Equations 5.5-5.7 below represent the multilevel models used in the present research. 
ijijjjij BY   10      (5.7) 
jj u000         (5.8) 
jj u111          (5.9) 
In Equation 5.6, ijY  is used to represent each outcome of interest (i.e., incarceration, 
sentence length, and likelihood of departure) and ijB  represents a vector of j offense 
and case-related factors.  The main difference between this equation and Equations 
5.4-5.6 is that this model accounts for individual cases, i, and districts, j.  Equations 
5.8 and 5.9 account for random intercepts, j0 , and random slopes, j1 , respectively 
(Field, 2009).   
Data Limitations 
Although the Commission’s data provide a great deal of information about 
individual offender and offense characteristics, some caveats should be noted.  First, 
the fact that the data set consists, in essence, of a large population rather than a 
sample means that statistical tests for significance are more sensitive, and even trivial 
differences are likely to appear to be significant.  Although these statistical tests are 
reported to be consistent with previous research, the focus of the discussion of results 
is on substantive differences.  At the same time, the statistical tests for contextual 
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models are based on the number of districts (n=90), so the likelihood of finding all 
predictors statistically significant at this level of analysis is much less. 
  The Commission’s data may be subject to omitted variable bias because 
information on some potentially important variables (e.g., socioeconomic status, 
employment history, family history, level of evidence) is not recorded (Johnson, 
Ulmer, and Kramer, 2008).  This may be due, in part, to the initial limitations placed 
on the Commission by Congress regarding the factors deemed appropriate for 
creating the federal sentencing guidelines.  The SRA specifically precluded the 
Commission from considering the personal characteristics of offenders, or proxies for 
these characteristics, in its creation of the Guidelines.  Information on other variables 
is simply no longer collected.
41
  Unfortunately, these omissions prevent researchers 
from directly examining what role certain factors play in federal criminal sentencing.  
Similarly, although the Commission collects identifying information on judges for 
internal usage, judicial identifiers are removed from the data that are made available 
to researchers.     
Despite these limitations, though, the Commission’s data are very high quality 
and contain a great deal of information about individual cases sentenced at the federal 
level.  Although some cases had to be dropped because they were missing 
information on key variables, 
 
this did not result in the loss of a significant number of 
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 Up through 2003, the Commission collected information on the type of attorney obtained by the 
defendant (e.g., private attorney, public defender, etc.).  As is noted in the 2004 Monitoring of Federal 




cases, and the current dissertation makes use of data on a large sample of federal 
cases.
42
     
Findings are presented as follows.  Results from the overall models are 
presented in Chapter VI; the findings for drug-specific models are detailed in Chapter 
VII; and immigration-specific results are detailed in Chapter VIII.  Chapter IX 
provides a summary of all of the results, and Chapter X discusses policy implications 
of the present research and suggests direction for future research efforts. 
                                                 
42
 Less than 8% of the cases had to be dropped from the dataset due to missing information; earlier 
years of data has larger proportions of cases with missing information on key variables. 
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CHAPTER VI: ALL OFFENSE TYPES (EXCLUDING IMMIGRATION) 
 This chapter explores the overall impact of the Supreme Court’s decision by 
comparing pre-Booker sentencing outcomes to those in the post-Booker era using 
both individual- and district-level data.  Consistent with other research studies (Ulmer 
and Light, 2010; Ulmer, Light, and Kramer, 2011a, 2011b), the current examination 
excludes immigration offenses, which are noticeably different from cases involving 
other federal offenses.  Unlike prior work, though, immigration offenses are 
examined separately in Chapter VIII.   
Individual-Level Analysis 
Table 4 includes descriptive statistics for the individual-level data.  Forty-
three percent of the cases included in the study occurred after the Booker decision.  
Due to the large sample size, a number of statistically significant differences are 
evident between the two time periods, though, substantively speaking, the two groups 
are generally very similar, particularly with respect to demographics.  At the same 
time, offenders sentenced after Booker had more extensive criminal histories and 
longer presumptive sentences, and they were more frequently detained prior to 
sentencing.  While slightly smaller percentages of offenders were sentenced for 
violent, property, drug, and fraud offenses in the post-Booker period, slightly larger 
percentages of offenders were sentenced for cases involving firearms and other 
offenses following the Supreme Court’s decision.    
Consistent with extant research (Hofer, 2007; Ulmer, Light, and Kramer, 
2011a; USSC, 2006), the descriptive statistics suggest that a significantly higher 
percentage of cases received imprisonment following Booker (87%) than in the years 
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prior to the decision (84%), and that the average term of imprisonment for these 
offenders also increased significantly, from 64 months to 72 months.  In addition, the 
percentage of cases receiving government-initiated departures increased significantly 
between the two periods, from 19% to 27%, and there was a significant but negligible 
change in the percentage of cases receiving judge-initiated departures following 
Booker.   
Imprisonment and Sentence Length – Individual-Level Models 
 The first hypothesis predicts that imprisonment and sentence length trends 
following Booker will largely resemble trends that existed prior to the Supreme 
Court’s decision but that differences will emerge with time, as judges become more 
comfortable with breaking with the sanctions dictated by the Guidelines.  These 
differences are predicted to differentially affect black and Hispanic offenders.  
Results for imprisonment and sentence length models are detailed separately below.  
Although models included all of the relevant variables detailed previously, tabled 
results are limited in the interest of space, and the discussion of results focuses 
primarily on hypothesized relationships between specific predictors and outcomes of 
interest.   
Imprisonment 
In order to assess predictions related to the imprisonment decision, three 
separate logistic regression models were estimated, and the results are displayed in 
Table 5.  The first model includes all cases during the entire study period, and the 
results suggest that the Booker decision was not related to significant increases in the 
likelihood of imprisonment.  During the same time frame, there were substantial 
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differences in the incarceration decision based on race/ethnicity such that, relative to 
whites, blacks were 4% more likely to be incarcerated, and Hispanics were 31% more 
likely to be incarcerated.   
Predictions about the changing influence of race and ethnicity on the 
incarceration decision can be investigated by comparing results in the pre-and-post 
Booker models in Table 5.  The results suggest that the odds of imprisonment for both 
blacks and Hispanics increased after the Booker decision.  Compared to whites, 
blacks were 4% more likely to be incarcerated prior to the decision, and they were 6% 
more likely to be incarcerated in the period following the High Court’s ruling.  
Hispanics were 27% more likely than whites to be incarcerated in the time period 
prior to the Supreme Court’s decision, while they were 39% more likely to be 
incarcerated after the decision.  However, the chi-square statistic in the far right 
column of the table shows that pre- and post-Booker differences in imprisonment 
outcomes were not statistically significant for blacks, though they were significant for 
Hispanics at the p<.05 level.
43
   
In order to more specifically address the question of whether deviations in 
sentencing trends for blacks and Hispanics are becoming more apparent with time, 
logistic regression models were estimated for the incarceration decision for each 
quarter in the data set.
44
  To account for sudden quarterly fluctuations and to establish 
a clearer trend line, a three quarter moving average of the odds ratios was calculated, 
and the results are graphed in Figure 1.  Incarceration outcomes for whites, the 
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 Again, consistent with other work (Allison, 1999; Hoetker, 2007), a Wald chi-square test is used to 
assess the statistical difference between nonlinear regression models because coefficients are scaled by 
an unknown variance. 
44
 Disaggregating the data by quarters reduced the number of cases included in the regression models.  
In some quarters, some districts had few or no cases and were therefore removed from the models. 
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omitted reference group, are represented by the thick, horizontal line at 1.0.  Notably, 
the trend line for blacks only dropped below 1.0 once, suggesting that, for nearly all 
of the study period, blacks were more likely to be the recipients of imprisonment than 
whites.  Further, the trend line for Hispanics was much higher than that of blacks for 
the entirety of the study period, indicating that they experienced even higher odds of 
incarceration.   
Figure 1 not only provides more context for interpreting the results of Table 5, 
but it provides little evidence of a “Booker effect” with respect to the incarceration of 
either blacks or Hispanics.  Although the graph suggests that imprisonment trends 
were slightly less stable for blacks following the decision, a separate t-test comparing 
the average odds of incarceration for these offenders prior to and following Booker 
reveals no statistically significant differences (t=.29).  Further, while the results 
shown in Table 5 indicate that Hispanics’ odds of incarceration significantly 
increased in the post-Booker period, and a separate t-test comparing the mean odds of 
incarceration for each time period supports this finding (t=2.22, p<.05), the quarterly 
results graphed in Figure 1 suggest that their odds of incarceration actually began to 
increase during the PROTECT period, well before the Booker ruling.  Finally, though 
the incarceration trend lines for both blacks and Hispanics were increasing in the last 
fiscal year of the study period, there is little prima facie evidence to suggest that 
Booker is responsible for these upward shifts, as the trends for both groups were 
trending downward in the preceding quarters.  Additional years of data are required to 
investigate whether these patterns were sustained, as well as whether they are 




Given that the incarceration decision is only the first of many choices that 
affect offenders’ overall sentences, it is necessary to additionally examine sentence 
length outcomes to determine whether important differences have emerged as more 
time has passed since the Booker decision.  OLS models representing the sentence 
length decision were estimated for the entire study period as well as for both the pre- 
and post-Booker periods; due to the skewed distribution of sentence lengths, 
logarithmic transformations of this outcome were completed.  The results for these 
logged sentence length models are reported in Table 6.  The results of the first model, 
which includes all cases sentenced from 2000 through 2008, suggest that slightly 
longer sentences were handed down during the post-Booker period.  However, during 
this time frame, sentence lengths were slightly shorter for both blacks and Hispanics 
relative to their white counterparts.   
Comparing the coefficients for minority groups across the pre- and post-
Booker models suggests very little change over time.  Although blacks were the 
recipients of significantly shorter sentences than whites during both periods, 
sentences for Hispanics were not significantly different from those of whites during 
either time frame.  However, the z-scores provided in the far right column of Table 6 
indicate significant changes between the two time periods such that both blacks and 
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Hispanics received slightly shorter sentences in the post-Booker period.
45
  
Accordingly, it is instructive to examine sentence lengths for cases on a quarterly 
basis to investigate when shifting patterns emerged.  As such, a three quarter moving 
average was calculated, and quarterly percent differences for these two groups are 
graphed in Figure 2.  Consistent with the findings already discussed, this graph offers 
no evidence that sentence lengths for black and Hispanic offenders became noticeably 
more punitive after the Booker decision.  Relative to whites, sentence lengths for 
these two groups began to decline prior to the PROTECT Act.  Although these trends 
appear to have changed substantially over time, sentence lengths were very similar 
for blacks, Hispanics, and whites by the end of the study period.  Moreover, t-tests for 
both groups confirm that mean percentage differences in sentence length were not 
significantly different prior to and following the Supreme Court’s decision (t=.65 for 
blacks; t=.59 for Hispanics).  Additionally, it is important to emphasize the modest 
magnitude of the effect sizes in Figure 2.  At no point during the study period were 
sentence lengths greater than 3% longer for Hispanic and black defendants than for 
whites, and at no point were differences favoring these groups larger than 5% and 7% 
respectively.   
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 Alternative models were estimated to separately account for the presumptive guidelines minimum 
and the application of any mandatory minimum.  Although the model for the full study period 
indicated that significantly longer sentences were handed down post-Booker, the coefficient for 
Hispanics was non-significant.  Separately estimated regression models for the pre- and post-Booker 
periods indicated that, though Hispanics received significantly longer sentences in the pre-Booker 
period, their sentences were not significantly different from those of whites in the post-Booker period.  
The application of mandatory minimums was non-significant in the post-Booker model but was 
significant in the models for the pre-Booker period and for the overall time period.  Other findings 
were not substantively different from those presented in the text. 
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Departures – Individual-Level Models 
 Disparities between whites and minorities in the receipt of both government- 
and judge-initiated departures are predicted to become more apparent as more time 
has passed since the Booker decision.  In order to assess these predictions, 
multinomial logistic regression models were estimated to represent the decision to use 
either government-initiated or judge-initiated downward departures (relative to using 
no departure).  The results for the first model, which includes all eligible cases 
sentenced throughout the entire study period, are presented in Table 7.  These results 
indicate that the Booker decision is associated with positive and significant increases 
in the likelihood of receiving both types of departures.  After the Supreme Court’s 
decision, offenders were 79% more likely to receive government-initiated departures, 
and they were 22% more likely to receive discounts initiated by judges on average.  
The results for this model also indicate that, during the nine years included in the 
study period, both blacks and Hispanics were less likely to be the recipients of 
downward departures, regardless of type of departure. 
 Period specific multinomial logistic regression models, representing the pre- 
and post-Booker eras, were also estimated, and the results are presented in Table 8.  
These results indicate that, both before and after the Supreme Court’s decision, blacks 
and Hispanics were significantly less likely to benefit from both government- and 
judge-initiated departures.  Changes between the two time periods are significant for 
Hispanics only for government-initiated departures, while significant changes are 
evident for blacks over time only for judge-initiated departures.  These results suggest 
that, though these groups were still less likely than whites to receive these departures, 
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their odds of receiving these respective sentencing discounts improved in the period 
following Booker.
46
    
 In order to further investigate racial disparity in the pre-and-post Booker eras, 
quarterly multinomial logistic regression models were examined.  Moving averages 
of odds ratios over three quarters were calculated for blacks and Hispanics, and the 
results are graphed in Figure 3 for government-initiated departures and in Figure 4 for 
judge-initiated departures.  As is most apparent in Figure 3, the odds of receiving 
government-initiated departures rose dramatically during the PROTECT Act period 
and peaked for both blacks and Hispanics right before the Supreme Court’s decision; 
for Hispanics, this increase was almost to the point of parity with whites.  The odds of 
receiving a government-initiated departure dropped for both groups after the decision, 
and declining odds of these departures continued through the remainder of the study 
period.   T-tests respectively comparing the mean odds of receiving a government-
initiated departure for black and Hispanic offenders prior to and following Booker 
reveals no statistically significant differences (t=.38 for blacks; t=0 for Hispanics). 
 Trends for judge-initiated departures, presented in Figure 4, are more 
suggestive of a possible Booker influence.  From the beginning of the study period 
through the passage of the PROTECT Act, Hispanics were more likely than whites 
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 Additional analyses examined the extent to which the magnitudes of both government- and judge-
initiated departures were influenced by the Booker decision.  Contrary to expectations that judges 
would use longer departures as a vehicle for providing what are believed to be more just and 
appropriate sentences, the magnitude of government-initiated departures did not significantly differ 
prior to and following the Supreme Court’s decision, and the magnitudes of judge-initiated departures 
were significantly shorter in the post-Booker era.  Period-specific models indicated that the magnitude 
of government-initiated departures were significantly shorter for Hispanics in the post-Booker era, 
though graphing the quarterly percent differences suggested that disparities between Hispanics and 
whites were improving somewhat after the decision.  Both blacks and Hispanics were found to have 
received significantly shorter judge-initiated departures following Booker, but graphing the quarterly 
percent differences in this outcome suggests that departure lengths for these groups began declining in 
the PROTECT Act period, prior to the Supreme Court’s decision. 
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(represented by the horizontal line at 1.0) to be the recipients of departures brought 
forth by judges.  However, by the end of the PROTECT Act period, their odds of 
receiving these departures had dropped dramatically and were, in fact, lower than 
both their black and white counterparts.  For black offenders, the odds of judge-
initiated departures hovered below .8 prior to the Booker decision.  After the Supreme 
Court’s ruling, the likelihood of receiving these departures gradually increased for 
both blacks and Hispanics, peaking near the end of fiscal year 2007, right before both 
Gall and Kimbrough were decided.  T-tests confirmed that the mean odds of receiving 
a judge-initiated departure increased significantly for black and Hispanic offenders 
following the Booker decision (t=3.60, p<.01 for blacks; t=2.84, p<.01 for Hispanics).  
It is worth noting that the trends for blacks and Hispanics much more closely 
mirrored each other after the Booker decision, but the odds of departure for neither 
group approached a level on par with those of whites. 
 To summarize, the overall regression results for both government- and judge-
initiated departures lend little credibility to the notion that Booker has created an 
environment in which sentencing discounts are increasingly being used for whites 
rather than for racial and ethnic minorities.  While whites were significantly more 
likely to benefit from departures in both time periods, regardless of who initiated 
them, the odds of receiving government-initiated departures increased for Hispanic 
offenders by 4% on average, and the odds of receiving judge-initiated departures 
increased for black defendants by 8% on average, following the Booker decision.  
Examination of the quarterly trends additionally suggests that the odds of receiving 
judge-initiated departures for minority offenders have been steadily increasing since 
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the Booker decision, though they still remained well below the level of whites at the 
end of the study period.   
Multi-Level Analysis 
 This section explores the role of contextual factors in each of the sentencing 
outcomes described above.  Descriptive statistics for district-level variables are 
provided in Table 9.  During the study period, an average district in the sample had 7 
judges, with approximately 463 filings per judge each year; average caseloads 
declined slightly between the periods prior to (468 cases) and following (457 cases) 
the Booker decision.  Averaged across the entire study period, case filings increased 
roughly 4%, but they increased nearly 11% when only the pre-Booker years are 
considered, and they declined by slightly more than one-half of one percent during 
the post-Booker period.  District-level departure rates hovered around 34% during 
both the pre- and post-Booker periods.  Although the average district-level racial 
composition was slightly less than 10% across the years in the study period, the 
district-level percentage increase in the black population was 91%, averaged across 
all of the years in the study period; the racial composition increased more 
substantially during the pre- than post-Booker period. 
 In general, inter-district variation was predicted to increase over time as 
Booker allowed judges to shape their decisions to be consistent with the desires of the 
communities in which they were embedded.  This prediction can be assessed by 
comparing the unconditional models for the pre-and post-Booker periods for each 
outcome (Table 10).  Consistent with the findings of Ulmer, Light, and Kramer 
(2011a), these results provide little evidence to support the notion that Booker has 
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contributed to decreased uniformity in the application of the Guidelines across federal 
districts.
 47
  In both the pre- and post-Booker periods, districts accounted for 
approximately 6-7% of the variance in incarceration outcomes (6.5% versus 6.1%), 
and about 5% of the variance in sentence length outcomes (5.1% versus 4.6%).  
Although the proportion of the variance accounted for by districts in the likelihood of 
receiving either government- or judge-initiated departures was comparatively more 
substantial, changes between the two time periods were modest (9.2% versus 12.6% 
for government-initiated departures; 11.2% versus 10.0% for judge-initiated 
departures).   
 Table 11 summarizes the findings for the district-level predictors for each 
sentencing outcome;
48
 individual-level predictors are excluded from this table 
because the findings were not substantively different from the individual-level models 
previously presented.  Judges in districts characterized by either heavy or increasing 
caseload pressure were predicted to sentence less punitively, and the impact of 
caseload pressure was hypothesized to be more evident in the post-Booker period.  
The only result consistent with these expectations was the finding that, in the post-
Booker period, judges in districts in which caseload pressure was increasing were 
significantly more inclined to grant judge-initiated departures.  Contrary to 
expectations, heavy caseloads were significantly and positively related to the 
likelihood of receiving government-initiated departures during the period prior to 
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 Separate analyses also indicate that the pre-to-post change in the proportion of variance accounted 
for by districts in the magnitude of government-initiated departures was negligible (8.6% versus 
11.1%).  Although the change in district-level variance for the judge-initiated departures was more 
substantial (8.4% versus 2.1%), this result contradicts expectations by suggesting that districts were 
actually becoming more uniform in the lengths of these departures after the Supreme Court’s decision.  
48
 A correlation matrix for district-level predictors is found in Appendix B. 
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Booker but not during the period following the Supreme Court’s decision.  Caseload 
pressure was significantly related to judge-initiated departures following the Supreme 
Court’s decision, but in the opposite of the predicted direction, such that judges in 
districts characterized by heavy caseloads were significantly less likely to grant these 
departures.   
 Historical district-level rates of departure were predicted to influence the 
likelihood of granting departures in the post-Booker era.  As is apparent in Table 11, 
districts with higher historical departure rates were more likely to grant both 
government- and judge-initiated departures both prior to and following the Supreme 
Court’s decision in Booker.  Historical departures rates were also related to 
significantly shorter average sentences in both time periods.
49
   
 Finally, it was hypothesized that less favorable sentencing outcomes would be 
handed down in districts in which blacks constituted either a sizeable or growing 
percentage of the population.  Further, the influence of racial composition and growth 
was predicted to be more influential on sentencing outcomes in the period following 
the Booker decision.  As is shown in Table 11, these predictions were met with 
limited support.  Consistent with expectations, judges in districts with large black 
populations were less likely to grant judge-initiated departures in the post-Booker 
period; in addition, districts with growing black populations were less likely to grant 
government-initiated departures after the Supreme Court’s decision.  More 
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 Separate analyses also revealed that judges in districts with higher historical departure rates granted 
significantly longer departures, regardless of who initiated them. 
77 
 
equivocally, the likelihood of incarceration was higher in districts with a higher 




The results presented in this chapter do not offer much evidence in support of 
the notion that Booker has directly altered the sentencing landscape (Table 12).  
Though the post-Booker period was characterized by significantly longer sentences 
and increased odds of receiving either a government- or a judge-initiated departure, 
evidence that Booker directly contributed to these outcomes is lacking.  This point is 
underscored when the focus is placed on racial/ethnic disparities.  Though significant 
pre-post differences are sometimes evident, the role of Booker is less apparent when 
quarterly trends are examined. 
 The next chapter examines sentencing outcomes as they specifically pertain to 
drug offenses.  Particular attention is paid to Booker’s influence in outcomes for crack 
and powder cocaine offenses, which have historically been the source of much 
disparity and controversy. 
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 Although the pre-Booker period was associated with shorter sentence lengths for districts with 
growing black populations and increased odds of government-initiated departures in districts in which 
blacks constituted a sizeable proportion of the population, neither of these findings was significant in 
the post-Booker period. 
78 
 
CHAPTER VII: DRUG OFFENSES 
 Separate models are used to examine hypotheses specifically dealing with the 
sentencing differences between different types of drug offenses.  As detailed in 
previous chapters, the Booker decision is anticipated to differentially affect the 
sentencing patterns for crack and powder cocaine offenders in particular.  
Accordingly, this chapter pays specific attention to the treatment of these offenders.  
Both individual- and district-level effects on sentencing outcomes for these offenses 
are explored. 
Individual-Level Analysis 
The drug-specific models presented in this chapter use the same dependent 
variables and most of the same independent variables as the overall models presented 
in the previous chapter.  However, the data set is limited to include only those 
offenders sentenced for drug offenses.  Therefore, instead of general offense type 
dummies, the current models include two sets of dummy variables specific to drug 
offenses.  First, a group of drug type variables is included to distinguish between 
cases involving powder cocaine, crack cocaine, amphetamines, opiates, psychedelics, 
other drug or paraphernalia offenses, and cases in which multiple types of drugs are 
present.
51
  These cases are compared to those involving marijuana or hashish, the 
omitted reference category.  An additional dummy variable is included to account for 
those cases identified as drug offenses but for which no drug type was listed in the 
data.  Second, a group of dummies is included to distinguish between different types 
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A complete breakdown of the drugs included in each of these categories is included in Appendix C. 
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of drug offending; these variables represent trafficking, communication facility,
52
 and 
possession (the omitted reference category). 
 The descriptive statistics for the drug cases examined in this chapter are 
presented in Table 13.  Independent samples t-tests were used to test for significant 
differences between pre- and post-Booker cases, and statistical significance at the 
p<.01 value is indicated on the far right hand side of the table.  It bears repeating that 
the large sample sizes mean that tests of statistical significance are very sensitive to 
even small differences between samples, so the discussion of results focuses on 
substantively meaningful differences between samples. 
Although the patterns of descriptive statistics for drug offenders largely mirror 
those of the broader federal criminal offender population, imprisonment and sentence 
length figures for drug offenders are much higher.  As reported in the previous 
chapter, 85% of the federal offenders (including drug offenders) sentenced between 
2000 and 2008 were imprisoned, while Table 13 indicates that 95% of drug offenders 
were sent to prison during the same period.  Additionally, while the broader group of 
offenders sentenced during the study period were sentenced to an average of 68 
months in prison, drug offenders were sentenced to an average of 79 months.    
Although Table 13 indicates significant differences in most of the sentencing 
outcomes examined, the difference between pre-Booker and post-Booker 
incarceration for drug offenders is slight (94% versus 96%).  More substantial 
differences are apparent in sentence lengths for drug offenders, from 76 months prior 
to Booker to 83 months afterward.  Yet the percentage of cases receiving departures 
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also increased after the decision from 14% to 18% for government-initiated 
departures, and from 14% to 19% for judge-initiated departures.   
With the exception of a declining percentage of cases involving 
marijuana/hashish after Booker, few substantial pre-post differences are evident with 
respect to drug types.  The types of drug offenses sentenced in the federal system 
similarly appear to be relatively unchanged in the time after the Supreme Court’s 
decision; both before and after Booker was decided, federal drug cases were 
dominated by trafficking offenses, while offenses involving both possession and 
communications facilities comprised only 4% of cases combined.   
Compared to the broader sample of cases examined in the previous chapter, 
cases involving drug offenses are comprised of more Hispanics (38% compared 
25%).  Additionally, drug offenders are slightly younger (33 versus 35 years old), 
more likely to be non-citizens (29% versus 20%), and are less educated (48% have no 
high school diploma compared to 39%) than federal offenders more generally.  Still, 
although significant pre-to-post Booker differences are apparent for the demographic 
characteristics of drug offenders, these differences are relatively small.  On the other 
hand, notable pre-to-post differences for drug offenders are evident with respect to 
criminal history (2.17 versus 2.32), presumptive guideline length (88.39 versus 
97.95), and presentence detention (71% versus 77%). 
Imprisonment and Sentence Length – Individual-Level Models 
 Sentencing trends for crack and powder cocaine offenders are predicted to 
become more comparable as more time passes in the new sentencing era, as judges 
are hypothesized to use the freedom afforded by Booker and subsequent Supreme 
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Court decisions to deviate from the particularly severe sentences prescribed by the 
Guidelines for these offenses.  In addition, sentencing outcomes for white and 
minority drug offenders are hypothesized to become less disparate in the wake of 
Booker (and subsequently Kimbrough).  As in the previous chapter, results for 
imprisonment and sentence length models are detailed separately, and the discussion 
of results focuses primarily on hypothesized relationships between specific predictors 
and outcomes of interest. 
Imprisonment 
The left column of Table 14 displays the findings of the logistic regression 
model for the imprisonment decision for drug cases over the full study period.  These 
results indicate that drug offenders sentenced after the Booker decision were 22% 
more likely to be imprisoned.  Relative to marijuana/hashish offenders, crack cocaine 
offenders were 43% more likely to be imprisoned, while powder cocaine offenders 
were 34% more likely to be imprisoned.  Drug offenders sentenced for trafficking 
offenses were 11.36 times more likely to be imprisoned than those sentenced for 
possession offenses.  Compared to their white counterparts, black offenders were 
19% more likely, and Hispanics were 48% more likely, to be imprisoned during the 
study period. 
 Separate pre- and post-Booker logistic regression models for drug cases, also 
presented in Table 14, indicate that offenders charged with powder cocaine offenses 
were significantly more likely than those whose cases involved marijuana/hashish to 
be incarcerated in both time periods.  At the same time, while crack offenders were 
significantly (1.52 times, or 52%) more likely to face incarceration than 
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marijuana/hashish offenders during the pre-Booker period, differences between these 
two groups were non-significant in the post-Booker era.  Importantly, the 33% 
reduction in the coefficient for crack between the two periods was significant, while 
the 9% reduction in the coefficient for power cocaine offenses was not, as indicated 
by the chi-square statistic in the right column of the table.  Similarly, the 18% 
reduction in the coefficient for blacks was significant, while the change in the 
coefficients for Hispanics was non-significant.   
To further examine how sentencing trends for drug offenders have changed 
over time, separate logistic regression models were estimated for each of the quarters 
in the dataset.  Three quarter moving averages of the odds ratios were calculated, and 
the results for blacks and Hispanics are graphed in Figure 5.  Dividing the graph into 
pre- and post-Booker periods suggests that both blacks and Hispanics were subject to 
higher odds of incarceration than whites (represented by the horizontal line at 1.0) 
throughout most of the pre-Booker period.  On the other hand, the post-Booker era 
was generally characterized by a continued decline in the odds of incarceration for 
Hispanics, while the odds of incarceration for blacks hovered below those for whites 
for most of the period.  T-tests comparing the mean odds of incarceration before and 
after the Booker decision indicate that differences were significant for blacks (t=2.35, 
p<.05) but not for Hispanics (t=.44).  However, the graph suggests that disparities 
between whites and minorities were most pronounced during the period between the 
passage of the PROTECT Act and the Supreme Court’s decision, and declining odds 
of incarceration for both groups began during this period and were continued in the 
period following Booker.   
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 Because offenders sentenced for crack and powder cocaine offenses were 
hypothesized to be particularly affected by Booker, Figure 6 graphs the quarterly 
trends for crack offenses.  For purposes of these quarterly analyses only, powder 
cocaine offenses were used as the omitted reference group and are, accordingly, 
represented by the horizontal line at 1.0.  Evidence offered from this graph is not 
strongly supportive of a “Booker effect.”  A t-test comparing the mean odds of 
incarceration for crack offenders during the pre- versus the post-Booker era confirms 
no statistically significant difference (t=1.21).  Consistent with prior research, the 
graph shows that crack cocaine offenders were overwhelmingly more likely to 
experience incarceration than offenders sentenced for powder cocaine offenses, with 
a peak occurring in the pre-PROTECT period. Although another, lesser peak occurred 
around the time of the Booker decision, the back-and-forth, up-and-down trend that 
occurred after the decision appears to be a continuation of an already ongoing pattern. 
Sentence Length 
 Sentence length trends for drug offenders are similarly hypothesized to be 
significantly affected by the Supreme Court’s decision in Booker.  The findings for 
the first OLS model in Table 15, including all drug offenders sentenced between 2000 
and 2008, indicate that sentence lengths were 1% greater for drug offenders sentenced 
after Booker.  Relative to offenders sentenced for marijuana/hashish offenses, only 
offenders sentenced for other drug types and paraphernalia experienced significantly 
shorter sentence lengths during the study period; the sentence lengths for all other 
drug types were greater than those for marijuana/hashish.  Most relevant to the 
current study, crack offenders experienced sentences that were 57% greater, while 
84 
 
powder cocaine offenders experienced sentences that were 54% greater.  Contrasted 
with white drug offenders, sentence lengths for blacks were 3% greater, and terms for 
Hispanic offenders were 4% greater.   
 The impact of the Supreme Court’s decision on sentence lengths for drug 
offenders is further explored through separate OLS regression models for the pre-
Booker and post-Booker periods, also presented in Table 15.  For both periods, the 
results closely mirror those found for the full study period.  Both blacks and 
Hispanics received longer sentences than whites during both periods, although the z-
statistic on the right side of the table indicates that the increase between the two time 
periods was significant only for blacks.  Again, consistent with the results of the full 
model, most drug types (except for those in the other/paraphernalia category) were 
sentenced more harshly than marijuana/hashish.  Yet, with the exception of 
psychedelics, z-scores on the right side of the table do not suggest that significant 
changes in the individual drug types occurred between the two times periods. 
Figure 7 graphs the three quarter moving average of the quarterly percent 
difference in sentence lengths (logged) for black and Hispanic drug offenders.  This 
graph shows that sentence length trends for these two groups tracked together fairly 
closely throughout the entire study period, and, for nearly all of this time, Hispanics 
experienced the longest sentences.  Sentence lengths for both groups began 
decreasing in the middle of 2000 and reached their lowest points in 2004, in the 
middle of the PROTECT Act period.  Sentence lengths for both groups increased 
thereafter.  By the end of the study period, both groups continued to receive more 
severe sentences for drug offenses than their white counterparts.  Although t-tests 
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comparing the average percent change in sentence lengths prior to and following 
Booker indicate significant differences for blacks (t=2.87, p<.05) but not Hispanics 
(t=.62), the graph is suggestive that shifts in sentencing trends began occurring during 
the PROTECT Act period rather than following the Booker decision. 
 Perhaps more interestingly, the quarterly percent difference in logged sentence 
lengths for crack relative to powder-cocaine is graphed in Figure 8.  This graph shows 
that, prior to the Supreme Court’s decision, crack offenders typically met with stiffer 
penalties than did offenders who were sentenced for powder cocaine offenses 
(represented by the horizontal line at 0).  Pre-Booker crack sentence lengths dropped 
at the beginning of the study period but rose again to a smaller peak around the 
beginning of 2004, during the PROTECT Act period.  After the Booker decision, 
sentences for crack offenses exhibited a marked decrease, falling to roughly the same 
level as powder cocaine sentences in the midst of 2006.  The sentence lengths for 
crack offenses peaked again, at around 4% higher than those of powder cocaine 
offenses, near the middle of 2007, and they fell in nearly every quarter thereafter; in 
fact, sentence lengths for crack near the end of the study period fell to roughly 6% 
below those of powder cocaine.  Notably, a t-test comparing the average percent 
change for the pre- and post-Booker periods indicates that the difference between the 
two is significant.  However, it should be stressed once again that this analysis is not 
causal and that other factors may have influenced the trends.  For instance, the 
Commission revised its Guidelines in 2007 (prior to the Kimbrough and Gall 
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decisions) to lower the base offense level by two levels for crack cocaine offenses.
53
  
Thus, further investigation is warranted. 
Departures – Individual-Level Models 
 Departures from the Guidelines have traditionally provided an avenue for 
lessening the severity of sentences, and departures for providing substantial assistance 
to prosecutors have been frequently used in drug cases in particular.  It is 
hypothesized that, in the post-Booker era, both government- and judge-initiated 
departures have provided a way to mitigate historical sentencing disparities, 
particularly for crack and powder cocaine.  In addition, disparities in the odds of 
departure for white and minority drug offenders are hypothesized to become less 
evident in the post-Booker period.   
To investigate these predictions, a multinomial logistic regression model 
representing the decision to depart downwardly from the Guidelines (relative to not 
departing) was estimated for drug cases for the entire study period, and the results are 
presented in Table 16.  The findings in the left column suggest that, controlling for 
other important factors, the likelihood of government-initiated departures increased 
by 70% in the post-Booker era.  Drug offenders who took their cases to trial were 
much less likely to receive these departures, as were offenders who were detained 
prior to sentencing; males, blacks, Hispanics, offenders with no high school diplomas, 
and those with longer criminal histories were also less likely to receive departures 
initiated by prosecutors.  While departures of this type were no more likely for crack 
cocaine than for marijuana/hashish offenses, offenders sentenced for powder cocaine 
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 Because the Fair Sentencing Act was not passed until 2010, it cannot explain sentencing patterns 
discussed in this dissertation. 
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offenses were 1.31 times more likely to receive these discounts during the full study 
period.
54
   
Departures initiated by judges are of particular interest, as the Booker decision 
afforded them wider latitude to deviate from the Guidelines.  As is shown in the right 
column of Table 16, offenders sentenced after the Supreme Court’s ruling were 82% 
more likely to receive judge-initiated departures.  Blacks and Hispanics were both 
significantly less likely than white drug offenders to be the recipients of these 
departures during the full study period, as were males, non-citizens, those without 
high school diplomas, those with more extensive criminal histories, those who took 
their cases to trial, and those detained prior to sentencing.  At the same time, none of 
the specific drug categories were significantly more or less likely than 
marijuana/hashish to receive judge-initiated departures during the study period.
55
 
 To further disentangle the role of Booker in departure outcomes for drug 
offenders, separate multinomial logistic regression models for the departure decision 
were estimated for the pre- and post-Booker periods.  The results for are displayed in 
Table 17.  During both periods, offenders sentenced for powder cocaine experienced 
significantly higher odds of receiving government-initiated departures than those 
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 Separate analyses found that the Booker decision was associated with significantly shorter 
government-initiated departures for drug offenders.  Though departure lengths for both black and 
Hispanic drug offenders were slightly shorter in the post-Booker era, changes over time were non-
significant.  Significant changes between the pre- and post-Booker period were evident with respect to 
government-initiated departure lengths for crack cocaine offenders; prior to the decision, these 
offenders received departures that were 15% larger than those of marijuana/hashish offenders, while 
their departures were 24% larger in the period following the decision.  However, graphing the three 
quarter moving averages of percentage changes for crack versus powder cocaine offenders suggested 
that post-Booker trends were initiated prior to the decision, at the start of the PROTECT Act. 
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 Separate analyses indicated that the magnitude of judge-initiated departures decreased for drug 
offenders after the Supreme Court’s decision.  In addition, the magnitude of these departures decreased 
significantly in the post-Booker period for Hispanics.  Significant reductions in departure lengths 
between the two time periods were also evident for powder cocaine offenders; changes in the 
magnitude of judge-initiated departures for crack cocaine offenders were not statistically significant. 
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sentenced for marijuana/hashish.  Yet, significant differences between time periods, 
as indicated by the chi-square statistic, were not evident for any drug type.  During 
both time periods, both blacks and Hispanics were significantly less likely than 
whites to be the recipients of departures initiated by prosecutors, but differences 
between the two time periods were statistically significant only for Hispanics; 
Hispanics were 18% less likely to receive government-initiated departures prior to the 
decision, but their odds of departure improved such that they were approximately 9% 
less likely than whites to receive these departures in the period after the decision.  
 With respect to judge-initiated departures, the results in Table 17 indicate that 
both black and Hispanic drug offenders were significantly less likely than whites to 
receive departures before and after the decision, and the change over time was non-
significant.    
Quarterly multinomial logistic regression models of the departure decision 
were also estimated, and the three quarter moving average of the odds ratios were 
calculated.  The results for government-initiated departures for black and Hispanic 
drug offenders (relative to whites) are graphed in Figure 9.  This graph is not 
particularly suggestive of a “Booker effect,” despite the fact that t-tests comparing the 
average odds of receiving these departures before and after the decision indicate 
significant differences for Hispanics (t=1.97, p<.05) but not for black offenders 
(t=1.35).  Instead, the graph shows that both groups were generally less likely to 
receive government-initiated departures than their white counterparts throughout the 
study period.  Although the odds of departure for blacks appeared to rise during the 
period following Booker, the trend line suggests that these offenders’ odds of 
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departure dropped during the PROTECT Act period and rebounded thereafter.  For 
Hispanics, higher post-Booker odds of departure appear to fit with an ongoing, 
increasing pattern. 
 Quarterly odds ratios for judge-initiated departures by race/ethnicity are 
displayed in Figure 10.  This graph suggests that departure trends for blacks and 
Hispanics tracked each other more closely in the post-Booker era than they did prior 
to the Supreme Court’s decision.  T-tests comparing the average odds of departure for 
the two periods indicate that differences were significant for blacks (t=2.45, p<.05) 
but not for Hispanics (t=.90).  However, the graph suggests that trends for both 
groups appeared to shift in the year prior to the Booker decision, in the midst of the 
PROTECT Act era.  From that point onward, blacks and Hispanics were generally 
less likely to be the recipients of departures, relative to white offenders. 
 Separate graphs focusing on quarterly government- and judge-initiated 
departures for crack offenders (relative to powder cocaine offenders, the omitted 
reference group) also fail to provide convincing evidence that the Supreme Court’s 
decision has substantially altered these sentencing outcomes.  Figure 11 suggests that 
the odds of receiving a government-initiated departure spiked for crack offenders in 
the middle of the PROTECT Act period and dropped dramatically in the two quarters 
leading up to the Booker decision before briefly raising again.  After Booker, the odds 
of departure for crack offenders continued to trend downward and reached their 
lowest point in the quarter that Kimbrough and Gall were decided before, notably, 
beginning to trend upward thereafter.  A t-test comparing the mean odds of departure 
90 
 
for crack offenders indicates that the odds were not significantly different between the 
pre- and post-Booker periods (t=1.26). 
The quarterly trends for judge-initiated departures are graphed in Figure 12 
and exhibit more variation than those of government-initiated departures.  Still, this 
graph fails to provide substantial evidence of a “Booker effect,” and a t-test 
comparing the mean odds of crack offenders receiving judge-initiated departures 
confirms no significant difference between the pre- and post-Booker period (t=.60).  
Although the odds of departure were generally much higher in the pre-PROTECT 
period, they dropped off dramatically immediately following the passage of the 
PROTECT Act.  Beginning in the quarter prior to the Supreme Court’s decision in 
Booker, trends reversed again to briefly favor crack offenders, but this trend leveled 
out around the time the Commission revised its Guidelines in 2007, with both groups 
appearing to receive comparable treatment.  Additional years of data are needed to 
confirm whether or not these trends have continued since the end of the study period. 
Multi-Level Analysis 
The next set of models examines the impact of district-level characteristics on 
sentencing outcomes in drug cases.  District-level descriptive statistics are presented 
in Table 18 and are largely the same as those presented in the previous chapter.  
However, relative drug caseload specifically is substituted for caseload pressure.
56
  
Roughly two-fifths (40%) of cases sentenced in these districts were drug cases; 
however, the percentage of drug cases varied across districts from a low of 20% to a 
high of 65%.  The percentage of district-level drug cases remained relatively stable 
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 Relative drug caseload represents the proportion of district-level drug cases, averaged over the 
relevant number of years (i.e., pre-Booker period, post-Booker period).  
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between the pre-Booker (40%) and post-Booker (39%) periods; over the course of the 
study period, relative drug caseloads across districts actually decreased by less than 
3%, though some districts experienced reductions in their caseloads as big as 48%, 
while others experienced increases as large as 33%.   
Unconditional models are presented in Table 19 and confirm that substantial 
district-level variation was present both before and after the Booker decision.  
However, similar to the results presented in Chapter VI, these findings suggest little 
change over time in the proportion of variance in sentencing outcomes explained by 
districts.
57
   
 Judges in districts characterized by heavy or increasing relative drug caseloads 
were predicted to grant more favorable sentencing outcomes in the post-Booker 
period.  The findings in Table 20 can be used to assess these predictions; again, 
individual-level predictors are not tabled due to their substantive similarity with the 
individual-level models previously examined.  Contrary to expectations, the results 
indicate that heavier relative drug caseloads were not significantly related to any of 
the outcomes examined.  Changes in relative drug caseload pressure were 
significantly related to departure outcomes in select time periods; however, these 
findings were again opposite of expectations, as increases in relative drug caseload 
pressure in the post-Booker period were not significantly related to more favorable 
outcomes in any of the models examined.   
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 Separate analyses revealed that the proportion of variance explained by districts changed most 
substantially with respect to the magnitude of judge-initiated departures.  Prior to the decision, districts 
accounted for 12% of the variances in judge-initiated departure lengths; after the decision, districts 




In summary, there is very little evidence to suggest that Booker has greatly 
altered the sentencing landscape for drug offenses (Table 21).  Rather, the majority of 
the findings suggest that outcomes evident in the post-Booker period were initiated 
well before the decision, beginning in the PROTECT Act period.  Further, because 
other changes have been enacted with respect to federal drug sentencing, particularly 
around 2007 and 2008, it is difficult to isolate Booker’s influence on outcomes for 
drug offenders.  Finally, district-level drug caseloads were less influential in 
sentencing outcomes for drug offenders than was hypothesized. 
The next chapter examines sentencing outcomes for immigration offenses. 
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CHAPTER VIII: IMMIGRATION OFFENSES 
 Because they are substantially different from other cases, immigration cases 
are examined separately.  Although the models used to examine these cases are 
substantively the same as those presented in previous chapters, important model 
specification differences are discussed in detail below, followed by a discussion of 
the results.      
Individual-Level Analysis 
 The data set used for the analyses presented in this chapter is limited to only 
those offenders sentenced for immigration offenses and, accordingly, excludes 
general offense type dummy variables.  Because 80% of offenders sentenced for 
immigration offenses were Hispanic, the analyses included in this chapter utilize 
binary comparisons of Hispanics to their non-Hispanic counterparts.  Similarly, 
because two-thirds (67%) of this sample did not graduate from high school and only a 
small minority attained more than a high school diploma (4% had some college, and 
approximately 1% graduated from college), controls for education are limited to 
binary comparisons of those who did not finish high school to those with high school 
diplomas or more.  A dummy variable was included to differentiate border districts 
from non-border districts; 73% of immigration cases sentenced during the study 
period were from border districts.
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Additional descriptive statistics for the immigration cases examined in this 
chapter are displayed in Table 22.  Pre-and post-Booker differences were assessed 
using independent samples t-tests, and significant differences are indicated in the far 
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 Because a large number of border districts are also districts that participate in Early Disposition or 
Fast Track programs, the analyses could not control for both fast track districts and border districts due 
to high correlation.  
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right column of the table.  Between 2000 and 2008, 96% of federal immigration 
offenders were incarcerated, and these offenders spent an average of nearly 25 
months in prison.  A significant decrease in sentence length occurred between the pre-
Booker period, when offenders spent an average of 27 months in prison, to the post-
Booker period, when offenders were sentenced to an average of 23 months.  Even 
more dramatic changes between the two time periods are evident with respect to the 
percentage of immigration cases receiving departures.  The percentage of cases 
receiving government-initiated downward departures increased from 12% prior to the 
decision to 33% in the period after the decision.   The opposite trend was true for 
judge-initiated departures; 26% of immigration cases in the sample received these 
departures in the pre-Booker period, while only 10% of these cases received these 
departures in the years following the decision.  Notably, the Commission did not 
begin capturing “fast track” departures as a category of departure until 2003, which 
likely explains some of the shifts in the use of these departures, and the increase in 
government-initiated departures in particular, over time. 
 As noted above, the majority of offenders (80%) in the immigration sample 
were Hispanic, but their representation did decline significantly over time, from 84% 
prior to Booker to 77% following the Supreme Court’s decision.
59
  Average criminal 
histories of immigration offenders also dropped significantly between the two time 
periods, from 3.01 prior to the Supreme Court’s ruling to 2.76 after the decision.  The 
presumptive guidelines recommendation exhibited a similar decline over time, from 
                                                 
59
 The percentage of white immigration offenders increased from 6% to 7% between the pre- and post-
Booker periods, while the percentage of immigration offenders classified as being of another 
race/ethnicity (including Asians) increased from 2% to 7%.  The percentage of immigration offenders 
whose race/ethnicity was missing in the data also increased in the post-Booker period (6%, compared 
to 4% pre-Booker). 
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28 to 23 months.  Other individual-level characteristics exhibited more stability over 
time.  The average age of immigration offenders during the study period was roughly 
33 years old, and the majority of these offenders (93%) were male.  Interestingly, 
only 88% of immigration offenders were classified as non-citizens in the data, while 
the citizenship status was missing for an additional 1% of offenders.   
Due to the relatively small body of literature on federal sentencing for 
immigration offenses, particularly with respect to the Booker decision, the hypotheses 
examined in this chapter are necessarily exploratory and broad.  It is predicted that 
immigration sentencing will exhibit differences in the post-Booker period and that 
disparities between Hispanics and non-Hispanics will be most apparent in the years 
following the decision. 
Because nearly all immigration offenders were imprisoned both prior to and 
following the Booker decision, the incarceration outcome lacks sufficient variation to 
justify examination here.  Accordingly, hypotheses specific to immigration offenses 
are explored first via models estimating the impact of the Booker decision on 
sentence length.   
Sentence Length – Individual-Level Models 
 Similar to previous chapters, the effect of Booker on sentence lengths for 
immigration offenses is assessed using three separate OLS regression models, and 
logarithmic transformations were completed to account for the skewed nature of 
sentence lengths.  The first set of results in Table 23 indicate that cases sentenced 
after the decision received significantly shorter prison terms than those sentenced 
96 
 
before the Supreme Court’s ruling.  Relative to non-Hispanics, sentences for Hispanic 
immigration offenders were nearly one-fifth (19%) greater between 2000 and 2008.  
 Table 23 also displays sentence length outcomes for immigration cases during 
both the pre- and post-Booker periods.  These findings indicate that Hispanics were 
the recipients of significantly longer sentences during both time frames.  Prior to 
Booker, Hispanics sentenced for immigration offenses received prison terms that 
were approximately 4% greater than those of their non-Hispanic counterparts.  After 
the Supreme Court’s ruling, Hispanics received sentences that were 24% greater than 
those of non-Hispanics.  This increase represents a significant change between the 
two periods, as is indicated by the z-statistic in the far right column. 
In order to further investigate the timing of the shift in sentence lengths for 
Hispanics, quarterly regression models for the sentence length decision were also 
estimated, and the moving averages of the percent differences for Hispanics (relative 
to non-Hispanics) are graphed in Figure 13.  This graph suggests the possibility of a 
“Booker effect,” and a t-test comparing the mean percent changes in sentence length 
for Hispanic offenders sentenced before and after the decision indicates a significant 
change (t=5.76).  The graph shows that, although sentence lengths for Hispanics were 
increasing during the period prior to the PROTECT Act, they remained relatively flat 
throughout much of the PROTECT Act period.  In the quarter prior to the Booker 
decision, sentence lengths for Hispanic immigration offenders increased dramatically, 
and they continued to rise in the two quarters following the decision.  During much of 
the post-Booker era, sentence lengths for Hispanics were between 27% and 33% 
longer than those of non-Hispanics sentenced for immigration offenses.  This trend 
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began to reverse in the period prior to the Gall decision.  Though not causal, this 
graph is certainly suggestive and points to the need for further examination of 
Booker’s role in sentence length outcomes for immigration offenses. 
Departures – Individual-Level Models 
 Departures play an important role in the sentencing of immigration offenders.  
In particular, so-called “fast-track” departures have traditionally been utilized in these 
cases as a way to save the government time and money while providing sentencing 
discounts to offenders for ostensible acceptance of responsibility.  Table 24 displays 
the results of the multinomial logistic regression model examining the likelihood of 
departures for offenders sentenced for immigration offenses during the full study 
period.  These results indicate that immigration offenders were more likely to benefit 
from both types of departures in the period after the Supreme Court decided Booker.  
While these offenders were 1.48 times more likely to receive judge-initiated 
departures following the decision, they were 4.32 times more likely to receive 
departures initiated by prosecutors, including fast-track departures.  Although these 
results are suggestive of increased popularity of government-initiated departures 
following the Booker decision, they must be interpreted cautiously because, as noted 
previously, the post-Booker increase in these departures may be at least partially 
attributable to the fact that the Commission did not capture fast tracks as a category of 
departures in its data until 2003. 
 Separate pre- and post-Booker departure models were also estimated to further 
investigate period-specific differences (Table 25).  These results indicate that, 
although the odds of government-initiated departure were statistically similar for 
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Hispanic and non-Hispanic immigration offenders prior to the Supreme Court’s 
ruling, Hispanic offenders were approximately 12% less likely to receive these 
departures in the years following the decision. However, the chi-square for difference 
indicates that change in magnitude between the two periods was non-significant at the 
p<.05 level.
60
   
 Significant pre- and post-Booker differences were evident with respect to 
Hispanics’ odds of being granted judge-initiated departures.  Consistent with the 
results for government-initiated departures, the results in Table 25 suggest that, 
though the odds of judge-initiated departures were similar for Hispanics and non-
Hispanics prior to Booker, Hispanics were 13% less likely to be granted these 
departures after the Supreme Court’s decision.  The declining likelihood of judge-
initiated departures between the two time periods was statistically significant at the 




In order to further investigate changes over time, multinomial logistic 
regression models were estimated for each quarter of the study period.  Figure 14 
graphs the three-quarter moving average of the odds of departure for Hispanic 
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 Separate analyses indicate that immigration cases sentenced after the Booker decision received 
significantly greater government-initiated departure lengths.  Although Hispanics were the recipients 
of significantly shorter government-initiated departures in both the periods leading up to and following 
the Supreme Court’s ruling, there is evidence to suggest that the magnitude of Hispanics’ departures 
improved significantly between the two time periods.  However, graphing the three-quarter moving 
averages of the percent differences for Hispanics versus non-Hispanics reveals that shifting trends in 
the magnitudes of government-initiated departures took place prior to Booker, during the PROTECT 
Act period. 
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 Additional analyses indicate that immigration cases sentenced after the Booker decision received 
significantly shorter judge-initiated departure lengths.  Both prior to and after the Supreme Court’s 
decision, Hispanics received judge-initiated departures that were similar in magnitude to those of non-
Hispanics.  Graphing the three-quarter moving average for the percent difference for Hispanics versus 
non-Hispanics indicates that departure lengths had generally been increasing since the middle of the 
PROTECT Act period. 
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(relative to non-Hispanic) offenders for both government- and judge-initiated 
departures.  The graph is not particularly suggestive of a “Booker effect” for either 
type of departure.  Hispanics’ odds of receiving government-initiated departures 
peaked during the PROTECT Act period.  Their odds of being granted these 
departures dropped somewhat at the beginning of the post-Booker period but 
remained relative stable – at around 1.4 times higher than non-Hispanics – until the 
end of 2006, when they began to drop sharply; throughout 2007, and for the 
remainder of the study period, Hispanics appeared to be less likely than non-
Hispanics to receive government-initiated departures.  A t-test indicates that 
Hispanics’ mean odds of departure were not significantly different between the two 
time periods (t=.59). 
 Judge-initiated departure trends for Hispanic immigration offenders reveal a 
different pattern.  The odds of these departures appeared to be generally declining 
from the beginning of the study period until the end of the PROTECT Act period.  
Although Hispanics’ likelihood of departure increased somewhat during the 
beginning of the post-Booker period, judges’ application of these departures was 
relatively similar for Hispanics and non-Hispanics for much of this period.  While the 
odds of departure for Hispanics declined again somewhat near the end of 2006, they 
appeared to rebound after the Gall decision.  Thus, while the multinomial logistic 
regression model presented in Table 25 suggested significant changes between the 
pre- and post-Booker periods, this graph suggests that the odds of judge-initiated 
departures for Hispanics were in decline well in advance of the decision.  Further, a t-
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test comparing their mean odds of departure between the two time periods does not 
suggest significant differences (t=1.49). 
Multilevel Analysis 
This section explores the role played by contextual factors in sentencing 
outcomes for immigration offenses.  Again, because of the relative dearth of literature 
regarding Booker’s impact on sentencing for immigration offenses, the research 
questions examined in this chapter are fairly general.  As such, it is simply 
hypothesized that inter-district variation in sentencing outcomes for immigration 
offenses exists and will increase significantly in the post-Booker era.  The district-
level variables included to explore this hypothesis are largely the same as those 
included in Chapter VI and are summarized in Table 26.
62
  
The unconditional models presented in Table 27 confirm that significant 
district-level variation existed both prior to and following the Supreme Court’s 
decision.  Unlike the findings presented in the two previous chapters, these findings 
indicate substantial change over time in the proportion of variance in sentencing 
outcomes explained by districts for several outcomes.  Districts accounted for 19% of 
the variance in sentence lengths in the pre-Booker era and 26% of the variance in the 
post-Booker era.  The amount of district-level variation in government-initiated 
departures also increased substantially, from 23% in the period prior to the decision to 
33% in the period following the decision.  On the other hand, districts accounted for 
22% of the variance in the likelihood of judge-initiated departures before the decision 
but only 14% of the variance in this outcome following the Supreme Court’s ruling.  
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 Caseload pressure measures overall number of case filings per judge, averaged over time; it is not 
specific to immigration cases, as large immigration caseloads are largely concentrated in a small 
proportion of districts. 
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However, it must be kept in mind that these large shifts in the proportion of variance 
accounted for by districts may be an artifact of the way the federal sentencing data 
were collected prior to 2003, when fast track departures were not captured as a 
distinct departure category.  Thus, the limited support for the hypothesis that the 
Booker decision increased inter-district variation in sentencing outcomes (in the cases 
of sentence length and government-initiated departure) must be viewed with caution. 
The models presented in Table 28 explore possible factors behind these 
changes.  Both prior to and following the Booker decision, judges in districts with 
higher historical departure rates were more likely to grant both government- and 
judge-initiated departures.  While factors related to caseload pressure exhibited 
statistically significant influence on sentence lengths only in the period prior to 
Booker, they were significantly related to departures only after the High Court’s 
decision.  Post-Booker, government-initiated departures were significantly more 
likely to be granted in districts with heavy caseloads; concomitantly, these departures 
were significantly less likely to be granted in districts where caseloads were 
increasing.  On the other hand, judges were significantly more likely to initiate 
departures after Booker in districts where caseload pressure was increasing.   
Summary 
 Consistent with the results presented in previous chapters, the findings of 
models focused specifically on Booker’s influence on sentencing outcomes for 
immigration offenders largely suggest that significant pre-to-post changes were likely 
the result of either ongoing trends or of changes initiated during the PROTECT Act 
period (Table 29).  However, sentence length outcomes provided an exception, as 
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graphing quarterly percent changes in the sentence lengths suggested that the 
significantly longer sentences experienced by Hispanics following the Booker 
decision were likely a result of post-Booker increases. The predicted increase in the 
role played by district-level factors following the Supreme Court’s decision was met 
with limited support, although the findings do suggest that further inquiry into the 
influence of increasing caseload pressure is warranted. 
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CHAPTER IX: SUMMARY 
This chapter summarizes the key findings found in each of the previous three 
chapters.  Conclusions and directions for future research are offered in Chapter X. 
Booker’s Role in Sentencing Outcomes for All Offenses (Excluding Immigration) 
The intended goal of the analyses in Chapter VI was, in large part, to replicate 
previous research that has examined the impact of the Booker decision on sentencing 
outcomes for all federal offenses (excluding immigration).  A series of regression 
models were used to evaluate the prediction that post-Booker incarceration and 
sentence length trends would largely resemble pre-Booker trends but that differences 
between whites and minorities would emerge as more time passes since the decision.  
Findings in Chapter VI indicate that incarceration was no more or less likely in the 
post-Booker era than in the period prior to the Supreme Court’s decision.  Also 
consistent with prior work (Hofer, 2007; USSC, 2006), the coefficient representing 
the Booker decision was found to be significantly related to longer sentences. 
  Booker’s influence on incarceration and sentence length outcomes for 
minority offenders is more nuanced.  Though period-specific logistic regression 
models indicate that Hispanic offenders’ likelihood of incarceration increased 
significantly in the period following the Supreme Court’s ruling – Hispanics were 
27% more likely than whites to be imprisoned prior to Booker and 39% more likely to 
be imprisoned after the decision – graphing their quarterly odds of incarceration 
relative to whites suggests that Hispanics’ odds of incarceration actually began to 
increase during the PROTECT Act period, well before the Supreme Court’s decision. 
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Evidence to support the notion that the Booker decision contributed to 
lengthier sentences for black and Hispanic offenders is lacking.  Period-specific 
models indicate that sentence lengths for both blacks and Hispanics became 
significantly shorter in the period following the High Court’s decision, while 
graphing the quarterly percent changes in sentence lengths for these two minority 
groups (relative to whites) similarly offers no evidence that sentence lengths for these 
groups became more punitive in the post-Booker period.  These results are consistent 
with previous findings by Ulmer, Light, and Kramer (2011b), who found that there 
was less disparity in sentence lengths of black males in the post-Booker/Gall periods 
than there was in the period preceding the passage of the PROTECT Act. 
Chapter VI also examined the prediction that disparities between whites and 
minorities in the use of departures would become more apparent with time.  Though 
higher percentages of offenders sentenced after the decision received both 
government- and judge-initiated departures, pre-to-post changes with respect to 
race/ethnicity varied by departure type.  Period-specific multinomial logistic 
regression models indicate that Hispanics’ odds of receiving a government-initiated 
departure improved significantly following Booker, but graphing trends based on 
models for each fiscal quarter suggests that the odds of receiving departures initiated 
by prosecutors were elevated for both blacks and Hispanics during the PROTECT 
ACT period – almost to the point of parity for Hispanics and whites – but dropped 
substantially thereafter.  Particularly with respect to Hispanic offenders, though their 
odds of government-initiated departure were lower following Booker than during the 
PROTECT Act period, they were still higher following the decision than they were 
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during the pre-PROTECT period.  At the same time, however, the graph is suggestive 
of declining odds of government-initiated departures for both blacks and Hispanics 
toward the end of the study period.  This finding is in line with previous work by 
Ulmer, Light, and Kramer (2011b), who found that disparities in the application of 
§5K1.1 departures were particularly pronounced for Hispanic males in the post-Gall 
period. 
Perhaps the clearest evidence of a “Booker effect” is offered with respect to 
judge-initiated departures.  Period-specific models indicate that odds of benefiting 
from a judge-initiated departures improved for blacks following the Supreme Court’s 
decision, and graphing the quarterly odds of judge-initiated departures shows that the 
odds of these departures gradually increased for both minority groups (relative to 
whites) after the Supreme Court’s ruling. Although these findings stand opposed to 
the prediction that disparities in the use of judge-initiated departures would increase 
over time – both before and after the Supreme Court’s decision, blacks and Hispanics 
were less likely to benefit from these departures, though there was evidence that their 
odds were improving with time – they are consistent with work by Ulmer, Light, and 
Kramer (2011b), which also failed to find evidence of post-Booker/Gall increases in 
disparities for blacks in the application of judge-initiated departures (though they did 
find post-Gall disparities in the use of these departures for Hispanics).  These results 
also align with previous work by Hofer (2007), which found that judges viewed 
offender characteristics (though not specifically race/ethnicity) as legitimate reasons 
for departing from the Guidelines after the decision.   
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Because prior work has either ignored contextual factors or has reported 
findings that seemed counter-intuitive (i.e., that inter-district variation did not 
increase in the post-Booker period), the current dissertation sought to re-examine 
Booker’s influence on inter-district variation.  Consistent with prior research by 
Ulmer, Light, and Kramer (2011a), the findings in Chapter VI suggested that Booker 
did not decrease uniformity in the application of the Guidelines across federal 
districts.  Further, the results in Chapter VI indicated that districts’ historical 
departure rates were influential on sentence lengths and odds of departure both prior 
to and following the Supreme Court’s decision, rather than specific to the post-
Booker era, as predicted.   
Though predictions regarding the role of heavy and increasing caseload 
pressure were largely met with opposing evidence, some findings are worth 
reiterating.  Specifically, results in Chapter VI indicate that, following Booker, judge-
initiated departures were significantly more likely when judges were in districts 
facing increasing caseload pressure.  At the same time, however, judges in districts 
where caseload pressure was already heavy were significantly less likely to initiate 
departures in the period following the decision. These seemingly opposing findings 
are worthy of further investigation.  In particular, future investigations should 
examine whether there is a certain threshold or tipping point at which caseload 
pressure operates to individual offenders’ disadvantage.   
Further attention is also warranted with respect to the role played by both 
large and growing black populations in sentencing outcomes after Booker.  As was 
predicted, findings in Chapter VI show that, in districts with large black populations, 
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judges were less likely to grant judge-initiated departures following the Supreme 
Court’s decision.  At the same time, government-initiated departures were 
significantly less likely in the post-Booker period in districts with growing black 
populations.  Future research should more closely examine how racial threat 
dynamics operate across districts, with particular attention paid whether there is an 
important interaction between racial composition and growth.  For example, is there a 
difference in departure outcomes between districts that have traditionally been non-
minority jurisdictions but have growing minority populations compared to 
jurisdictions that have always had large minority populations but are experiencing 
more minority population growth? 
Booker’s Role in Drug Sentencing 
Given the controversy surrounding what have been characterized as overly-
severe prescribed sentences for crack cocaine offenses (and drug offenses more 
generally) under the presumptive Guidelines, it was anticipated that judges would 
seize the opportunity presented by Booker to mitigate the traditionally differential 
sentencing patterns of crack and powder cocaine offenders and to balance the 
sentencing outcomes for different racial/ethnic groups as well.  Chapter VII 
investigated these predictions and found that, in general, prison sentences for drug 
offenders became more certain and severe in the post-Booker era; following the 
decision, drug offenders were 22% more likely to be incarcerated, and, contrary to 
prior findings by Ulmer and Light (2010) and Ulmer, Light, and Kramer (2011a) their 
sentences were 1% greater than those of offenders sentence prior to the decision.  At 
the same time, the likelihood of government-initiated departures in drug cases 
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increased by 70% after the decision, while the likelihood of judge-initiated departures 
increased by 82%. 
With respect to differences in sentencing outcomes for specific types of drugs, 
findings in Chapter VII indicate that, relative to offenders sentenced for 
marijuana/hashish offenses, the likelihood of incarceration for crack offenders 
decreased by 33% between the pre- and post-Booker periods, while 9% the reduction 
in the likelihood of imprisonment for powder cocaine offenders following the 
decision was non-significant.  However, graphing the quarterly odds of imprisonment 
revealed that likelihood of incarceration of crack offenders (relative to powder 
cocaine offenders) peaked prior to the PROTECT Act and that odds of incarceration 
were generally decreasing over time, though the trend line exhibited a back-and-forth, 
up-and down pattern over time.  Although changes between the pre- and post-Booker 
period with respect to sentence length were non-significant for both crack and powder 
cocaine offenders (relative to marijuana/hashish offenders), graphing the quarterly 
percent difference in logged sentence lengths for crack (versus powder) cocaine 
offenders is somewhat more suggestive of a “Booker effect,” as sentences for crack 
offenders dropped markedly after the decision and fell to roughly the same level as 
sentences for powder cocaine in the midst of 2006.  However, caution is warranted 
because other important changes surrounding crack-versus-powder cocaine 
sentencing, including revisions to the Guidelines, occurred during the post-Booker 
period. 
Contrary to expectations, significant changes were not evident with respect to 
the use of either government- or judge-initiated departures for crack or powder 
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cocaine offenders (relative to marijuana/hashish offenders) in the post-Booker period.  
Graphing the quarterly odds of government-initiated departure indicated that the odds 
of receiving such a departure actually peaked for crack offenders (relative to powder 
cocaine offenders) during the PROTECT Act period and declined thereafter.  With 
respect to judge-initiated departures, using the same graphing technique also failed to 
provide evidence of a “Booker effect,” instead suggesting that the PROTECT Act 
period was the anomalous period, wherein departures for crack offenders plummeted; 
although trends reversed again post-Booker to briefly favor crack offenders, they 
leveled out again by the time the Commission revised its guidelines with respect to 
crack-cocaine sentencing in 2007. 
With respect to race/ethnicity, results of the models presented in Chapter VII 
are equally non-supportive of a hypothesized “Booker effect.”  Although the odds of 
incarceration reduced by 18% for blacks following the decision, the change in odds 
between the two time periods was non-significant for Hispanic offenders.  Further, 
graphing the quarterly odds of imprisonment for these two groups (relative to whites) 
suggested that the declining odds of incarceration for both groups began during the 
PROTECT Act period.  Similarly, though period-specific regression models 
suggested that sentence lengths increased significantly for black drug offenders 
following the Supreme Court’s decision, graphing the quarterly percent difference in 
the logged sentence lengths for black and Hispanic drug offenders (relative to whites) 
suggested that sentence lengths for both groups reached their lowest points in the 
midst of the PROTECT Act period; increases during the post-Booker period appeared 
to be a continuation of an existing trend. 
110 
 
Although results presented in Chapter VII suggested that Hispanics’ 
likelihood of receiving government-initiated departures improved following the 
Supreme Court’s decision, both blacks and Hispanics were less likely than whites to 
receive these departures in drug cases in both the pre- and post-Booker periods.  
Similarly, both groups were significantly less likely than whites to receive judge-
initiated departures in drug cases during both periods, and changes between the two 
periods were non-significant.  Again, graphing the quarterly odds of these two 
minority groups (relative to whites) receiving either type of departure underscores the 
importance of the PROTECT Act period rather than suggesting a “Booker effect” for 
either.   
Chapter VII also investigated the hypothesis that districts characterized by 
heavy or increasing relative drug caseloads would grant more favorable sentencing 
outcomes in the post-Booker period.  Multilevel findings not only suggested that the 
proportion of variance attributed to districts changed very little over time but also 
indicated that, contrary to expectations, heavier relative drug caseloads were not 
significantly related to any of the outcomes examined.  In addition, increases in 
relative drug caseloads in the post-Booker period were not significantly related to 
more favorable outcomes in any of the models examined. 
Booker’s Role in Immigration Sentencing 
 Given their unique role in the federal sentencing picture, immigration offenses 
were also examined separately.  Because relatively few prior studies have focused on 
immigration cases, the stated hypotheses were necessarily exploratory in nature, with 
sanctions for immigration offenses expected to differ before and after the Booker 
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decision.  Because 96% of immigration offenders were imprisoned during the study 
period, the incarceration decision was not modeled.  Unlike the overall or drug-
specific results presented in previous chapters, the findings specific to immigration 
offenders indicated that offenders sentenced after the Supreme Court’s ruling were 
the recipients of significantly shorter sentences than those who were sentenced in the 
pre-Booker era.  In addition, immigration offenders sentenced in the post-Booker 
period were 1.48 times more likely than those sentenced prior to the decision to 
benefit from judge-initiated departures, and they were 4.32 times more likely to 
benefit from government-initiated departures. 
 Additional predictions anticipated that Hispanic and non-Hispanic differences 
would be most apparent in the years following the Booker decision.  Sentence lengths 
for Hispanic offenders increased significantly between the two time periods, from 4% 
greater than non-Hispanics in the pre-Booker period to 24% greater in the post-
Booker period.  A graph of the quarterly percent differences for Hispanics (relative to 
non-Hispanics) was suggestive of a “Booker effect,” as sentence lengths that were 
relatively flat throughout the PROTECT Act period increased dramatically  in the 
quarter prior to the Booker decision and continued to rise and remained relatively 
high until the period prior to the Gall decision. 
 As noted in Chapter VIII, results related to government- and judge-initiated 
departures must be interpreted cautiously because data collection issues related to fast 
track departures may be at least partially responsible for pre- and post-Booker 
differences.  Bearing this caveat in mind, the results suggest that reductions in the 
likelihood of government-initiated departures for Hispanic offenders across the two 
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time periods were non-significant, and graphing the quarterly odds of these departures 
were also not particularly suggestive of a “Booker effect.”  Though period-specific 
models indicate that Hispanic offenders odds of receiving a judge-initiated departure 
declined significantly in the period following the decision, graphing the quarterly 
odds of judge-initiated departures was similarly non-supportive that the Booker 
decision alone has fundamentally changed how these departures are handed down 
with respect to ethnicity. 
 Finally, multilevel results presented in Chapter VIII, unlike the multilevel 
results presented in the other two results chapters, indicate that significant changes in 
the proportion of variance attributable to districts were evident for both government- 
and judge-initiated departures.  However, the same caveat regarding the 
Commission’s data collection casts some suspicion on this finding.  Other findings 
presented in Chapter VIII suggest the need to further explore the role played by 
contextual factors in immigration sentencing outcomes. 
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CHAPTER X: CONCLUSIONS 
 With a few exceptions, the results presented in the previous chapters find very 
little evidence of a “Booker effect” during the years examined.  When noticeable 
differences were found pre- to post-Booker, closer examination of quarterly trends 
often revealed that shifts occurred prior to Booker, during the PROTECT Act period.  
These findings are largely consistent with prior research, including work by the 
Commission, and they underscore the challenge of explaining why judges have 
largely continued to sentence according to the Guidelines even though they are now 
ostensibly re-afforded a tremendous amount of discretion.   
The first step toward understanding these findings is to consider whether the 
methodological approach employed may be masking Booker’s role.  However, it 
should again be emphasized that, due to the large sample sizes employed in the 
current work, tests of statistical significance are very sensitive to even small 
differences between groups. As such, one would expect that rejection of the null 
hypothesis would be more likely.  As Engen (2011:1142) points out, “the problem is 
not, as I have heard it described, that very large ‘Ns’ somehow produce significant 
differences or effects where none exist but that large Ns allow us to measure 
associations with great precision, thus increasing our confidence that the slope 
coefficients in our models were not obtained by chance (which is not a bad problem 
to have).  The consequence, however, is that even small associations achieve 
‘significance,’ and we often will reject the null hypothesis of no difference in slope 
coefficients obtained in two or more time periods, or across groups, even when those 
differences are small.”  Thus, it is perhaps more surprising that the models presented 
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in the current study, and in prior work, do not yield a greater number of significant 
differences between the pre- and post-Booker time periods. 
 Another possible methodological issue involves determining what time frame 
is appropriate for uncovering a “Booker effect.”  The current dissertation utilizes data 
from 2000 through 2008 to provide relatively equal pre- and post-Booker sample 
sizes.  However, many of the clarifications for Booker, including Kimbrough and 
Gall, were decided near the end of the study period, and it is likely that the effects of 
these clarifications were evident after the study period ended.  In fact, a recent report 
by the Commission (2012:3), points to these cases as a possible explanation for the 
fact that “unwarranted disparities in federal sentencing appear to be increasing.”  
Thus, additional years of data may be necessary to examine the true impact of 
Booker, which may have come much later than what was allowed for by the current 
dataset.  Of course, such analyses are further complicated by other changes – not just 
Supreme Court decisions - that have occurred since Booker.  Most notably, in the case 
of drug offenses, the Commission revised its Guidelines to deal with disparities in 
specific drug offenses in 2007, and President Obama signed the Fair Sentencing Act 
to further address disparities between crack and powder cocaine in 2010.  Due to such 
complications in drawing causal inference, it may be that an alternative 
methodological approach, such as a regression discontinuity design that is focused 
more closely on the periods immediately before and after the Supreme Court’s 
decision, would be better suited to more precisely determining Booker’s effects (see  
Starr and Rehavi, 2012). 
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 The current dissertation, and sentencing research more generally, is also 
limited by the variables that it can consider.  The SRA restricted the personal 
characteristics of offenders that could be incorporated into the Guidelines and 
captured in the Commission’s data, which means that it is not possible to control for 
socioeconomic status, family involvement, and other possibly relevant individual 
factors.  In addition, one possible proxy for socioeconomic status, type of defense 
attorney, is no longer captured in the data maintained by the Commission.   
Aside from these individual-level factors, federal sentencing research would 
benefit from the inclusion of a broader array of contextual factors than has typically 
been examined.  Though researchers, often using the focal concerns theoretical 
orientation, have given consideration to caseload pressure and other organizational 
factors, less attention has been paid to the role of prison crowding as a practical 
constraint considered by judges in making sentencing decisions. The Government 
Accountability Office (GAO, 2012) reported that, between 2006 and 2011, the 
Bureau of Prisons (BOP) increased capacity by approximately 8,300 beds, “but 
because of the population expansion, crowding (or population in excess of rated 
capacity) increased from 36 to 39 percent…BOP’s 2020 long-range capacity plan 
projects continued growth in the federal prison population from fiscal years 2012 
through 2020, with systemwide crowding exceeding 45 percent through 2018.”  
Because such system pressures are driven, in large part, by judicial decision making, 
future research should examine the extent to which judges’ sentencing decisions are, 
in turn, affected by burgeoning prison populations. 
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Characteristics of the judges themselves may also be influential in 
determining sentencing outcomes for offenders.  Though collected, judge-level data 
are not made publicly available by the Commission and therefore could not be 
considered in the current study.  Because prior research has demonstrated differences 
in outcomes based on interactions between the characteristics of judges and offenders, 
researchers should revisit these analyses if and when the Commission makes judge-
level data available.  At the same time, it is worth noting that researchers would not 
be able to glean judges’ motivations for continuing to sentence according to the 
Guidelines in the post-Booker era even if such data were made available.  Federal 
sentencing researchers should be mindful of prior criticisms of their overreliance on 
officially collected data (see Wellford, 2007) and make better use of qualitative data, 
including surveys and interviews with judges, to investigate how judicial attitudes and 
opinions – not just the characteristics of the districts where they sit on the bench – 
contextualize their decisions.   
 The current study’s findings with respect to immigration offenses are limited 
due to the fact that possible “Booker effects” in the use of departures for these cases 
are confounded by data issues surrounding the use of Early Disposition Program, or 
fast track, departures.  Given the dearth of research attention devoted to examining 
these offenses more generally, future research efforts should investigate how district-
level attitudes and population characteristics affect sentencing outcomes for 
immigration offenders therein.  In particular, the role played by large and increasing 
Hispanic populations should be investigated to determine whether immigration 
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offenders are treated more harshly when they represent a perceived ethnic group 
threat to the district in which they are sentenced.   
More generally, more research attention should be devoted to the PROTECT 
Act period, which has been given fairly limited consideration in the research 
literature.  The PROTECT Act was passed by Congress in 2003 and “not only 
repudiated the abuse-of-discretion standard of review announced in Koon but also 
specified that an appellate review of sentences would be de novo, directed the 
Commission to reduce requirements for non-guideline sentences, and directed 
prosecutors to resist downward departures” (Scott, 2011: 1134).  Scott (2011) cites 
prior research (Stith, 2008; USSC, 2003; 2006) as showing that judge-initiated 
downward departures dropped to 5% after the PROTECT Act was passed.  Yet, 
despite this dramatic change in federal sentencing policy and practice, most 
researchers have devoted little attention to the PROTECT Act period, other than as a 
period to which the post-Booker period may be compared.  The current work suggests 
that sentencing outcomes were dramatically different in the PROTECT Act period 
than in the periods leading up to or following it.  Accordingly, researchers wishing to 
better understand the impact of shifts in sentencing policy should more closely 
investigate what happened in the wake of the PROTECT Act. 
Researchers should also be mindful of the fact that the degree of disparity 
uncovered at the sentencing stage is likely much smaller in magnitude than what may 
be uncovered at earlier stages in the criminal justice system, where decision making is 
more hidden and has not been subject to dramatic reform efforts or intense, 
systematic scrutiny (Anderson, Kling, and Stith, 1999; Bushway and Piehl, 2001, 
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2007; Farabee, 1998; Kempf-Leonard and Sample, 2001).  Recent research (Rehavi 
and Starr, 2012; Starr and Rehavi, 2012) utilizes data from the U.S. Marshals’ 
Service, the Executive Office of the U.S. Attorneys, the Administrative Office of the 
U.S. Courts, and the United States Sentencing Commission and finds that longer 
sentences for black males were largely driven by initial charging decisions; in 
particular, prosecutors were twice as likely to file mandatory minimum charges 
against black offenders.  Starr and Rehavi (2012) also use a regression discontinuity 
analysis to investigate Booker’s immediate effects on sentencing, and they find that, 
though departures immediately increased, sentencing disparities did not; again, 
however, they found that blacks were more likely to be charged with mandatory 
minimums (and have longer average sentences).  They speculate that “prosecutors 
may have reacted to the Guidelines’ weakening by charging more harshly, and in 
particular by seeking to constrain judges with mandatory minimums instead” (Starr 
and Rehavi, 2012: 4).  However, their results suggest that this pattern was only 
temporary and that the use of mandatory minimums eventually returned to pre-
existing trends.  Future research should revisit and extend these findings, with 
particular attention paid to how Booker impacted charging decisions related to drug 
and immigration offenses. 
In addition to these directions for future research, there also exists a need to 
broaden the types of theories typically applied to sentencing research and to enhance 
those that are already being used.  In particular, more work is needed to explain why 
courtroom workgroups appear to have largely maintained the status quo even in the 
face of monumental changes to the rules governing the behavior of workgroup 
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members.  Commonly applied theories that account for organizational factors, 
including the focal concerns perspective, have not yet been extended to explain 
whether and how legal rulings such as Booker impact organizations and, ultimately, 
sentencing outcomes.  Perhaps Newton’s First Law of Motion – that objects at rest 
will stay at rest, and objects in motion will stay in motion, unless acted upon by an 
unbalanced force – is appropriate for explaining why there is so little evidence of 
district-level variation in sentencing outcomes, and for why these outcomes have 
largely remained consistent with prior trends, in the wake of Booker. 
 Finally, ten years after the Booker decision, policymakers still face the 
question of what should be done to prevent disparities in sentencing outcomes now 
that the Guidelines are advisory.  Paternoster (2011) critiques sentencing researchers 
who have taken part in this policy debate for rejecting a return to a mandatory 
Guidelines system (with ostensibly more uniformity) in favor of allowing judges to 
exercise greater discretion under an advisory system.  He believes “that at least part 
of the issue among federal sentencing scholars is that the mandatory guidelines were 
too severe for their taste and they fear any attempt to return to them” (Paternoster, 
2011: 1070).  At the same time, if much of the evidence points to the fact that judges 
continue to sentence in accordance with the Guidelines and that disparities have not 
dramatically increased, is a return to mandatory Guidelines really necessary (see also 
Albonetti, 2011; Ulmer et al., 2011)?  Perhaps the Commission’s own viewpoint is 
most instructive.  In their 2012 report on Booker, the Commission stopped short of 
advocating for a return to a mandatory system and instead outlined recommendations 
for improving the appellate process and for clarifying the extent to which judges 
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could consider some offender characteristics.  In addition, the Commission called on 
Congress to statutorily clarify how much weight should be given to the Guidelines, 
noting that the uncertainty caused by Supreme Court decisions subsequent to Booker 
may have opened the door for increased disparities.  Ultimately, it may be that more 
research is needed before a policy course is chosen.  As Scott (2011:1136) notes: “To 
move policy makers . . . evidence of a trend in race disparity will have to be robust 
and sustained.  So far, the race disparity research, standing alone, is insufficient to 








Apprendi v. New Jersey 2000 The Supreme Court ruled that, aside from a prior conviction, facts that lead to an aggravated sentence beyond 
a statutorily prescribed maximum must be decided by a jury using the “beyond a reasonable doubt” standard. 
Ring v. Arizona 2002 The Supreme Court ruled that the Arizona statute that allowed trial judges to determine whether the 
aggravating factors to impose death were present violated the Sixth Amendment since the aggravating factors 
acted as the “functional equivalent” of a greater offense.  Such aggravating factors should be decided by a 
jury. 
Blakely v. Washington 2004 The Supreme Court thus ruled that a judge’s application of an enhanced sentence under the Washington State 
guidelines violated the defendant’s Sixth Amendment right to a jury trial, as the defendant had not made 
admissions that supported the court's finding of this fact. 
United States v. Booker 2005 As in Blakely, the Court ruled in its "merits" opinion that facts (other than a prior conviction) that increase 
the offender's sentence beyond what is authorized by the Guidelines must be either provided by the 
defendant’s admission or proved beyond a reasonable doubt to a jury.  The Court’s “remedial” opinion 
excised the provisions of the Sentencing Reform Act that made the Guidelines mandatory and which outlined 
the grounds for appeal related to guideline departures. 
Gall v. United States 2007 The Supreme Court ruled that sentencing outside of the Guidelines was not necessarily "unreasonable." 
Kimbrough v. United 
States 
2007 The Court reaffirmed that the Guidelines are only one factor that judges should consider in determining a 
sentence and that the built-in disparity between crack and powder cocaine sentences in the Guidelines is a 
valid reason for judicial variation from the sentences prescribed by the Guidelines.   
Irizarry v. United States 2007 The Supreme Court reasoned that, because judges are now using the factors laid out in 18 U.S.C. §3553(b) in 
an advisory system, any resulting deviations from the Guidelines are not “departures” but “variances.”  





Table 2. Descriptive Summaries of Level 1 Variables 
 
Variables Coding Specifications Description 
  Dependent Variables     
     PRISDUM 1=Yes Dummy indicating receipt of prison sentence 
     SENTLOG Ln Months Natural log of the total prison sentence in months (capped at 470) 
     GOVDEP 1=Yes Dummy indicating receipt of government-initiated downward departure  
     DOWNDEP 1=Yes Dummy indicating receipt of judge-initiated downward departure 
  Independent Variables 
 
  
     BOOKPOST 
1=Post-Booker (01/12/05 or 
later) Dummy indicating sentencing period in reference to the Booker decision 
     RACE DUMMIES 3 Dummy Variables Dummies indicating defendant's race/ethnicity; white is the reference category 
     RACEMISS2 1=Missing  Dummy indicating that information on defendant's race/ethnicity is missing 
     AGE Years Defendant's age at time of offense 
     MALE 1=Male Dummy indicating defendant's sex 
     NONCITZ0 1=Not a U.S. citizen Dummy indicating that the defendant is not a U.S. citizen 
     CITMISS 1=Missing  Dummy indicating that the defendant's citizenship status is missing 
     DEPEND 1=One or more dependents Dummy indicating one or more dependents 
     DPENDMIS 1=Missing  Dummy indicating that information on dependents is missing 
     EDUCATION DUMMIES  3 Dummy Variables 
Dummies indicating educational level; high school graduate is the reference 
category 
     EDUCMISS 1=Missing  Dummy inidcating that information on defendant's education is missing 
     OFFENSE DUMMIES 6 Dummy Variables Dummies indicating offense type; property offense is the reference category 
     XCRHISSR Scale of 1 to 6 Defendant's final criminal history category as determined by the court 
     PRESUMPTIVE Months Adjusted minimum months of incarceration recommended by the Guidelines 
     TRIAL 1=Trial Dummy indicating conviction at bench or jury trial 
     DETAINED 1=Yes Dummy indicating presentence detention 
     DEPARTURE DUMMIES 3 Dummy Variables Dummy variables indicating presence of departure; No Departure is the reference 
     DEPMISS 1=Missing  Dummy variable indicating that information on departures is missing 
     DISTRICT DUMMIES 89 Dummy Variables Dummy variables for district in which offender was sentenced 
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Table 3. Descriptive Summaries of Level 2 Variables 
 
Independent Variables Coding Specifications Description 
     COURT SIZE Continuous Variable Average number of federal judgeships in the district, 2000-2008 
     DEPARTURE RATE Percentage Average percentage of departures per district, averaged over time 
     CASELOAD Continuous Variable Number of case filings per authorized judgeship, averaged over time 
     CASELOAD CHANGE Percentage Percentage change in filings per judgeship, averaged over time 
     RACIAL COMPOSITION Percentage Percentage of blacks per district, averaged over time 




Table 4. Level 1 Descriptive Statistics for Federal Criminal Cases (Excluding Immigration), FY2000-2008 
  Full Study 
Period Pre-Booker Post-Booker     
N=445,481 N=252,907 N=192,574     
Dependent variables Mean S.D. Mean S.D. Mean S.D. | t | 
     Incarceration .85 .35 .84 .37 .87 .34 26.84 * 
  (N=445,481) (N=252,907) (N=192,574)     
     Sentence Length 67.92 74.82 64.48 73.07 72.28 76.76 31.86 * 
     Sentence Length (Logged) 3.62 1.32 3.57 1.27 3.68 1.38 25.03 * 
  (N=377,889) (N=211,374) (N=166,515)     
     Government-Initiated Down. Departure .22 .42 .19 .39 .27 .44 56.74 * 
  (N=399,013) (N=221,986) (N=177,027)     
     Judge-Initiated Downward Departure  .16 .37 .16 .37 .16 .36 2.68 * 
  (N=399,013) (N=221,986) (N=177,027)     
Independent variables                 
     Booker decision .43 .50 -- -- -- -- --   
     White (reference category) .36 .48 .37 .48 .36 .48 9.43 * 
     Black .31 .46 .31 .46 .32 .47 4.05 * 
     Hispanic .25 .44 .25 .44 .25 .43 2.36   
     Other Race .05 .22 .04 .20 .06 .24 24.85 * 
     Race Information Missing .02 .13 .02 .14 .01 .12 13.64 * 
     Age of Defendant 34.99 11.16 34.65 11.09 35.44 11.24 23.31 * 
     Male .85 .36 .84 .37 .85 .36 10.01 * 
     Defendant is a Non-Citizen .20 .40 .20 .40 .20 .40 3.78 * 
     Citizenship Status Missing .02 .13 .02 .13 .02 .12 3.80 * 
     Offender has Dependents .59 .49 .59 .49 .60 .49 7.04 * 
     Information on Dependents Missing .04 .19 .04 .20 .04 .19 5.32 * 
     No High School Diploma .39 .49 .39 .49 .38 .49 5.03 * 
     High School Graduate (ref. category) .33 .47 .33 .47 .34 .47 6.13 * 
     Some College .19 .39 .19 .39 .18 .39 2.16   
     College Graduate .07 .25 .07 .25 .07 .25 1.48 
      Education Information Missing .03 .17 .03 .17 .03 .17 .17   
     Violent Offenses .05 .21 .05 .22 .04 .21 9.81 * 
     Property Offenses (reference category) .04 .20 .05 .22 .03 .18 27.93 * 
     Drug Offenses .49 .50 .50 .50 .48 .50 12.23 * 
     Fraud Offenses  .22 .41 .22 .42 .21 .41 11.52 * 
     Firearms Offenses .13 .34 .11 .32 .15 .36 40.54 * 
     Other Offenses .07 .25 .06 .24 .08 .27 19.35 * 
     Criminal History Category 2.31 1.72 2.24 1.68 2.39 1.77 28.22 * 
     Presumptive Guideline Length 68.42 80.52 64.07 77.95 74.13 83.44 41.41 * 
     Trial .05 .22 .05 .21 .05 .23 12.03 * 
     Presentence Detention .62 .49 .59 .49 .65 .48 43.57 * 
     Block of Departure Dummy Variables -- -- -- -- -- -- --   
     Block of District Dummy Variables -- -- -- -- -- -- --   
* p<.01 
      




Table 5. Logistic Regression Models for Incarceration Decision, Federal Criminal Cases (Excluding Immigration), FY2000-2008 
    Full Study Period Pre-Booker Post-Booker       
N=445,481 N=252,907 N=192,574   
 
  





     Constant -1.34 .04 -- ** -1.26 .05 -- ** -1.47 .07 -- * -- --   
     Booker Decision .02 .01 1.02   -- -- --   -- -- --   -- --   
     Black .04 .02 1.04 ** .04 .02 1.04 * .06 .03 1.06 * 1.59 .49   
     Hispanic .27 .02 1.31 ** .24 .03 1.27 ** .33 .03 1.39 ** 1.38 4.52 * 
     Other Race .05 .03 1.05   -.03 .04 .97   .17 .04 1.18 ** -5.00 13.88 ** 
     Age of Defendant -.01 .00 .99 ** -.01 .00 .99 ** -.01 .00 .99 ** 1.67 8.00 ** 
     Male .36 .01 1.44 ** .36 .02 1.43 ** .37 .02 1.45 ** 1.04 .25   
     Defendant is a Non-Citizen .78 .02 2.18 ** .70 .03 2.01 ** .91 .04 2.47 ** 1.29 21.51 ** 
     Offender has Dependents -.03 .01 .97 * -.04 .02 .96 ** -.01 .02 .99   .25 1.66   
     No High School Diploma .14 .02 1.15 ** .15 .02 1.17 ** .12 .03 1.13 ** .77 1.09   
     Some College .04 .16 1.04 * .04 .02 1.04   .03 .03 1.03   .64 .18   
     College Graduate .08 .02 1.08 ** .11 .03 1.12 ** .03 .03 1.03   .24 4.00 * 
     Violent Offenses .80 .04 2.23 ** .86 .06 2.36 ** .71 .07 2.03 ** .82 2.72   
     Drug Offenses .82 .03 2.27 ** .84 .03 2.32 ** .83 .04 2.30 ** .99 .02   
     Fraud Offenses  .72 .02 2.05 ** .73 .03 2.07 ** .72 .04 2.06 ** .99 .01   
     Firearms Offenses .83 .03 2.29 ** .86 .04 2.36 ** .79 .05 2.20 ** .91 1.46   
     Other Offenses .19 .03 1.21 ** .21 .03 1.24 ** .17 .04 1.19 ** .80 .61   
     Criminal History Category .35 .01 1.42 ** .36 .01 1.43 ** .35 .01 1.42 ** .97 .50   
     Presumptive Guideline Length .09 .00 1.10 ** .09 .00 1.09 ** .11 .00 1.11 ** 1.21 162.00 ** 
     Trial .78 .04 2.17 ** .84 .06 2.31 ** .68 .07 1.97 ** .81 3.25   
     Presentence Detention 1.41 .02 4.08 ** 1.47 .02 4.34 ** 1.34 .02 3.81 ** .91 16.62 ** 
     Government-Initiated Downward Departure -1.61 .02 .20 ** -1.59 .02 .20 ** -1.71 .03 .18 ** 1.07 9.65 ** 
     Judge-Initiated Downward Departure -1.22 .02 .30 ** -1.29 .02 .28 ** -1.14 .03 .32 ** .89 16.71 ** 
     Upward Departure 2.17 .14 8.74 ** 1.88 .19 6.54 ** 2.46 .19 11.66 ** 1.31 4.53 * 
     Block of District Dummy Variables -- -- --   -- -- --   -- -- --   -- --   
Reference Categories: White, Female, Citizen, High School Graduate, Property Offenses, No Departure 
     
  
**p<.01; *p<.05 
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Table 6. OLS Regression Models for Sentence Length (Logged) Decision, Federal Criminal Cases (Excluding Immigration), FY2000-2008 
  Full Study Period Pre-Booker Post-Booker     
N=377,889 N=211,374 N=166,515     
Independent Variables β S.E. Exp (β) β S.E. Exp (β) β S.E. Exp (β) z-score 
     Constant 1.56 .01 -- ** 1.56 .02 -- ** 1.57 .02 -- ** .06   
     Booker Decision .02 .00 1.02 ** -- -- --   -- -- --   --   
     Black -.03 .00 .97 ** -.02 .01 .98 ** -.03 .01 .97 ** -2.25 * 
     Hispanic -.01 .01 .99 ** -.01 .01 .99   -.01 .01 .99   -2.34 ** 
     Other Race -.05 .01 .95 ** .00 .01 1.00   -.08 .01 .93 ** -9.79 ** 
     Age of Defendant .00 .00 1.00 ** .00 .00 1.00 ** .00 .00 1.00 ** --   
     Male .28 .00 1.32 ** .29 .01 1.33 ** .28 .01 1.32 ** -.29   
     Defendant is a Non-Citizen -.07 .00 .93 ** -.08 .01 .92 ** -.06 .01 .94 ** 2.49 ** 
     Offender has Dependents .02 .00 1.02 ** .02 .00 1.02 ** .02 .01 1.02 ** -.68   
     No High School Diploma .00 .00 1.00   .00 .00 1.00   .00 .01 1.00   .00   
     Some College .00 .00 1.00   -.00 .01 1.00   .01 .01 1.01   11.95 ** 
     College Graduate .09 .01 1.09 ** .08 .01 1.08 ** .11 .01 1.11 ** 2.04 * 
     Violent Offenses .82 .01 2.26 ** .85 .01 2.35 ** .76 .02 2.14 ** -.63   
     Drug Offenses .82 .01 2.27 ** .84 .01 2.31 ** .80 .02 2.22 ** -.31   
     Fraud Offenses  .11 .01 1.12 ** .10 .01 1.11 ** .13 .02 1.13 ** 1.13   
     Firearms Offenses .64 .01 1.90 ** .66 .01 1.94 ** .62 .02 1.85 ** -.40   
     Other Offenses .39 .01 1.47 ** .36 .01 1.43 ** .41 .02 1.51 ** .82   
     Criminal History Category .05 .00 1.06 ** .06 .00 1.06 ** .05 .00 1.05 ** -4.91 ** 
     Presumptive Guideline Length .01 .00 1.01 ** .01 .00 1.01 ** .01 .00 1.01 ** --   
     Trial .10 .01 1.10 ** .13 .01 1.13 ** .06 .01 1.06 ** -5.37 ** 
     Presentence Detention .33 .00 1.40 ** .29 .00 1.34 ** .39 .01 1.48 ** 2.75 ** 
     Government-Initiated Downward Departure -.51 .00 .60 ** -.45 .01 .64 ** -.59 .01 .56 ** -2.45 ** 
     Judge-Initiated Downward Departure -.45 .00 .64 ** -.45 .01 .64 ** -.44 .01 .64 ** .14   
     Upward Departure .58 .01 1.79 ** .58 .02 1.79 ** .57 .02 1.78 ** -.09   
     Block of District Dummy Variables -- -- --   -- -- --   -- -- --   --   
Reference Categories: White, Female, Citizen, High School Graduate, Property Offenses, No Departure 
     **p<.01; *p<.05 





Table 7. Multinomial Logistic Regression Models for Departure Decision, Federal Criminal 
Cases (Excluding Immigration), FY2000-2008   
    Full Study Period 
    N=394,443 
    Government-Initiated Judge-Initiated 
  Independent Variables β S.E. Exp(β) β S.E. Exp(β) 
       Intercept 51.08 1.81 -- ** 27.64 1.90 -- ** 
       Booker Decision .58 .01 1.79 ** .20 .01 1.22 ** 
       Black -.30 .01 .74 ** -.18 .01 .83 ** 
       Hispanic -.36 .01 .70 ** -.08 .02 .92 ** 
       Other Race -- -- --   -- -- --   
       Age of Defendant -.00 .00 1.00 ** .00 .00 1.00 ** 
       Male -.39 .01 .68 ** -.47 .01 .63 ** 
       Defendant is a Non-Citizen -.07 .01 .94 ** -.05 .02 .95 ** 
       Offender has Dependents .07 .01 1.08 ** .00 .01 1.00   
       No High School Diploma -.10 .01 .91 ** -.04 .01 .97 ** 
       Some College .10 .01 1.11 ** .10 .01 1.10 ** 
       College Graduate .28 .02 1.32 ** .28 .02 1.32 ** 
       Violent Offenses -.14 .04 .87 ** .26 .04 1.29 ** 
       Drug Offenses 1.06 .03 2.88 ** .56 .03 1.75 ** 
       Fraud Offenses  .51 .03 1.66 ** .28 .03 1.32 ** 
       Firearms Offenses .11 .03 1.12 ** .39 .03 1.48 ** 
       Other Offenses .01 .04 1.01   .47 .03 1.59 ** 
       Criminal History Category -.07 .00 .93 ** -.03 .00 .97 ** 
       Presumptive Guideline Length .01 .00 1.01 ** .00 .00 1.00 ** 
       Trial -3.31 .05 .04 ** -.57 .02 .57 ** 
       Presentence Detention -.76 .01 .47 ** -.76 .01 .47 ** 
       Block of District Dummy Variables -- -- --   -- -- --   
  Reference Categories: White, Female, Citizen, High School Graduate, Property Offenses, No Departure 
**p<.01; *p<.05 




Independent Variables β S.E. β S.E. β S.E. β S.E.
   Intercept 34.06 2.46 -- ** 69.69 2.69 -- ** -- -- 2.29 2.38 -- 60.66 3.35 -- ** -- --
   Black -.28 .02 .76 ** -.31 .02 .74 ** 1.09 1.15 -.25 .02 .78 ** -.15 .02 .86 ** .60 14.31 **
   Hispanic -.38 .02 .69 ** -.31 .02 .73 ** .83 5.28 * -.11 .02 .90 ** -.17 .02 .85 ** 1.54 3.75
   Other Race -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- --
   Age of Defendant -.00 .00 1.00 ** -.01 .00 1.00 ** 5.00 12.50 ** .00 .00 1.00 ** .01 .00 1.01 ** 2.50 4.50 *
   Male -.35 .02 .71 ** -.44 .02 .64 ** 1.27 13.31 ** -.49 .02 .61 ** -.45 .02 .64 ** .92 2.09
   Defendant is a Non-Citizen -.13 .02 .88 ** -.03 .02 .97 .23 14.69 ** .03 .02 1.03 -.13 .02 .88 ** -4.61 26.53 **
   Offender has Dependents .06 .01 1.06 ** .09 .01 1.09 ** 1.52 2.66 .04 .01 1.05 ** -.04 .02 .96 ** -.93 17.16 **
   No High School Diploma -.10 .01 .90 ** -.10 .02 .91 ** .97 .02 -.02 .02 .99 -.06 .02 .95 ** 3.80 3.04
   Some College .10 .02 1.11 ** .10 .02 1.10 ** .95 .04 .11 .02 1.12 ** .08 .02 1.08 ** .69 1.52
   College Graduate .24 .03 1.27 ** .32 .03 1.38 ** 1.36 4.60 * .34 .03 1.41 ** .21 .03 1.23 ** .60 10.82 **
   Violent Offenses -.01 .05 .99 -.34 .06 .72 ** 33.50 17.32 ** .39 .05 1.47 ** .01 .06 1.01 .03 25.45 **
   Drug Offenses 1.12 .04 3.07 ** .94 .05 2.55 ** .83 8.82 ** .85 .04 2.33 ** .09 .05 1.09 .10 151.32 **
   Fraud Offenses .53 .04 1.69 ** .45 .05 1.56 ** .85 1.59 .42 .04 1.53 ** .02 .05 1.02 .04 42.90 **
   Firearms Offenses .13 .04 1.14 ** .05 .05 1.05 .34 1.66 .52 .05 1.68 ** .11 .05 1.12 * .21 38.83 **
   Other Offenses .14 .05 1.15 ** -.15 .06 .87 ** -1.01 15.56 ** .48 .05 1.61 ** .25 .05 1.29 ** .53 10.35 **
   Criminal History Category -.06 .00 .95 ** -.09 .00 .91 ** 1.65 40.50 ** -.02 .01 .99 ** -.06 .01 .95 ** 3.80 35.28 **
   Presump. Guideline Length .01 .00 1.01 ** .01 .00 1.01 ** 1.17 -- .00 .00 1.00 ** .00 .00 1.00 ** .75 --
   Trial -2.89 .06 .06 ** -3.83 .08 .02 ** 1.32 90.81 ** -1.32 .04 .27 ** -.06 .03 .94 * .05 690.95 **
   Presentence Detention -.76 .02 .47 ** -.74 .02 .48 ** .97 .83 -.68 .02 .51 ** -.87 .02 .42 ** 1.28 64.22 **
   Block of District Dummies -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- --
Reference Categories: White, Female, Citizen, High School Graduate, Property Offenses, No Departure
**p<.01; *p<.05
Table 8. Pre- and Post-Booker Multinomial Logistic Regression Models for Departure Decision, Federal Criminal Cases (Excluding Immigration), 
FY2000-2008
N=220,220 N=174,223 N=220,220 N=174,223






















Table 9. Level 2 Descriptive Statistics for Federal Criminal Cases (Excluding Immigration), FY 2000-
2008 
District-level Variables (n=90) Mean S.D. Min Max 
 District Size (2000-2008) 7.35 5.62 1.50 28.00 
 Caseload Pressure (2000-2008) 462.96 135.75 180.78 862.22 
      Caseload Pressure (2000-2004) 467.71 135.47 168.60 918.00 
      Caseload Pressure (2005-2008) 457.02 164.52 172.75 1267.50 
 Change in Caseload Pressure (2000-2008) 4.31 45.77 -41.38 335.63 
      Change in Caseload Pressure (2000-2004) 10.54 42.71 -31.92 355.76 
      Change in Caseload Pressure (2005-2008) -0.56 23.71 -44.72 131.27 
 Departure Rate (2000-2008) 34.27 10.64 13.79 66.96 
      Departure Rate (2000-2004) 34.32 10.54 14.01 67.13 
      Departure Rate (2005-2008) 34.20 10.83 13.25 66.73 
 Racial Composition (2000-2008) 9.69 12.29 0.07 70.19 
     Racial Composition (2000-2004) 9.64 12.49 0.05 71.17 
      Racial Composition (2005-2008) 9.75 12.10 0.10 68.96 
 Change in Racial Composition (2000-2008) 91.14 321.30 -24.65 2098.94 
      Change in Racial Composition (2000-2004) 40.77 162.10 -14.80 1027.83 
      Change in Racial Composition (2005-2008) 12.84 33.94 -10.31 221.04 
  
 
Table 10. Unconditional Multilevel Models,  Federal Criminal Cases (Excluding Immigration), FY2000-2008 
  
Incarceration Sentence Length 
Likelihood of Departure (vs. No Departure) 


















Variance .23 .21 .08 .09 .33 .47 .42 .36 
Intra-class Correlation 6.5% 6.1% 5.1% 4.6% 9.2% 12.6% 11.2% 10.0% 




Table 11. Conditional Multilevel Models, Federal Criminal Cases (Excluding Immigration) FY2000-2008
b S.D. b S.D. b S.D. b S.D.
District Size (2000-2008) .007 .01 .010 .01 -.000 .00 -.002 .00
Caseload Pressure† -.064 .04 -.004 .03 -.004 .01 .010 .01
Change in Caseload Pressure‡ .014 .01 -.004 .02 .001 .00 -.005 .01
Departure Rate‡ .072 .04 .046 .04 -.065 .01 ** -.057 .02 **
Racial Composition‡ .092 .03 ** .101 .03 ** .007 .01 .003 .01
Change in Racial Composition‡ .001 .00 -.001 .01 -.001 .00 * .002 .00
b S.D. b S.D. b S.D. b S.D.
District Size (2000-2008) -.002 .01 -.000 .01 .001 .01 .033 .01 **
Caseload Pressure† .067 .03 * .034 .02 .039 .05 -.131 .03 **
Change in Caseload Pressure‡ -.008 .01 -.012 .01 -.016 .01 .064 .02 **
Departure Rate‡ .498 .04 ** .614 .04 ** .555 .04 ** .400 .04 **
Racial Composition‡ .068 .02 ** .031 .02 -.011 .02 -.080 .03 *
Change in Racial Composition‡ .002 .00 -.038 .01 ** .003 .00 .009 .01
**p<.01; *p<.05
† 100 unit change
‡ 10% change
Pre-Booker Post-Booker Pre-Booker Post-Booker
N = 220,020 N = 174,223 N = 220,020 N = 174,223
N = 252,907 N = 192,574 N = 211,374 N = 166,515
Gov.-Initiated Departures Judge-Initiated Departures
Incarceration Sentence Length






Table 12. Summary of Support for Hypotheses   
Hypothesis Supported? 
H1: Incarceration and sentence length differences between whites and 
Hispanics will emerge as more time passes since the decision. No 
H2: Disparities between whites and minorities in the application of 
government- and judge-initiated departures will become more apparent with 
time. No 
H3: Inter-district variation in sentencing outcomes will increase significantly 
in the post-Booker era. No 
H4: Judges in districts characterized by heavy or increasing caseload pressure 
will hand down less punitive sentences in the post-Booker period. 
Limited 
support 
H5: Historical departure rates will influence the likelihood of individual 
departures in the post-Booker era. 
Limited 
support 
H6-8: Less favorable sentencing outcomes will be handed down in those 
districts in which blacks constitute a large or growing percentage of the 
population; the influence of district-level racial composition and growth will 





Table 13. Level 1 Descriptive Statistics for Drug Cases, FY2000-2008
Dependent variables Mean S.D. Mean S.D. Mean S.D.
     Incarceration .95 .22 .94 .23 .96 .20 14.62 *
     Sentence Length 79.10 75.93 75.94 75.21 83.36 76.69 22.10 *
     Sentence Length (Logged) 3.90 1.14 3.85 1.10 3.96 1.18 19.93 *
     Government-Initiated Downward Departure .16 .37 .14 .35 .18 .39 25.51 *
     Judge-Initiated Downward Departure .16 .37 .14 .34 .19 .39 30.96 *
Independent variables
     Booker  decision .42 .49 -- -- -- -- --
     Marijuana/Hashish (reference category) .27 .44 .29 .45 .24 .43 22.59 *
     Cocaine .19 .39 .19 .39 .20 .40 4.37 *
     Crack .16 .37 .16 .37 .17 .37 1.12
     Amphetamines .16 .36 .15 .35 .17 .38 17.41 *
     Opiates/Opioids .06 .25 .07 .25 .06 .24 6.78 *
     Psychedelics .02 .15 .03 .16 .02 .14 9.19 *
     Other Drug Types/ Paraphernalia .01 .08 .01 .08 .01 .07 2.31
     Multiple Drug Types .11 .31 .10 .30 .12 .33 18.67 *
     Drug Type Missing .02 .13 .02 .14 .02 .12 8.02 *
     Trafficking .96 .19 .96 .20 .97 .18 10.47 *
     Possession (reference category) .02 .15 .02 .15 .02 .13 11.55 *
     Communications Facility .02 .13 .02 .13 .02 .12 2.53
     White (reference category) .26 .44 .27 .44 .26 .44 5.42 *
     Black .30 .46 .30 .46 .31 .46 4.86 *
     Hispanic .38 .49 .39 .49 .38 .49 4.37 *
     Other Race .03 .18 .02 .15 .04 .20 23.23 *
     Race Information Missing .02 .13 .02 .14 .01 .11 13.65 *
     Age of Defendant 32.96 9.80 32.67 9.81 33.35 9.77 15.90 *
     Male .87 .34 .87 .34 .87 .33 4.39 *
     Defendant is a Non-Citizen .29 .45 .29 .46 .28 .45 4.49 *
     Citizenship Status Missing .01 .12 .02 .13 .01 .11 9.74 *
     Offender has Dependents .62 .48 .62 .49 .64 .48 9.89 *
     Information on Dependents Missing .04 .19 .04 .20 .03 .18 7.64 *
     No High School Diploma .48 .50 .49 .50 .48 .50 5.47 *
     High School Graduate (reference category) .32 .47 .31 .46 .33 .47 6.72 *
     Some College .14 .35 .14 .35 .15 .35 1.98
     College Graduate .03 .16 .03 .16 .03 .16 1.97
     Education Information Missing .03 .16 .03 .17 .02 .15 8.95 *
     Criminal History Category 2.23 1.66 2.17 1.61 2.32 1.72 21.48 *
     Presumptive Guideline Length 92.44 84.74 88.39 83.27 97.95 86.39 26.19 *
     Trial .04 .20 .04 .20 .04 .21 4.40 *
     Presentence Detention .74 .44 .71 .45 .77 .42 28.90 *
     Block of Departure Dummy Variables -- -- -- -- -- -- --
     Block of District Dummy Variables -- -- -- -- -- -- --
* p<.01









Table 14. Logistic Regression Models for Incarceration Decision, Drug Cases, FY2000-2008
Independent Variables β S.E. β S.E. β S.E.
     Constant -2.00 .08 -- ** -1.94 .10 -- ** -1.90 .14 -- ** -- --
     Booker Decision .20 .03 1.22 ** -- -- -- -- -- -- -- --
     Cocaine .30 .04 1.34 ** .31 .05 1.36 ** .24 .07 1.27 ** .77 .65
     Crack .36 .06 1.43 ** .42 .07 1.52 ** .17 .10 1.19 .41 4.14 *
     Amphetamines .37 .05 1.45 ** .42 .06 1.53 ** .17 .08 1.18 * .40 5.96 *
     Opiates/Opioids .14 .06 1.15 * .26 .07 1.29 ** -.02 .09 .99 -.06 5.27 *
     Psychedelics -.02 .06 .99 .03 .08 1.03 -.27 .12 .76 * -10.84 4.41 *
     Other Drug Types/ Paraphernalia -1.21 .08 .30 ** -1.36 .10 .26 ** -1.07 .13 .34 ** .79 3.08
     Multiple Drug Types .24 .06 1.27 ** .34 .07 1.41 ** .04 .09 1.04 .12 6.63 **
     Trafficking 2.43 .05 11.36 ** 2.61 .06 13.66 ** 2.10 .09 8.14 ** .80 22.91 **
     Communications Facility 1.43 .08 4.17 ** 1.64 .10 5.13 ** 1.07 .13 2.90 ** .65 12.22 **
     Black .17 .04 1.19 ** .24 .05 1.27 ** .06 .06 1.06 .24 5.04 *
     Hispanic .39 .04 1.48 ** .38 .05 1.46 ** .39 .07 1.48 ** 1.03 .02
     Other Race .09 .06 1.09 -.07 .09 .93 .27 .10 1.31 ** -3.66 6.73 **
     Age of Defendant -.00 .00 1.00 ** -.00 .00 1.00 -.01 .00 .99 ** -- 6.13 *
     Male .55 .03 1.74 ** .56 .04 1.76 ** .54 .05 1.71 ** .95 .19
     Defendant is a Non-Citizen 1.29 .05 3.65 ** 1.40 .06 4.06 ** 1.09 .08 2.98 ** .78 9.27 **
     Offender has Dependents .04 .03 1.04 .01 .03 1.01 .08 .05 1.08 9.75 1.54
     No High School Diploma .22 .03 1.25 ** .26 .04 1.29 ** .16 .05 1.18 ** .64 1.95
     Some College -.12 .03 .89 ** -.11 .04 .90 * -.10 .06 .90 .94 .01
     College Graduate -.25 .06 .78 ** -.26 .08 .77 ** -.22 .10 .81 * .83 .12
     Criminal History Category .32 .02 1.37 ** .31 .02 1.36 ** .34 .03 1.41 ** 1.10 .88
     Presumptive Guideline Length .04 .00 1.04 ** .04 .00 1.04 ** .06 .00 1.06 ** 1.71 312.50 **
     Trial .50 .14 1.66 ** .46 .17 1.58 ** .42 .24 1.53 .92 .02
     Presentence Detention 1.57 .03 4.78 ** 1.58 .04 4.87 ** 1.54 .05 4.67 ** .97 .41
     Government-Initiated Downward Departure -1.58 .03 .21 ** -1.65 .04 .19 ** -1.60 .06 .20 ** .97 .52
     Judge-Initiated Downward Departure -1.34 .04 .26 ** -1.42 .05 .24 ** -1.26 .07 .28 ** .88 4.10 *
     Upward Departure 2.07 .31 7.94 ** 2.14 .44 8.52 ** 2.15 .45 8.56 ** 1.00 .00
     Block of District Dummy Variables -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- --







Exp (β) Exp (β) Exp (β)
Full Study Period Pre-Booker Post-Booker
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Table 15. OLS Regression Models for Sentence Length (Logged) Decision, Drug Cases, FY2000-2008
Independent Variables β S.E. β S.E. β S.E.
     Constant .83 .02 -- ** .94 .02 -- ** .68 .03 -- ** -1.43
     Booker Decision .01 .00 1.01 ** -- -- -- -- -- -- --
     Cocaine .43 .01 1.54 ** .40 .01 1.49 ** .46 .01 1.58 ** 1.15
     Crack .45 .01 1.57 ** .44 .01 1.56 ** .45 .01 1.57 ** .20
     Amphetamines .49 .01 1.64 ** .46 .01 1.58 ** .52 .01 1.69 ** 1.00
     Opiates/Opioids .36 .01 1.44 ** .35 .01 1.42 ** .36 .01 1.43 ** .17
     Psychedelics .32 .01 1.38 ** .27 .01 1.31 ** .38 .02 1.46 ** 1.79 *
     Other Drug Types/ Paraphernalia -.38 .03 .69 ** -.37 .03 .69 ** -.37 .05 .69 ** -.01
     Multiple Drug Types .43 .01 1.54 ** .42 .01 1.52 ** .44 .01 1.55 ** .42
     Trafficking 1.58 .02 4.87 ** 1.54 .02 4.65 ** 1.62 .03 5.05 ** .24
     Communications Facility 1.42 .02 4.15 ** 1.44 .02 4.20 ** 1.36 .04 3.91 ** -.22
     Black .03 .01 1.03 ** .02 .01 1.02 ** .05 .01 1.05 ** 6.98 **
     Hispanic .04 .01 1.04 ** .04 .01 1.04 ** .05 .01 1.05 ** 1.11
     Other Race .02 .01 1.02 * .01 .01 1.01 .04 .02 1.04 ** 5.57 **
     Age of Defendant .00 .00 1.00 ** .00 .00 1.00 ** .00 .00 1.00 ** .00
     Male .20 .01 1.22 ** .19 .01 1.20 ** .21 .01 1.23 ** 1.02
     Defendant is a Non-Citizen -.01 .00 .99 ** -.03 .01 .97 ** .00 .01 1.00 14.19 **
     Offender has Dependents .04 .00 1.04 ** .03 .00 1.03 ** .04 .01 1.04 ** .89
     No High School Diploma -.00 .00 1.00 -.01 .00 .99 * .00 .01 1.00 18.65 **
     Some College -.02 .01 .98 ** -.01 .01 1.00 -.03 .01 .97 ** -9.41 **
     College Graduate -.04 .01 .97 ** -.03 .01 .97 * -.03 .02 .97 * -.36
     Criminal History Category .04 .00 1.04 ** .05 .00 1.05 ** .04 .00 1.04 ** -2.60 **
     Presumptive Guideline Length .01 .00 1.01 ** .01 .00 1.01 ** .01 .00 1.01 ** 2.97 **
     Trial .02 .01 1.02 ** .03 .01 1.03 ** -.00 .01 1.00 -10.54 **
     Presentence Detention .27 .00 1.31 ** .22 .01 1.24 ** .36 .01 1.43 ** 4.16 **
     Government-Initiated Downward Departure -.57 .00 .57 ** -.54 .01 .59 ** -.62 .01 .54 ** -1.38
     Judge-Initiated Downward Departure -.48 .01 .62 ** -.51 .01 .60 ** -.37 .01 .69 ** 2.87 **
     Upward Departure .45 .02 1.57 ** .52 .03 1.68 ** .40 .03 1.49 ** -1.01
     Block of District Dummy Variables -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- --
Ref. Categories: Marijuana/Hashish, Possession, White, Female, Citizen, High School Graduate, No Departure
**p<.01; *p<.05
Exp (β) Exp (β) Exp (β) z






Table 16. Multinomial Logistic Regression Models for Departure Decision, Drug Cases, FY2000-2008 
  Full Study Period 
    N=184,967 
    Government-Initiated Judge-Initiated 
  Independent Variables β S.E. Exp (β) β S.E. Exp (β) 
       Intercept -8.63 3.88 -- * -12.16 3.75 -- ** 
       Booker Decision .53 .01 1.70 ** .60 .01 1.82 ** 
       Cocaine .27 .08 1.31 ** .05 .09 1.05   
       Crack .12 .08 1.12   .02 .09 1.02   
       Amphetamines .22 .08 1.24 ** -.12 .09 .89   
       Opiates/Opioids .13 .13 1.14   -.09 .14 .91   
       Psychedelics .15 .20 1.16   .36 .19 1.44   
       Other Drug Types/ Paraphernalia .04 .16 1.04   -.35 .17 .70 * 
       Multiple Drug Types .11 .08 1.11   -.17 .09 .84 * 
       Trafficking -- -- --   -- -- --   
       Communications Facility -- -- --   -- -- --   
       Black -.09 .02 .92 ** -.17 .02 .84 ** 
       Hispanic -.14 .03 .87 ** -.08 .03 .92 ** 
       Other Race -- -- --   -- -- --   
       Age of Defendant -.00 .00 1.00   .01 .00 1.01 ** 
       Male -.26 .02 .77 ** -.32 .02 .73 ** 
       Defendant is a Non-Citizen .14 .03 1.15 ** -.10 .03 .91 ** 
       Offender has Dependents .16 .01 1.17 ** .01 .01 1.01   
       No High School Diploma -.08 .02 .92 ** -.04 .02 .96 * 
       Some College .08 .02 1.09 ** .03 .02 1.03   
       College Graduate .30 .02 1.34 ** .16 .02 1.17 ** 
       Criminal History Category -.12 .01 .89 ** -.08 .01 .92 ** 
       Presumptive Guideline Length .01 .00 1.01 ** .00 .00 1.00 ** 
       Trial -2.70 .06 .07 ** -.34 .03 .71 ** 
       Presentence Detention -.86 .02 .42 ** -.83 .02 .44 ** 
       Block of District Dummy Variables -- -- --   -- -- --   
  Ref. Categories: Marijuana/Hashish, Possession, White, Female, Citizen, High School Graduate, No Departure 
**p<.01; *p<.05 




Table 17. Pre- and Post-Booker  Multinomial Logistic Regression Models for Departure Decision, Drug Cases, FY2000-2008
Independent Variables β S.E. β S.E. β S.E. β S.E.
Intercept -31.76 5.40 -- ** 10.69 5.60 -- -- -- -29.57 5.27 -- ** 1.69 5.35 -- -- --
Cocaine .27 .13 1.30 * .23 .11 1.26 * .86 .05 .04 .12 1.04 .21 .12 1.23 5.57 .94
Crack .15 .13 1.16 .07 .11 1.07 .43 .26 -.04 .13 .96 .20 .12 1.23 -5.67 1.81
Amphetamines .34 .12 1.40 ** .10 .11 1.10 .28 2.21 -.13 .12 .88 -.03 .13 .97 .21 .35
Opiates/Opioids .15 .20 1.17 .10 .17 1.11 .66 .04 -.32 .21 .72 .18 .19 1.19 -.55 3.13
Psychedelics .22 .30 1.24 .02 .27 1.02 .09 .25 .22 .28 1.25 .58 .27 1.79 * 2.62 .87
Other Drug Types/ Paraphernalia .02 .24 1.02 .01 .21 1.01 .50 .00 -.30 .25 .74 -.28 .24 .75 .95 .00
Multiple Drug Types .10 .14 1.10 .05 .10 1.05 .48 .08 -.20 .14 .82 .02 .12 1.02 -.12 1.53
Trafficking -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- --
Communications Facility -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- --
Black -.10 .02 .90 ** -.07 .03 .93 ** .66 1.02 -.21 .03 .81 ** -.15 .02 .86 ** .70 3.20
Hispanic -.20 .04 .82 ** -.09 .04 .91 ** .46 4.63 * -.08 .04 .93 * -.10 .04 .90 ** 1.36 .30
Other Race -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- --
Age of Defendant -.00 .00 1.00 -.00 .00 1.00 -- .00 .01 .00 1.01 ** .01 .00 1.01 ** .83 .50
Male -.20 .03 .82 ** -.33 .03 .72 ** 1.65 11.84 ** -.35 .03 .71 ** -.29 .03 .75 ** .83 2.57
Defendant is a Non-Citizen .13 .04 1.14 ** .15 .04 1.17 ** 1.18 .24 -.02 .04 .98 -.19 .04 .83 ** 10.05 11.41 **
Offender has Dependents .10 .02 1.10 ** .22 .02 1.24 ** 2.28 18.61 ** .06 .02 1.06 ** -.02 .02 .98 -.29 7.03 **
No High School Diploma -.06 .03 .94 * -.10 .03 .91 ** 1.63 1.16 -.02 .03 .98 -.06 .03 .94 * 3.00 1.41
Some College .06 .03 1.06 * .11 .03 1.12 ** 1.85 1.85 .04 .03 1.04 .03 .03 1.03 .63 .17
College Graduate .24 .03 1.27 ** .36 .04 1.43 ** 1.52 6.54 * .20 .03 1.23 ** .12 .03 1.13 ** .61 2.94
Criminal History Category -.11 .01 .90 ** -.13 .01 .88 ** 1.20 4.94 * -.05 .01 .95 ** -.12 .01 .89 ** 2.27 43.11 **
Presumptive Guideline Length .01 .00 1.01 ** .01 .00 1.01 ** 1.20 .50 .00 .00 1.00 ** .00 .00 1.00 ** .50 2.00
Trial -2.20 .08 .11 ** -3.29 .11 .04 ** 1.49 68.31 ** -.91 .05 .40 ** .02 .04 1.02 -.02 227.36 **
Presentence Detention -.89 .02 .41 ** -.84 .02 .43 ** .94 2.17 -.77 .02 .46 ** -.89 .02 .41 ** 1.16 13.91 **
Block of District Dummies -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- --
Ref. Categories: Marijuana/Hashish, Possession, White, Female, Citizen, High School Graduate, No Departure
**p<.01; *p<.05
Government-Initiated Judge-Initiated












N=100,869 N=84,098 N=100,869 N=84,098




Table 18. Level 2 Descriptive Statistics for Drug Cases, FY 2000-2008 
  
District-level Variables (n=90) Mean S.D. Min Max 
District Size (2000-2008) 7.35 5.62 1.50 28.00 
Relative Drug Caseload (2000-2008) 39.66 9.69 19.86 65.18 
     Relative Drug Caseload (2000-2004) 39.80 9.74 19.99 64.82 
     Relative Drug Caseload (2005-2008) 39.48 9.65 19.70 65.62 
Change in Relative Drug Caseload (2000-2008) -2.35 15.91 -48.47 32.93 
     Change in Relative Drug Caseload (2000-2004) -3.00 86.98 -56.14 30.84 
     Change in Relative Drug Caseload (2005-2008) 0.71 3.04 -13.99 8.39 
Departure Rate (2000-2008) 34.27 10.64 13.79 66.96 
     Departure Rate (2000-2004) 34.32 10.54 14.01 67.13 
     Departure Rate (2005-2008) 34.20 10.83 13.25 66.73 
Racial Composition (2000-2008) 9.69 12.29 0.07 70.19 
     Racial Composition (2000-2004) 9.64 12.49 0.05 71.17 
     Racial Composition (2005-2008) 9.75 12.10 0.10 68.96 
Change in Racial Composition (2000-2008) 91.14 321.30 -24.65 2098.94 
     Change in Racial Composition (2000-2004) 40.77 162.10 -14.80 1027.83 
     Change in Racial Composition (2005-2008) 12.84 33.94 -10.31 221.04 
 
 
Table 19. Unconditional Multilevel Models,  Drug Cases, FY2000-2008
Pre-Booker Post-Booker Pre-Booker Post-Booker Pre-Booker Post-Booker Pre-Booker Post-Booker
Variance .55 .50 .13 .16 .25 .37 .30 .31
Intra-class Correlation 14.2% 13.1% 12.0% 11.8% 7.0% 10.1% 8.4% 8.6%
n 127,099 93,217 119,780 89,005 100,869 84,098 100,869 84,098
Incarceration Sentence Length






Table 20. Conditional Multilevel Models, Drug Cases, FY2000-2008
b S.D. b S.D. b S.D. b S.D.
District Size (2000-2008) .012 .01 .009 .01 -.005 .00 * -.006 .00
Relative Drug Caseload† -.926 .68 -.756 .69 -.187 .14 -.411 .22
Change in Relative Drug Caseload‡ -.068 .04 -.024 .23 .005 .01 .022 .06
Departure Rate‡ .093 .06 .000 .06 -.069 .01 ** -.069 .02 **
Racial Composition‡ .142 .07 * .126 .05 * -.007 .02 -.002 .03
Change in Racial Composition‡ .006 .00 * -.014 .03 -.001 .00 ** .006 .00
b S.D. b S.D. b S.D. b S.D.
District Size (2000-2008) .013 .01 * .019 .01 ** .001 .01 .019 .01 **
Relative Drug Caseload† .018 .46 -.469 .36 -.694 .41 -.330 .51
Change in Relative Drug Caseload‡ .044 .02 * .027 .10 .034 .02 -.091 .14
Departure Rate‡ .344 .04 ** .460 .04 ** .436 .04 ** .319 .05 **
Racial Composition‡ .011 .03 .018 .02 -.027 .03 -.073 .03 *
Change in Racial Composition‡ -.002 .00 -.003 .01 .003 .00 ** .010 .01
**p<.01; *p<.05
† 100 unit change
‡ 10% change
Incarceration Sentence Length
Pre-Booker Post-Booker Pre-Booker Post-Booker
N = 127,099 N = 93,217 N = 119,780 N = 89,005
Gov.-Initiated Departures Judge-Initiated Departures
Pre-Booker Post-Booker Pre-Booker Post-Booker




Table 21. Summary of Support for Hypotheses, Drug Offenses   
Hypothesis Supported? 
H9: Sentencing outcomes for crack will become more comparable to those 
found in cases involving powder cocaine in the post-Booker era. Limited 
H10: Disparities between whites and minorities in drug cases will decrease in 
the post-Booker era, particularly in more recent years of data. No 
H11-12: Judges in those districts characterized by heavy or increasing relative 
drug caseloads will grant favorable sentencing outcomes to drug offenders in 





Table 22. Level 1 Descriptive Statistics for Immigration Cases FY2000-2008
Dependent variables Mean S.D. Mean S.D. Mean S.D.
     Incarceration .96 .19 .96 .20 .97 .18 9.15 **
     Sentence Length 24.51 21.06 26.74 22.14 22.50 19.82 34.72 **
     Sentence Length (Logged) 2.76 1.07 2.9 1.03 2.66 1.09 35.55 **
     Government-Initiated Downward Departure .18 .38 .12 .32 .33 .47 85.78 **
     Judge-Initiated Downward Departure .23 .42 .26 .44 .10 .29 74.53 **
Independent variables
     Booker  decision .53 .50 -- -- -- -- --
     Hispanic .80 .40 .84 .37 .77 .42 29.99 **
     Age of Defendant 33.16 8.88 32.71 8.68 33.56 9.04 16.92 **
     Male .93 .25 .94 .24 .93 .26 6.85 **
     Defendant is a Non-Citizen .88 .33 .88 .33 .88 .33 .28
     Citizenship Status Missing .02 .13 .01 .12 .02 .14 7.28 **
     Offender has Dependents .59 .49 .60 .49 .58 .49 6.93 **
     Information on Dependents Missing .14 .35 .11 .32 .16 .37 26.44 **
     No High School Diploma .67 .47 .68 .47 .67 .47 5.91 **
     Criminal History Category 2.88 1.63 3.01 1.66 2.76 1.59 27.43 **
     Presumptive Guideline Length 25.63 23.13 28.26 24.22 23.24 21.82 38.47 **
     Trial .01 .11 .01 .11 .01 .11 2.02 *
     Presentence Detention .88 .33 .88 .33 .88 .33 .34
     Border District .73 .44 .71 .45 .75 .43 17.56 **
     Block of Departure Dummy Variables -- -- -- -- -- -- --
     Block of District Dummy Variables -- -- -- -- -- -- --
**p<.01; *p<.05











Table 23. OLS Regression Models for Sentence Length (Logged) Decision, Immigration Cases FY2000-2008 
      Full Study Period Pre-Booker Post-Booker     
N=118,253 N=56,065 N=62,188     
Independent Variables β S.E. Exp (β) β S.E. Exp (β) β S.E. Exp (β) z 
     Constant 1.23 .01 -- ** 1.40 .02 -- ** 1.10 .02 -- ** -1.28   
     Booker Decision -.02 .00 .98 ** -- -- --   -- -- --   --   
     Hispanic .18 .01 1.19 ** .04 .01 1.04 ** .22 .01 1.24 ** 9.51 ** 
     Age of Defendant .00 .00 1.00 ** .00 .00 1.00 ** .00 .00 1.00 ** --   
     Male .17 .01 1.19 ** .14 .01 1.15 ** .19 .01 1.21 ** 2.02 * 
     Defendant is a Non-Citizen -.20 .01 .82 ** -.14 .01 .87 ** -.22 .01 .80 ** -3.56 ** 
     Offender has Dependents .03 .00 1.03 ** .03 .01 1.03 ** .04 .01 1.04 ** 1.87 * 
     No High School Diploma .11 .00 1.12 ** .10 .01 1.11 ** .12 .01 1.13 ** 1.87 * 
     Criminal History Category .09 .00 1.09 ** .09 .00 1.09 ** .09 .00 1.09 ** .36   
     Presumptive Guideline Length .03 .00 1.03 ** .03 .00 1.03 ** .04 .00 1.04 ** --   
     Trial .04 .02 1.04 * .04 .02 1.04   .00 .02 1.00   -6.38 ** 
     Presentence Detention .10 .01 1.10 ** .05 .01 1.05 ** .15 .01 1.16 ** 6.45 ** 
     Government-Initiated Departure -.19 .01 .83 ** -.17 .01 .85 ** -.23 .01 .79 ** -3.04 ** 
     Judge-Initiated Downward Departure -.30 .01 .74 ** -.26 .01 .77 ** -.32 .01 .73 ** -1.46   
     Upward Departure .73 .02 2.08 ** .62 .04 1.86 ** .76 .02 2.13 ** .90   
     Border District .02 .00 1.02 ** .02 .01 1.02 ** .04 .01 1.04 ** 5.97 ** 
Reference Categories: Non-Hispanic, Female, Citizen, High School Diploma or Higher, No Departure 
     **p<.01; *p<.05 





Table 24. Multinomial Logistic Regression Models for Departure Decision, Immigration 
Cases, FY2000-2008 
  Full Study Period 
  N=106,302 
  Government-Initiated Judge-Initiated 
Independent Variables Β S.E. Exp(β) β S.E. Exp(β) 
     Intercept -1.67 .13 -- ** -1.45 .13 -- ** 
     Booker Decision 1.46 .04 4.32 ** .39 .04 1.48 ** 
     Hispanic -.09 .04 .91 * -.04 .04 .96   
     Age of Defendant -.01 .00 .99 ** -.00 .00 1.00   
     Male -.60 .08 .55 ** -.66 .08 .52 ** 
     Defendant is a Non-Citizen -.40 .08 .67 ** -.02 .08 .98   
     Offender has Dependents -.05 .04 .95 ** .09 .04 1.10 * 
     No High School Diploma -.19 .04 .83 ** -.10 .04 .90 * 
     Criminal History Category -.07 .01 .94 ** -.17 .01 .85 ** 
     Presumptive Guideline Length .03 .00 1.03 ** .03 .00 1.03 ** 
     Trial -2.39 .28 .09 ** -.82 .13 .44 ** 
     Presentence Detention -.38 .07 .69 ** -.40 .07 .67 ** 
     Border District  1.06 .05 2.90 ** 1.08 .04 2.94 ** 
Reference Categories: Non-Hispanic, Female, Citizen, High School Diploma or Higher 
 **p<.01; *p<.05 




Table 25. Pre- and Post-Booker Multinomial Logistic Regression Models for Departure Decision, Immigration Cases, FY2000-2008
Independent Variables β S.E. β S.E. β S.E. β S.E.
     Intercept -1.36 .21 -- ** -.35 .16 -- * -- -1.57 .19 -- ** -.99 .18 -- ** --
     Hispanic .02 .08 1.02 -.13 .05 .88 * -6.60 2.66 .06 .06 1.07 -.14 .06 .87 * -2.22 5.80 *
     Age of Defendant -.00 .00 1.00 -.01 .00 .99 ** 8.00 2.56 -.01 .00 .99 ** .01 .00 1.01 -.56 10.89 **
     Male -.65 .13 .52 ** -.59 .10 .56 ** .91 .13 -.55 .12 .57 ** -.75 .10 .47 ** 1.36 1.57
     Defendant is a Non-Citizen -.41 .12 .66 ** -.38 .10 .69 ** .92 .04 -.01 .12 .99 -.01 .12 .99 1.14 .00
     Offender has Dependents .19 .07 1.20 * -.17 .05 .85 ** -.90 15.82 ** -.01 .05 .99 .21 .06 1.23 ** -34.50 7.22 **
     No High School Diploma -.21 .07 .81 ** -.19 .05 .83 ** .89 .08 -.07 .06 .94 -.16 .06 .86 ** 2.31 1.23
     Criminal History Category -.25 .03 .78 ** .02 .02 1.02 -.09 80.95 ** -.16 .02 .85 ** -.17 .02 .84 ** 1.11 .36
     Presumptive Guideline Length .02 .00 1.02 ** .03 .00 1.03 ** 1.17 3.20 .03 .00 1.03 ** .03 .00 1.03 ** .85 12.50 **
     Trial -1.77 .37 .17 ** -2.85 .42 .06 ** 1.61 3.69 -1.16 .21 .31 ** -.49 .18 .61 ** .42 6.09 *
     Presentence Detention -.32 .12 .73 ** -.39 .09 .68 ** 1.23 .23 -.42 .11 .66 ** -.39 .11 .68 ** .93 .04
     Border District 1.35 .07 3.85 ** .82 .06 2.27 ** .61 31.42 ** 1.48 .06 4.40 ** .53 .07 1.70 ** .36 110.61 **
Reference Categories: Non-Hispanic, Female, Citizen, High School Diploma or Higher
**p<.01; *p<.05
Government-Initiated Judge-Initiated












N=51,306 N=54,996 N=51,306 N=54,996




Table 26. Level 2 Descriptive Statistics for Immigration Cases, FY2000-2008
District-level variables (n=90) Mean S.D. Min Max
District Size (2000-2008) 7.35 5.62 1.50 28.00
     Caseload pressure (2000-2008) 462.96 135.75 180.78 862.22
     Caseload pressure (2000-2004) 467.71 135.47 168.60 918.00
     Caseload pressure (2005-2008) 457.02 164.52 172.75 1267.50
Change in caseload pressure (2000-2008) 4.31 45.77 -41.38 335.63
     Change in caseload pressure (2000-2004) 10.54 42.71 -31.92 355.76
     Change in caseload pressure (2005-2008) -.56 23.71 -44.72 131.27
Departure Rate (2000-2008) 34.27 10.64 13.79 66.96
     Departure Rate (2000-2004) 34.32 10.54 14.01 67.13
     Departure Rate (2005-2008) 34.20 10.83 13.25 66.73  
 
 
Table 27. Unconditional Multilevel Models,  Immigration Cases, FY2000-2008
Pre-Booker Post-Booker Pre-Booker Post-Booker Pre-Booker Post-Booker
Variance .22 .36 .98 1.65 .94 .52
Intra-class Correlation 18.6% 26.1% 23.0% 33.4%* 22.3% 13.6%*
n 56,065 62,188 51,306 54,996 51,306 54,996
Sentence Length





Table 28. Conditional Multilevel Models, Immigration Cases, FY2000-2008
b S.D. b S.D.
District Size (2000-2008) .003 .00 .008 .00
Caseload Pressure† .022 .02 .014 .02
Change in Caseload Pressure‡ -.009 .00 ** -.007 .01
Departure Rate‡ .002 .02 -.014 .02
b S.D. b S.D. b S.D. b S.D.
District Size (2000-2008) -.013 .01 .002 .03 .002 .01 .017 .01
Caseload Pressure† .062 .09 .342 .11 ** -.048 .08 -.093 .06
Change in Caseload Pressure‡ -.004 .02 -.182 .06 ** .020 .03 .068 .03 *
Departure Rate‡ .589 .12 ** .731 .10 ** .585 .11 ** .357 .09 **
**p<.01; *p<.05
† 100 unit change
‡ 10% change
N = 51,306 N = 54,996 N = 51,306 N = 54,996
Incarceration
Pre-Booker Post-Booker
N = 56,065 N = 62,188
Gov.-Initiated Departure Judge-Initiated Departure
Pre-Booker Post-Booker Pre-Booker Post-Booker
 
 
Table 29. Summary of Support for Hypotheses, Immigration Offenses   
Hypothesis Supported? 
H13: Sanctions for immigration offenses will exhibit differences in the post-
Booker period.  Yes 
H14: Disparities in sentencing outcomes will be evident between non-
Hispanics and Hispanics in the post-Booker period, particularly in more recent 
years of data. Limited 
H15: Inter-district variation in sentencing outcomes for immigration offenses 



































































































































































































































































































































































































































































District Size (2000-2008) 1
Caseload Pressure (2000-2008) .36** 1
Caseload Pressure (2000-2004) .29** .92** 1
Caseload Pressure (2005-2008) .37** .91** .67** 1
Change in Caseload Pressure (2000-2008) .21* .37** .03 .66** 1
Change in Caseload Pressure (2000-2004) .03 .31** .35** .23* .32** 1
Change in Caseload Pressure (2005-2008) .23* .29** .03 .50** .82** .22** 1
Departure Rate (2000-2008) .14 .10 .06 .12 .04 -.03 .02 1
Departure Rate (2000-2004) .13 .10 .06 .12 .05 -.03 .02 1.0** 1
Departure Rate (2005-2008) .15 .10 .06 .12 .04 -.03 .02 1.0** .99** 1
Racial Composition (2000-2008) .11 -.03 .01 -.07 -.12 .00 -.05 -.05 -.05 -.04 1
Racial Composition (2000-2004) .11 -.03 .02 -.07 -.12 .01 -.05 -.05 -.05 -.04 1.0** 1
Racial Composition (2005-2008) .11 -.04 .00 -.08 -.11 -.01 -.04 -.05 -.05 -.04 1.0** 1.0** 1
Change in Racial Composition (2000-2008) -.11 -.11 -.14 -.06 .07 .05 -.03 -.12 .10 -.13 -.20 -.21** -.18 1
Change in Racial Composition (2000-2004) -.05 -.09 -.12 -.04 .06 .04 -.03 -.10 -.09 -.11 -.18 -.19 -.16 .97** 1
Change in Racial Composition (2005-2008) -.19 -.02 -.08 .05 .12 .12 -.07 -.01 .01 -.02 -.30** -.31** -.30** .39** .24* 1  
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APPENDIX C: DRUG CATEGORIZATION FOR DRUG OFFENSE MODELS 
 
Drug Category
Marijuana/Hashish Marijuana Hashish oil
Marijuana plant Tetrahydrocannabinol (organic)
Hashish Tetrahydrocannabinol (synthetic)
Cocaine Cocaine
Crack Crack / cokebase
Amphetamines Amphetamine Methamphetamine actual
Amphetamine actual Methamphetamine pre-cursor (2D1.11 cases)
Dextroamphetamine N-n-dimethylamphetamine





Opium Meperidine / Pethidine
3-methylfentanyl Methadone














LSD Dry psilcybin (mushrooms)
MDA Wet psilcybin (mushrooms)
MDEA Psilocin
MDMA / ecstasy Psilocybin
Mescaline TCP
Other Drug Types / Aminorex Phenmetrazine
Paraphernalia Codeine PHP
Fenethyline Prescription drugs and Schedule I/II depressants
Flunitrazepam Ritalin
Gamme Butyroleactone Schedule III substance
Gamm-hydroxybutyric acid Schedule IV substance
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